Comparing Dualism And Jackson's Knowledge Argument

The philosophical theory of dualism holds that mind and body are two separate entities. While dualism presupposes that the two ‘substances’ may interact, it contrasts physicalism by refusing to denote correlation between body and mind as proof of identity. Comparing the two theories, dualism’s invulnerable proof of the existence of qualia manages to evade arguments from physicalism. While a common argument against qualia—non-physical properties defined in Jackson’s Knowledge Argument—targets the unsound nature of epiphenomenalism, this claim is not fatal to the theory of dualism as it contains claims of causation and fails to stand resolute to the conceivability of philosophical zombies. This essay argues that epiphenomenalism, while often

Given the task of studying color in a monochromatic environment using a black-and-white television screen, Mary develops a complete physical knowledge of color vision. Upon release into the polychromatic, it is rational to believe that Mary will acquire some sort of knowledge. Thus, this implies that there is some sort of knowledge of color vision that Mary did not have prior to her release. Having known all the physical facts, it follows that non-physical facts must exist. These non-physical facts, defined by Jackson as qualia, are the subjective experiences of the individual. As Jackson states in his paper, analysis of the brain cannot reveal information regarding “the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise, or seeing the sky.” The perception of these non-physical experiences belongs to the individual. Once acquired, however, the perception of qualia has no impact on the physical

Adapted by Conee and, by some standards, Jackson later in his life, the argument of acquaintance affirms the existence of qualia. However, it places their significance on their interpretation and recognition by the brain. In opposition to this argument, I implore you to conceive of a human being with a body without a mind. This being would respond as other humans would in situations naturally accompanied by pain, happiness, or sadness. Regardless of the being’s ability to respond be reacting naturally to a qualia experience, this mimicry of a conscious being would be deceptive. Nevertheless, the being would continue to undergo events acknowledged by both physicalists and dualists as possessing qualia. The conceived “zombie” would be incapable of reacting to the experience of qualia consciously with a feeling of satisfaction as a conscious being would. While the assumption that such a creature could exist presupposes dualism to be valid, the ability of a human—possessing a mind—to have subjective experiences of qualia contrasts the inability of a purely physical zombie. It follows from this thought experiment that in order to experience qualia, a non-physical substance must be