To the vast majority of people, the problem of other minds may seem inconsequential or non-existent; to some; however, the problem of other minds is a tantalizing dilemma. The problem of other minds asks how one can support the commonsense belief in the existence of other minded individuals against the general denial of other minds. A general denial of other minds requires an individual to wholeheartedly believe they are the only minded individual that exists and all others are simple automatons. The problem of other minds arises because any belief we have about another’s minds is drawn solely from observation and inference; and the information supplied by the senses cannot be proven accurate. Furthermore no amount of observation can reveal the conscious thought processes and experiences of another individual (and more importantly their mind) with the same clarity and understanding which we have toward our own minds. Consequently we must question what warrants our inferences and beliefs about the mindedness of other individuals? How can we truly know the individual sitting next to us in class, or on a plane, is a conscious, thinking person with their own beliefs and experiences? According to George Graham there are three main proposed explanations for the problem of other minds which fail to withstand critique (Logical Behaviorism, Humbling Disclosure, Arguments from Analogy), and one acceptable solution to the problem (The Inference to the Best Explanation).
Logical Behaviorism claims observation of intelligent peripheral behavior is the only way to draw inferences about other minds; in this way the observation of intelligent external behavior constitutes the entirety of the mind (minds are just peoples’ expressions and...
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...o hypotheses should be used. Network Criteria efficiently lumps Graham’s example of Mrs. T and the Flatworm together because, in the case of Mrs. T she possess a singular belief not established in a network of other beliefs. In the case of the Flatworm Network Criteria eliminates it from containing beliefs because of its complete lack of intelligence or even ability to tell the direction of stimuli. Network Criteria applies beliefs to more intelligent animals such as dogs and cats who’s actions can be explained by a network of beliefs. For instance a cat runs up a tree because it knew it was being chased by a dog and assumed the tree would provide safety. While the cat may not recognize the tree as a living organism or the dog as indeed a dog that does not mean it does not harbor beliefs but rather its beliefs are less complex than ones you and I may have.
Behaviorist identify mental states with dispositions. A mental state is identical when, given the same inputs the disposition toward a particular output in the same. Unlike functionalism, behaviorism recognizes dispositions according to merely outward behavior. Alternatively, a functional system includes a typical behavioral outputs given a range of inputs, as well as a tendency to experience a property of a mental state. Functionalists want to individuate mental states causally, but since mental states have mental effects, functionalist advance on behaviorism by acknowledging some similar input and output systems have similar descriptions without entailing similar mental effects. Functionalism, as an advancement of behaviorism, also describes the function of the mental state.
I will show that Kelly's response to the question of epistemic significance of peer disagreement is not compelling. In my explanation of Kelly's argument, I will show that it is contradictory of him to assert the first persons perspective and the right reasons view. I will then examine the third person perspective, and show that this is more compatible with the right reasons view. Nevertheless I will propose an objection in the form of a question. Specifically, why should the difference between first person and third person change my thinking skeptically? Would this view only be attractive from the third person view? The third person perspective, the right reasons view as Kelly explains it, plus what I will call external Validation of a belief makes a more compelling argument.
The skills typically required to development a theory of mind are minimal. It is important that a child first acquires the ability to view oneself and others as intentional agents, or individuals who cause things to happen to reach a desired goal, so that they can then be able to take the perspective of others and understand what their intentions are (Bjorklund, p.200). Now, although infants are not born with these abilities, they do develop them over time. How children come to appreciate that other people have beliefs and desires, often different from their own, that motivate their behavior, is assessed through what is known as the false-b...
Bertrand Russell expressed his belief on knowing other minds, in an article based primarily around the notion of ‘analogy’, meaning similar to or likeness of. His belief is that, "We are convinced that other people have thoughts and feelings that are qualitatively fairly similar to our own. We are not content to think that we know only the space-time structure of our friends’ minds, or their capacity for initiating causal chains that end in sensations of our own" (Russell 89). Russell speaks of the inner awareness, such as being able to observe the occurrences of such things as remembering, feeling pleasure and feeling pain from within our own minds’. This would then allow us to presume that other beings that have these abilities would then be that of having minds.
Fodor develops the idea of functionalism by combining certain parts of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory. From logical behaviorism, Fodor incorporates the idea that mental processes can be represented by physical if-then statements. As such, behavior and mental causation are no longer distinct and unable to interact. Also, logical behaviorism provides a way for mental causes to interact with other mental causes. This, in turn, may result in a behavioral effect. The last point is also a characteristic of the central-state identity theory. One doctrine of the central-state identity theory is called "token physicalism." Token physicalism states that all mental states that currently exist are neurophysiological. Thus, token physicalism does not place physical restrictions on the type of substance capable of having mental properties. When the points of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, as described here, are combined, functionalism is the result. The theory of functionalism supposes that a m...
In 1913 a new movement in psychology appeared, Behaviorism. “Introduced by John Broadus Watson when he published the classic article Psychology as the behaviorist views it.” Consequently, Behaviorism (also called the behaviorist approach) was the primary paradigm in psychology between 1920 to 1950 and is based on a number of underlying ‘rules’: Psychology should be seen as a science; Behaviorism is primarily concerned with observable behavior, as opposed to internal events, like thinking and emotion; People have no free will – a person’s environment determines their behavior; Behavior is the result of stimulus resulting in a response; and All behavior is learned from the environment. How we process these stimuli and learn from our surrounds
The problem I hope to expose in this paper is the lack of evidence in The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds supporting that A, a thought or feeling, is the only cause of B. Russell believes that there are other minds because he can see actions in others that are analogous to his own without thinking about them. He believes that all actions are caused by thoughts, but what happens when we have a reaction resulting as an action of something forced upon one’s self? Such as when a doctor hits your patellar tendon with a reflex hammer to test your knee-jerk reflex. Russell does not answer this question. He is only “highly probable” that we are to know other minds exist through his A is the cause of B postulate.
The minds of others are not known to us by acquaintance but by denoting phrases. We can then know the properties of other minds while not knowing the actual minds themselves, because we can know the constituents of the denoting phrases used to introduce them to us.
Humans have the capability to think for themselves and therefore can be aware of there own existence. In the first essay we studies, “From Skepticism to Conviction” by Rene Descartes, shows the basis of the human
Leslie, A. M. 1987. Pretense and representation: The origins of" theory of mind.” Psychological review, 94 (4), p. 412
Other issues under the cognitive theory are social and learning theories that are founded on the assumptions that humans make decisions based on logical evaluation of ideas. One of the strengths of the theory is in its recognition of humans as logical beings. It rejects behaviorism because the theory does not recognize the importance of logics in human reasoning.
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
The traditional notion that seeks to compare human minds, with all its intricacies and biochemical functions, to that of artificially programmed digital computers, is self-defeating and it should be discredited in dialogs regarding the theory of artificial intelligence. This traditional notion is akin to comparing, in crude terms, cars and aeroplanes or ice cream and cream cheese. Human mental states are caused by various behaviours of elements in the brain, and these behaviours in are adjudged by the biochemical composition of our brains, which are responsible for our thoughts and functions. When we discuss mental states of systems it is important to distinguish between human brains and that of any natural or artificial organisms which is said to have central processing systems (i.e. brains of chimpanzees, microchips etc.). Although various similarities may exist between those systems in terms of functions and behaviourism, the intrinsic intentionality within those systems differ extensively. Although it may not be possible to prove that whether or not mental states exist at all in systems other than our own, in this paper I will strive to present arguments that a machine that computes and responds to inputs does indeed have a state of mind, but one that does not necessarily result in a form of mentality. This paper will discuss how the states and intentionality of digital computers are different from the states of human brains and yet they are indeed states of a mind resulting from various functions in their central processing systems.
There are three types of behaviorism. The first, methodological is a normative theory about the scientific conduct of psychology. It claims that psychology should concern itself with the behavior of organisms and not with mental states or events or with constructing internal information processing accounts of behavior. ("Behaviorism," 2000) The second is psychological behaviorism. It explains human and animal behavior in terms of external physical stimuli, responses, learning histories and reinforcements. The last type is analytical or logical behaviorism. This theory has a philosophy about the meaning of mental terms and concepts. The idea of the mental state is the idea of behavioral tendencies that shows how a person behaves in one situation compared to another.
...ocesses which are distinct from observable behavioral responses. Acts such as thinking, remembering, perceiving, and willing are defined by behavioral actions and by dispositions to perform behavioral actions. However, Ryle criticises Behaviorist theory for being overly simplistic and mechanistic, just as he criticizes Cartesian theory for being overly simplistic and mechanistic. While Cartesian theory asserts that hidden mental processes cause the behavioral responses of the conscious individual, Behaviorism asserts that stimulus-response mechanisms cause the behavioral responses of the conscious individual. Ryle argues that both the Cartesian theory and the Behaviorist theory are too simplistic and mechanistic to enable us to fully understand the Concept of Mind.