Since the times of the Vienna Circle in the early twentieth century, most philosophers have defined science’s epistemic aims in the interlinked concepts of explanation and understanding, laws, unity of science, and causes (IIT). Most theories relating to the above four concepts emphasize generality’s importance in science’s epistemic significance (Nov 2nd handout). This notion of generalization is linked to the underlying belief that science is reducible, and the collective body of sciences aim to be unified and to discover the broad laws of nature (Neurath 306). This unity-of-science view is sustained by the reducible nature of physics— an old science admired because of its logical and mathematical structure. However, the unity-of-science view clashes with the messier and newer sciences, such as biology. …show more content…
Using Philip Kitcher’s chapter “Scientific Significance,” this essay argues that the universalization of the unity-of-science approach to all sciences is problematic and confines our comprehension of science’s
The unificationist account of explanation and the notion of ad hoc-ness as posited by Popper are very similar concepts, but there is a nuance between the two that is worth explaining. Although both notions seem to show why we choose certain explanatory theories over others, they differ in that the model of unification shows us what type of theory we should accept, while Popper’s notion of ad hoc-ness shows us what type of theory to reject. Together, these concepts help us better understand the explanatory model of unification which leads us to a better understanding of why we are inclined to accept certain scientific theories over others. In this paper, I will attempt to show that falsifying theories based on Popper’s ad hoc-ness criteria strengthens the idea of unification by giving people a more specific way of eliminating competing scientific theories in search of the most unified one. First, I will briefly describe the unificationist account of explanation, then I will explain the idea of ad hoc-ness as laid out by Popper, and finally I will show how ad hoc-ness can be used to strengthen the account of unification by means of increasing its objectivity and by providing simpler explanations.
d. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. Is Science Autonomous? American Psychologist, 23, 70. Retrieved February 13, 2011, from http://journals.ohiolink.edu/ejc/article.cgi?issn=0003066x&issue=v23i0001&article=70_isa&search_term=%28title%3D%28is+science+autonomous%29%29 Messenger, E., Gooch, J., & Seyler, D. U. (2011). The 'Standard' of the 'Standard'. Arguing About Science -.
Since the mid-20th century, a central debate in the philosophy of science is the role of epistemic values when evaluating its bearing in scientific reasoning and method. In 1953, Richard Rudner published an influential article whose principal argument and title were “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments” (Rudner 1-6). Rudner proposed that non-epistemic values are characteristically required when making inductive assertions on the rationalization of scientific hypotheses. This paper aims to explore Rudner’s arguments and Isaac Levi’s critique on his claims. Through objections to Levi’s dispute for value free ideal and highlighting the importance of non-epistemic values within the tenets and model development and in science and engineering,
With the Scientific Revolution in full swing, Sir Isaac Newton became very interested in advanced science and philosophy. In fact, he...
Sir Popper's piece, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations," reaffirms the scientific methods currently in use. No scientific theory is ratified without serious consideration and careful observation. Science is the pursuit of what can be proven false and the resulting assumptions of what must be true.
Polkinghorne asserts that “scientists are motivated by the desire understand what is happening in the world.”(551, Polkinghorne). As a physicist himself, Polkinghorne understands the desire to understand the world, even shifting careers to become a priest to better his understanding. Science asks how things happen, and does not attempt to answer every question. Questions asking why go ignored, as if they are not necessary to fully understand the world and the life that lives here. Science alone
In the essay “Studies In the Logic of Explanation”, Carl Hempel attempts to break down scientific explanation into its fundamental components in pursuit of defining what it means to explain a phenomenon scientifically. In doing so, he proposes a set of rigorous criteria that he believes constitute a true explanation. He starts by separating an explanation “into two major constituents, the explanandum and the explanans” (136). The explanandum is the phenomenon that is to be explained, while the explanans represent a series of statements which “account for the phenomenon” (137). According to Hempel, the explanans can be further subdivided into particular antecedent conditions and certain general laws which can be combined in such a way to
The Deductive-Nomological (D-N) Model gives an account of explanation through its basic form, the Covering Law Model. The D-N Model asks the basic question “What is a scientific explanation?” The aim of this paper is to answer that question and further develop the definition of an explanation by problematizing the D-N Model’s account of explanation, providing a solution to one of those problems, and then further problematizing that solution. By examining the details of an example that the D-N Model explains well, we can see why this model was popular in the first place before describing two of its major problems. Then, by looking at Wesley Salmon’s account of scientific explanation, we can see just how problematic the flaws in the D-N Model
Moritz Schlick believed the all important attempts at establishing a theory of knowledge grow out of the doubt of the certainty of human knowledge. This problem originates in the wish for absolute certainty. A very important idea is the concept of "protocol statements", which are "...statements which express the facts with absolute simplicity, without any moulding, alteration, or addition, in whose elaboration every science consists, and which precede all knowing, every judgment regarding the world." (1) It makes no sense to speak of uncertain facts, only assertions and our knowledge can be uncertain. If we succeed therefore in expressing the raw facts in protocol statements without any contamination, these appear to be the absolutely indubitable starting points of all knowledge. They are again abandoned, but they constitute a firm basis "...to which all our cognitions owe whatever validity they may possess." (2) Math is stated indirectly into protocol statements which are resolved into definite protocol statements which one could formulate exactly, in principle, but with tremendous effort. Knowledge in life and science in some sense begins with confirmation of facts, and the protocol statements stand at the beginning of science. In the event that protocol statements would be distinguished by definite logical properties, structure, position in the system of science, and one would be confronted with the task of actually specifying these properties. We fin...
In general, there are two focus questions that lead the Popperian account of science: firstly, Popper asks how our (scientific) knowledge grows. Secondly, Popper faces an inductive problem, as he questions how science is able to discover universal laws through singular observations (Chalmers, 1999)
This essay will discuss differences in motives which have driven ancient and modern science, arguing that 17th century alterations of power structures led to the ultimate division between modern and ancient science and the eruption of modern science as it is today. Comparisons will be drawn regarding knowledge accessibility, prevailing philosophies and ideologies, and the relationship between science and the church.
Voltaire said “the perfect is the enemy of the good” (Voltaire 74). In striving for a perfect definition and application of scientific analysis, Karl Popper established an impractical and ineffective approach to science. In this paper, I will discuss the premises and principles behind Popper’s scientific method of critical rationalism. I will then explain where I believe his method succeeds, where it fails, and why I consider his method both impractical and ineffective. I will do so by first explaining his thoughts on science versus the status quo, then I will take the position that his approach is flawed and impractical, and lastly conclude with a commentary on why truth has to be flexible. My thesis is that in defining highly rigid parameters
Before Kuhn’s book was written, the commonly held position by scientists and philosophers of science, such as Mach and Otswald , about the structure of science; was that it involved linear progression as a result of an incremental accumulation of knowledge from the activities undertaken by members of the scientific community. They thought that as generations of scientists observed more and more, their understanding of a particular scientific fact would become better refined through an ever growing stockpile of facts, theories and methods. The aim of the historian of science would be to pin point the man and the moment in time a further discovery was made; whilst also describing the obstacles that inhibited scientific progression.
During the seventeenth century, the modern science of physics started to emerge and become a widespread tool used around the world. Many prominent people contributed to the build up of this fascinating field and managed to generally define it as the science of matter and energy and their interactions. However, as we know, physics is much more than that. It explains the world around us in every form imaginable. The study of physics is a fundamental science that helps the advancing knowledge of the natural world, technology and aids in the other sciences and in our economy. Without the field of physics, the world today would be a complete mystery, everything would be different because of the significance physics has on our life as individuals and as a society.
As the introduction prepared us for this, we can discern three different phases in the history of institutional development of science. If we put them in an order according to chronological interest that each phase has, we could say that the first one is the pre-science phase, the second is the science for gentlemen and the third is the phase of professional science. (Dr. Nedeva Maria, Lecture “The story of science”, 2006)