Ross's Discussion of Moral Epistemology in What Makes Right Acts Right?,

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In Ross's discussion of moral epistemology in What Makes Right Acts

Right?, he makes a number of claims for moral objectivity and a set of

prima facie duties. In Ross's view, these prima facie duties

should govern how we behave in every sort of moral situation. Much of

Ross's argument depends on this duties being innate and objective. This

paper will criticize Ross's claims, specifically on the grounds of the

existence and objectivity of these prima facie duties. I intend

to show that Ross's comparisons about prima facie duties and

mathematical axioms are baseless and false.

In order to criticize Ross's claims, we must first discuss exactly what

he says in What Makes Right Acts Right?. Ross claims that there

are some of self-evident, objective moral truths which should govern

the way we make decisions. These truths, or duties, should be considered

and applied in any situation that involves a moral decision. In a moral

dilemma, these duties must be analyzed and compared in order to find the

most applicable one. This correct duty is the one that must be

carried out in order to do good, or right. It is important

to note that in every moral dilemma, Ross says there is a correct

answer, even if we are unable to attain it.

Now, the crux of Ross's argument rests on his ideas regarding prima

facie duties. Ross states that these duties are ``part of the fundamental

nature of the universe'' as mathematical axioms are. I intend to show

that these mathematical axioms are just as arbitrarily defined as Ross's

prima facie duties. As an example, let us consider the Triangle

Sum Law (the sum of the interior angles of a triangle must sum to 180

degrees). Now, this is a fundamental axiom of geometry, but it is neither

...

... middle of paper ...

...ues (at least to rational persons)

evoke very different emotions and feelings than things like mathematical

facts. You may say that some are merely subscribing to these mathematical

facts and take them for granted. But surely, even those that subscribe

to some set of moral guiding principles (through organized religion or

a similar practice) may disagree with some of the proponents. It is the

grounds of moral disagreement which is detrimental to Ross's argument

here.

I hope to have shown that Ross's ideas about prima facie duties and

how they relate mathematical axioms are not sound. Neither axioms or

prima facie duties have a self-evident nature, which hurts Ross's ideas

of objectivity in these rules. Also, the state of moral disagreements and

consensus on moral issues seems to suggest that Ross was wrong about his ideas

regarding moral epistemology.

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