INTRODUCTION
As the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks approaches, it is surprising and somewhat disconcerting that the United States is still struggling with how to employ strategic communication (SC). Many believe the main reason the US is losing the global war of ideas and the war on terror itself is directly related to its inability to effectively communicate and XX. Making gains in the war on terror will not come from kinetic actions alone. “In order to be successful, it’s important for our messages to be coordinated – quick and credible. They must speak to the conscience of people around the world.” Unfortunately, the U.S. military hasn’t been overly successful in this arena. There is much work to be done to improve SC efforts within the Department of Defense (DoD).
Operational leaders appreciate that SC is a critical element to achieving victory in current and future conflicts, but continue to struggle with how to employ SC given the lack of doctrine. A view across the combatant commands illustrates that “many different approaches to SC are being utilized, with uneven results. Processes are often quite different and integration into the planning process is not consistent.” Operational planners recognize SC is a necessary element of planning but are unsure how to plan for it.
Defense Department senior officials have determined that the employment of strategic communication is a means to achieving strategic ends. The most effective way to achieve noted strategic ends is through the utilization of Public Affairs (PA) as a strategic communication force multiplier. This paper examines the evolving nature of SC, reviews current joint doctrine to identify gaps in guidance, analyzes the efforts in execu...
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Effective planning is impossible without first understanding the problem. Commanders rely on personal observations, experiences, and input from others to develop understanding. They also prioritize information requests and incorporate additional information as those requests are answered. A complete understanding of the problem and environment builds the foundation for the operational process and ...
...at home. Based on the QDR Gen Casey writes the objectives memorandum to best support the defense of the United States and support the civil authorities at home.
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The ability to understand a problem, determine the desired end state, and develop a strategy to achieve that end state is a highly sought after skill in every facet of the military profession. However, in a joint setting, the problems are generally much more complex requiring an advanced mastery of problem solving from joint staff officers. The complexities of planning on the joint staff level stem from the amount of education it takes to simply understand the problem. Joint staff officers not only must understand the components and capabilities of their own service, they must also understand any service they might interact with to include the nine combatant commands. These demands put a heavy emphasis on joint professional military education before the joint staff officer shows up to their assignm...
The iterative process of operational design facilitated the change in the definition of the problem and the reframing of the operational approach that resulted in the surge that would eventually provide a more secure Iraq. This paper will evaluate the planning for the Iraq war and the subsequent reframing by General Petraeus.
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
“Operational design is a journey of discovery, not a destination.” Operational design provides a framework, with the guidance of the Joint Force Commander (JFC), that staffs and planning groups can use to give political leaders, commanders, and warfighters a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the problems and objectives for which military forces will be committed, or are planned to be committed. Furthermore, operational design supports commanders and planners to make sense of complicated operational environments (often with ill-structured or wicked problems), helps to analyze wicked problem, and devise an operational approach to solve the problem in the context of the operational environment.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
The Army has four types of military briefings which Soldiers present to their commanders, fellow staff members, and/or other military or nonmilitary personnel. The four types of briefings are: 1) Information Briefing; 2) Decision Briefing; 3) Mission Briefing; and 4) Staff Briefing. Each have a purpose, and will help you in accomplishing the intent of conducting the brief. Each military briefing has a set of steps that need to be followed in order to make sure that the intent of the type of brief you are using is met. The intent of this paper is to describe each of the military briefings, and outline each of the steps for each of the military briefings; information, decision, mission, and staff.
... improvements in the way the United States Armed Forces operate. The U.S. military consistently strives to provide facts to the public and face issues head-on to uphold the integrity of the U.S. Armed Forces, which is essential to adapting to operational commitments. It has always been essential to the United States Armed Forces to keep the world informed about situations and normal operations to prevent any speculations from unanswered questions. With the consistent development of mass media, the United States Armed Forces will continue to face negative issues, improve policies and uphold standards of the United States Armed Forces. Today’s mass media has increasingly affected the way the United States Armed Forces operates. The U.S military uses discrediting media connotation to systematically improve operations and training procedures within our Armed Forces.
In 1976 Rex Harlow tried to create a common definition for public relations, since he believed that the existing definitions “have been so diverse and conflicting,” and “they have failed to impress or satisfy” (Harlow, 1976, p. 34). He defines Public Relations
Q1. Grunig and Repper (1992) proposed a model of strategic management of public relations. Sung (2004) commented that the model emphasizes Public relations has a significant role in the process of an organization’s strategic management by identifying stakeholders, publics, and issues around the consequences facing the organization.
Yeomans, L. (2009) Internal communication, in Tench, R., and Yeomans, L. (2009) Exploring public relations, 2nd Ed., Financial Times/Prentice Hall, pp. 317-337