Collateralized Debt Obligation Case Study

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1. Origins and evolution of the US subprime mortgage market:
Subprime debts are loans that do not conform to the criteria for “prime” or “conforming” debts, and thus are expected to have a lower probability of full repayment. This assessment is usually made based on the borrower’s credit history and score, debt service-to-income (DTI) ratio, and/or loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. In the United States (US), borrowers with low credit scores, DTIs above 55 percent, and/or LTV ratio over 85 percent are likely to be considered subprime, reflecting the greater difficulty subprime borrowers have in making down-payments and the propensity of these borrowers to extract equity during refinancing. “Alt-A” loans fall into a gray area between prime and subprime …show more content…

2. Collateralized debt obligation (CDO) – Origins, benefits and risks
Traditionally, regulated depository institutions such as banks and savings and loan associations used their deposits to fund loans. Because these originators held the loans in their portfolios, they were also exposed to the credit risk, market risk from interest rate fluctuations, and the liquidity risk, giving them incentives to maintain credit quality of their loan portfolios.
To provide greater liquidity and fresh capital to these markets, GSEs bought mortgages from the originators, returning cash proceeds to them. By buying the loans and kept them as portfolio, GSEs also acquired the credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk. However, because they could borrow longer term than depository institutions, they were in a better position to deal with market and liquidity risks. The GSEs could better manage credit risk because they held a mortgage portfolio that was diversified nationwide, which even the largest banks then found difficult to do. Notably, they would only purchase prime …show more content…

Australian mortgage market:
In Australia, non-conforming loans are provided by a few specialist non-deposit taking lenders, with Pepper, Bluestone and Liberty Financial accounting for three-quarters of the market. This is in contrast to the U.S. where a wide range of financial institutions can originate subprime loans.
Non-conforming loans in Australia accounted for only about 1 percent of outstanding loans in 2007, compared to the 13 percent share in the U.S. The proportion of newly originated loans in Australia that are non-conforming has also been very low over in recent years, at about 1 to 2 percent, significantly less than the 21 percent share of subprime loans in the U.S. in 2006 (Debelle, 2008).
The interest rate applied to non-conforming loans in Australia is also lower than that of subprime debts in the U.S. All of the above points reflect differences in the features of non-conforming loans in Australia in comparison with subprime loans in the U.S.:
• Australian non-conforming debts are less risky than its equivalents in the U.S. On average, newly approved non-conforming loans only has LTV ratio of about 75 percent, well below the average LTV ratio of 85 percent on US subprime

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