In Schafer’s paper Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement, assessor relativism gives two options to someone participating in a disagreement. They can either “converge” with their opponent (agree) upon one belief, or refuse to converse with their opponent. Williams’ paper The Truth in Relativism argues for the idea of notional versus real confrontations. Williams’ idea of notional and real confrontation says someone participating in a disagreement can only convert to their opponent’s belief if and only if they are able to recognize this conversion as a real option. If there is no real option, then there is no real disagreement.
I will prove that notional confrontation is not analogous to refusing to take part in a conversation. First I will summarize both Schafer and Williams’ respective views. I will also explain three differences between the views. I will describe two particular cases where it might seem like notional confrontations are ways of refusing to take part in a conversation. I call them the Amish case and the alien case (Williams, Pg. 225). I will show how notional confrontations, that seem to be like Schafer’s assessor relativist resisting a conversation, are in some cases not actually notional confrontations. In other cases, I will show that notional confrontations are mistaken for resisting a conversation because they appear to be convergence, yet are actually conversions.
Schafer tries to determine what distinguishes moral disagreements from empirical disagreements. He proposes two options; either moral disagreement is not really disagreement, or they are disagreements but morality is somewhat objective (Schafer, Pg. 603). If we hold that moral disagreements are not real disagreements, like empi...
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...ms, is an objective question (Williams, Pg. 223).
This is the third and final difference between Schafer and Williams’ relativism. For Williams, it is neither sufficient, nor necessary that a peer in a moral disagreement want to convert to their opponent’s “system. For Schafer, it must at least be necessary that a peer in a moral disagreement want to converge with their opponent. The truth-value of the content of a proposition relies on the technical notion of truth, trues. Therefore, for two opponents to converge on a moral belief, they must both have the same conception of trues about that belief.
References
(1) Schafer, Karl. "Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement." The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50.4 (2012): 602-20. Web.
(2) Williams, Bernard. "The Truth in Relativism." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1975): 215-28. Web.
(1) Kelly, Thomas (2005). “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Eds. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pg.1 – 36.
Kraut, R 2014, ‘Aristotle's Ethics’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), .
According to Tännsjö (2007), we all have our own moral universes that consists of moral codes that are relevant only to our universe. In Wong’s account of Velleman, (2016), he states that in a relativist world we are each on our own moral islands, independent of everyone else’s rules and judgments. Moral relativism also includes the acceptance of both contradicting moralities possibly being correct (Tännsjö, 2007. Hugly & Sayward, 1985). For example, if one person from one moral universe believes that something is right, but another one believes that this same thing is wrong, moral relativism states that within their own contexts and beliefs this action could be justified as both wrong and right (Tännsjö, 2007). Moral relativism essentially argues that morality is formed through every individual’s own perception and shares very little between moral universes or moral
Gilbert Harman lays out his moral relativism theory with “inner judgments”, the statements concerned with “ought”, in Moral Relativism Defended. However, he assumes an important premise of his theory to be true, which is the reason that I will prove the missing premise – that moral relativism is true – in this paper. Moreover, his form of moral relativism with his “four-place predicate ‘Ought(A,D,C,M),’ which relates an agent A, a type of action D, considerations C, and motivating attitudes M,” has brought about both meta-ethical and practical concerns. He argues that these inner judgments are only possible if agent A acknowledges considerations of the circumstance C, invokes motivating attitudes M, and supports the action D with C and M. In
Moral relativism maintains that objective moral truth does not exist, and there need not be any contradiction in saying a single action is both moral and immoral depending on the relative vantage point of the judge. Moral relativism, by denying the existence of any absolute moral truths, both allows for differing moral opinions to exist and withholds assent to any moral position even if universally or nearly universally shared. Strictly speaking, moral relativism and only evaluates an action’s moral worth in the context of a particular group or perspective. The basic logical formulation for the moral relativist position states that different societies have empirically different moral codes that govern each respective society, and because there does not exist an objective moral standard of judgment, no society’s moral code possesses any special status or maintains any moral superiority over any other society’s moral code. The moral relativist concludes that cultures cannot evaluate or criticize other cultural perspectives in the absence of any objective standard of morality, essentially leveling all moral systems and limiting their scope to within a given society.
1. Conflicting views improve one’s moral reasoning, critical thinking, and mental dexterity, but difficult to accept because of their context and one’s cognitive dissonance (Dalton, Week 5).
American Philosophical Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1984): 227-36.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
There are many arguments for moral realism, one of which is presented by David Enoch, who posits a unique explanation of how normative truths can exist. He argues for moral realism by using his Indispensability Argument, which explains the necessity of normative facts in deliberation. I will argue that Enoch’s claim is valid in that it fairs well against opposition, however it shows weakness by not addressing moral subjectivity.
In this paper, I will argue that Kant provides us with a plausible account of morality. To demonstrate that, I will initially offer a main criticism of Kantian moral theory, through explaining Bernard Williams’ charge against it. I will look at his indulgent of the Kantian theory, and then clarify whether I find it objectionable. The second part, I will try to defend Kant’s theory.
The Web. https://sakai.luc.edu/access/content/group/PHIL_181_014_5296_1142/Readings/ROSS3.pdf>. The "Ethical Relativism" Ethical Relativism. Lander,. Web.
Moral relativism is the concept that people’s moral judgement can only goes as far a one person’s standpoint in a matter. Also, one person’s view on a particular subject carries no extra weight than another person. What I hope to prove in my thesis statement are inner judgements, moral disagreements, and science are what defend and define moral relativism.
Collins, H.M. 1981 Introduction: Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism, Social Studies of Science pp. 3-10
Rachels, J. (1986). The Challenge of Cultural Relativism. The elements of moral philosophy (pp. 20-36). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Gilbert, Allan H. "The Aristotelian Catharsis." The Philosophical Review 35.2 (1926): 301-14. Web. 5 Apr. 2014.