The tenets of analytic functionalism worked well at attempting to align the philosophies of behaviorism and the identity theory, and though there are many objections to the theory’s method of formulaic definition of mental states, I find that analytic functionalism is a plausible theory that describes the mind. I find that in determining a means in which to define mental states, analytic functionalism demonstrates an ontological method in which one can characterize the mind using statements that can endure more rigor than “folk psychology” alone. I will argue this by first describing the progression into functionalism and the specifics behind analytic functionalism. I will then describe some of the prominent objections of functionalism including Ned Block’s “Nation of China Brain” argument , John Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument , and those that address the whether or not analytic functionalism falls under the realm of ontology. Beyond these arguments, I will provide my counterexamples for these claims and provide reasoning for analytical functionalism’s reasonable credibility as a proper philosophy of the mind. In the development of the philosophy of mind, many had come to rely on Descartes and his Meditations on First Philosophy. Dualism and the understanding of the causal relationship between the mental realm and the physical world had been widely accepted. Though, doubts had begun to sprout as considerations of the exclusivity of a person’s mental realm came into question. With developments in the field of psychology in the late 19th-century, Sigmund Freud had theorized on the idea that the mind is not always aware of its mental state and that humans tend to ignore or deny the underlying thoughts that are taking place under t... ... middle of paper ... ...s leaves analytic functionalism as a standing theory. Following this discussion, I find that analytic functionalism is a plausible theory of the mind because of its function as an ontological method for describing the characteristics and presence of the mental states. Works Cited Block, Ned. (1978). Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325. Searle, John. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417-457 Ryle, Gilbert. (1949). “Descartes’ Myth”, Chapter 1, The Concept of Mind, pp. 11-24 Smart, J.J.C. (1959). "Sensations and Brain Processes", Philosophical Review, 68, pp. 141-156. Putnam, Hilary. (1967). The nature of mental states. W.H. Capitan & D.D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. Pittsburgh University Press. Nagel, Thomas. (1974). The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4, pp.435-50.
Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psycho...
Fodor’s modularity thesis popularized faculty approaches to cognitive psychology. This theory bears a striking resemblance to the phenomenological theory that Merleau-Ponty proposed two decades earlier. Both theories employ a trichotomous functional architecture to explain cognition and view perception as a mid-level processing of information that lies between the world and consciousness. The key feature that differentiates the views is whether that middle level of processing is completely impenetrable by consciousness. If Fodor was to relax his strong position of the impenetrability of information in modules, modules could both be somewhat encapsulated and maintain a general independence from consciousness. Then only the degree of perception’s independance from consciousness would distinguish his theory from Merleau-Ponty’s. Currently, both theories can account for the substantive, outward, behavior of humans. Only the procedural behavior, the internal process, differentiates the theories. The conundrum of deciding between the theories is resolvable by an empirical critical experiment. While this will require more knowledge of cognitive psychology, current evidence suggests that Merleau-Ponty was correct and the mind is less encapsulated than Fodor's original claim.
Ned Block in Troubles with Functionalism offers his Absent Qualia Argument. The argument provides a counter example to functionalism. The essential aspect to the functional theory of mind defines mentality in terms of its functional states of a system. The functional states of a system match states according to their inputs, outputs, and internal states. Block’s counter example argues for the possibility of two systems to have the same functional states which determines their functional equivalence. In addition to functional equivalence, the two systems have distinguishable mental states. If functionalism is as adequate account of mentality, then functional equivalence entails mental state equivalence. Block argues against the consequent of
The first basis of Freud 's belief system was found in the existence of the personal unconscious. The mind is a substance that incorporates much more than the simple conscious component. The unconscious component is the much larger than the
This essay is going to describe in depth and detail the theories of Sigmund Freud's psycho dynamic approach. The strengths and weakness as an evaluation of Sigmund Freud's work. A summary and evaluation of the cognitive perspective as an alternative of human behaviour will also be identified in this essay.
Thirdly, some of Ned Blocks objections to the Higher Order Thought Theory will be considered and review in order to reaffirm the validity of the main argument. Block's objections will be taken as the main challenge to Rosenthal's HO theory....
Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying "Dr. Lux is hungry," one would say "If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it." The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeley’s representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.
Functionalism is a theory on the relationship between the mind and the brain. Functionalists argue that all psychological properties are multiple realizable. This means that not every psychological property has an identical physical property. For example, most functionalists agree that in the future, robots could potentially be functioning members of society. Although humans and robots are different physically, they could have a mental or psychological process tha...
With this notion, Clark and Chalmers try to establish an interactive cognitive link between humans and external entities, thus showing how it is the system between the two makes up the mind - both the internal and external components are vital parts of the mind. In this essay, I shall oppose this view by revealing firstly, a fallacy and Clark and Chal...
Sigmund Freud has been heralded as one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century. He is renowned for his discoveries about the human mind, particularly dreams, fantasies, and the role of the unconscious. Even though many of his theories were (and are) viewed as controversial, his ideas revolutionized the way people think about themselves. The potency of his notions have permeated almost every discipline, including literature, art, and medicine. This paper will examine the life, the influences, and the impact of Sigmund Freud. It will begin by discussing who he is, his personal history, and then talk about his role in the development of psychoanalysis. Next it will discuss some of the individuals who greatly inspired Freud. Finally, it will move on to talk about some of those upon whom Freud was an influence.
Wiley Backe, A. (2001). John Dewey and early Chicago functionalism. History of Psychology. 4(4), 323-340. Retrieved from PsycARTICLES 3, February 2010.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Functionalism is the doctrine that what makes something a thought, desire, pain (or any other type of mental state) depends not on its internal constitution, but solely on its function, or the role it plays, in the cognitive system of which it is a part. More precisely, functionalist theories take the identity of a mental state to be determined by its causal relations to sensory stimulations, other mental states, and
Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem (MBP). The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.
Functionalism, an early school of psychology, focuses on the acts and functions of the mind rather than its internal contents. Its most prominent American advocate is William James. William James is the author of ?The Principles of Psychology? a book that is considered to be one of the most important texts in modern psychology.