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how history and natural science relate
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In Cuvier’s introduction he discusses the essence of natural sciences as to “render sensible in all its parts the mutual influence of every being” (Cuvier, 4). Cuvier is able to show that natural history is an indispensible part of natural philosophy and can successfully unveil the laws of nature. In making this assertion Cuvier argues that natural history plays an equal and scientific role in uncovering the system of natural sciences when compared to more empirical methods such as dynamics or chemistry. These empirical forms are able to establish laws through calculation, or experiment where natural history relies on observation.
He shows that each of these forms are powerful in their own right but fail when attempting to explain all of natural science. Cuvier explains that each science addresses natural philosophy in an individual yet unified way. Each branch of science dissects a philosophical issue to arrive at a greater understanding. This is often done by experiment or dissecting it into parts and calculating their relationship and equilibrium. One cannot experiment in an open system without throwing off the dynamic, just as one cannot explain the through calculation the equilibrium in a vast and complicated system. The study of natural history cannot always dissect its subjects as does dynamics and chemistry because in their parts, the subjects no longer function. In these absences, natural history systematically observes and describes in order to fully understand general laws. While observation and description seem to be less scientific ways of understanding Cuvier argues that they have their place. Cuvier argues that this method must be systematic and natural.
While some such as John Ray argue that the re...
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... habitat. Through this process of observation and comparison one can arrive at a true philosophical understanding of nature. In combination with general laws of physics or chemistry, natural history helps to produce a coherent understanding of the system of nature.
Cuvier shows that a philosophical understanding of nature cannot be obtained by calculation, experimentation, or observation alone, each of these methods play an important role in coming up with general laws which govern nature. Natural history is not given the luxury of being able to dissect its subjects and still retain their function and therefore has to rely on observation. While observation may seem to be a less scientific means, if observations are compared, general rules and relationships can be deduced. Through the systematic use of comparison one can arrive at a natural philosophical truth.
ABSTRACT: Given the great historical distance between scientific explanation as Aristotle and Hempel saw it, I examine and appraise important similarities and differences between the two approaches, especially the inclination to take deduction itself as the very model of scientific knowledge. I argue that we have good reasons to reject this inclination.
Carl G. Hempel was of the most influential proponents of what is now regarded as the classic view of explanation in science. In his work, Philosophy of Natural Science, he created the deductive-nomological model which is the following account of scientific explanation, where an explanation is set out as a formalized argument. This is the principle format for works such as Aristotle’s Physica, Ptolemy’s Almagest, Newton’s Principia and Opticks, Franklin’s Electricity, Lavoisie’s Chemistry, and Lyell’s Geology. Thomas Kuhn calls these achievements Paradigms. Through these paradigms normal science developed. In Kuhn’s book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he argues that normal science in a way hinders the development of new phenomenon. He says that there must be a change in a paradigm to create a scientific revolution. Throughout this essay I will explain what Hempel’s model consists of and how it relates to Kuhn’s view.
(2) Kitcher, Philip, and Wesley C. Salmon, eds. Scientific Explanation. Vol. 13, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
According to Tomas Kuhn, “normal science means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (Pajares ). The achievements that Kuhn defines as paradigms help the scientific community develop a scientific method to resolve puzzles. Particular puzzles that paradigms fail to solve and eventually lead to paradigm shifts are called anomalies. Since Kuhn first introduces the relations of these three terms to philosophy of science in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” scientific communities have improved their understandings of science and society. By describing two different paradigms of Paley and Lamarck on organic change in the early nineteenth century, Kuhn’s paradigms can further demonstrate its efficient way to articulate scientific assumptions and understand the scientific change.
Before Kuhn’s book was written, the commonly held position by scientists and philosophers of science, such as Mach and Otswald , about the structure of science; was that it involved linear progression as a result of an incremental accumulation of knowledge from the activities undertaken by members of the scientific community. They thought that as generations of scientists observed more and more, their understanding of a particular scientific fact would become better refined through an ever growing stockpile of facts, theories and methods. The aim of the historian of science would be to pin point the man and the moment in time a further discovery was made; whilst also describing the obstacles that inhibited scientific progression.
We need theories that follow natural law, and references events observable in nature. To develop a theory that complements nature, we study nature and then extrapolate.
“Those who don’t know history are doomed to repeat it.” This famous quote from Edmund Burke is one that many of us are familiar with. In spite of this, many people disregard history, branding it as unimportant or irrelevant to modern-day situations. However, history is actually a quite important subject with a myriad of lessons to be learned for anybody to apply now and in the future. Additionally, history gives us much needed information about our past, keeping us from forgetting why our nations became the way they are. It allows us to draw parallels between modern events and past events to collect our best judgment and gives us the important knowledge of the origin of our modern world, giving extra credibility
The major difference between History and Human science is way in which the scientist uses tools while the historian uses facts and figures. Feyerabend explains that an allegory presented by the human scientist depends on egotism, ideals, and the perspective of other shape of knowledge, and are not enveloped by method, evidence, reason or argument (Anderson 259). There is a big debate to whether social science is actually a science. J.S.Mill believes that while we can justify and discover unpretentious regularities in the physical world, we can also explore the connections between actions thoughts through Mill’s Method on causation (Salmon). This allows us to interpret the change in human behavior over a period of time. Human science can become exact to physical science as human behavior can cause unknowable circumstances (Salmon).
Weinberg, Steven. 1992. Dreams of a Final Theory: The Search for the Fundamental Laws of Nature. New York: Pantheon Books.
Can philosophy and science have always learned from one another over the years? Philosophy tirelessly draws most of its ideologies from scientific discoveries, material for broad generalizations and to scientists it imparts world perception and methodological of pulses of its universal principles. On the other hand, a number of general guiding ideas, which lie at the foundation of the modern science were first enunciated through the perceptive force of physiology. In this paper, we analyze science and philosophy and how these two subjects relate, contradict one another and also how they help solve and interpret life issues.
History is a story told over time. It is a way of recreating the past so it can be studied in the present and re-interpreted for future generations. Since humans are the sole beneficiaries of history, it is important for us to know what the purpose of history is and how historians include their own perspective concerning historical events. The purpose and perspective of history is vital in order for individuals to realise how it would be almost impossible for us to live out our lives effectively if we had no knowledge of the past. Also, in order to gain a sound knowledge of the past, we have to understand the political, social and cultural aspects of the times we are studying.
After considering all the described points in this paper, it can be rightly said that there is a considerable difference between science and other types of knowledge.
Knowledge has a preliminary definition which is that it is justified true belief. Due to its dynamic nature, knowledge is subject to review and revision over time. Although, we may believe we have objective facts from various perceptions over time, such facts become re-interpreted in light of improved evidence, findings or technology and instigates new knowledge. This raises the questions, To what extent is knowledge provisional? and In what ways does the rise of new evidence give us a good reason to discard our old knowledge? This new knowledge can be gained in any of the different areas of knowledge, by considering the two areas of knowledge; History and Natural Sciences, I will be able to tackle these knowledge issues since they both offer more objective, yet regularly updated knowledge, which is crucial in order to explore this statement. I believe that rather than discarding knowledge we build upon it and in doing so access better knowledge, as well as getting closer to the truth.
W. V. O. Quine (1908-2000) did not conceive of philosophy as an activity separate from the general province of empirical science. His interest in science is not best described as a philosophy of science but as a set of reflections on the nature of science that is pursued with the same empirical spirit that animates scientific inquiry. Quine’s philosophy should then be seen as a systematic attempt to understand science from within the resources of science itself. This project investigates both the epistemological and ontological dimensions of scientific theorizing. Quine’s epistemological concern is to examine our successful acquisition of scientific theories, while his ontological interests focus on the further logical regimentation of that theory. He thus advocates what is more famously known as ‘naturalized epistemology’, which consists of his attempt to provide an improved scientific explanation of how we have developed elaborate scientific theories on the basis of meager sensory input. Quine further argues that the most general features of reality can be examined through the use of formal logic by clarifying what objects we must acknowledge as real given our acceptance of an overarching systematic view of the world. In pursuing these issues, Quine reformulates and thus transforms these philosophical concerns according to those standards of clarity, empirical adequacy, and utility that he takes as central to the explanatory power of empirical science. While few
Voltaire said “the perfect is the enemy of the good” (Voltaire 74). In striving for a perfect definition and application of scientific analysis, Karl Popper established an impractical and ineffective approach to science. In this paper, I will discuss the premises and principles behind Popper’s scientific method of critical rationalism. I will then explain where I believe his method succeeds, where it fails, and why I consider his method both impractical and ineffective. I will do so by first explaining his thoughts on science versus the status quo, then I will take the position that his approach is flawed and impractical, and lastly conclude with a commentary on why truth has to be flexible. My thesis is that in defining highly rigid parameters