Nonoriginalist Adjudication

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Nonoriginalist Adjudication: A Troubling Approach to Constitutional Interpretation In the 1980 law review, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding”, Paul Brest challenges traditional approaches to Constitutional interpretation by proposing non-originalist adjudication, a method that “accords the text and original history of the Constitution presumptive weight, but does not treat them as authoritative or binding” (p. 70). This method directly conflicts with originalism, the method of interpretation supported by Antonin Scalia, but generally agrees with semantic intentionalism, the approach proposed by Ronald Dworkin. The difference in the outcome of nonoriginalist interpretation is especially seen in cases involving morality and equality, for example, if applied hypothetically to the 1971 Supreme Court case, Roe v. Wade. The comparison of different approaches to Constitutional interpretation and the examination of the supposed legal outcome of nonoriginalist adjudication brings us to the realization that a method that allows the law to stray so far from the Constitution is truly dangerous to our traditional notion of government and threatens the stability of our Constitutional system. Nonoriginalism, Originalism, and Semantic Intentionalism Nonoriginalism and originalism, the approaches to constitutional interpretation put forth by Paul Brest and Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia contrast as much in philosophy as they do in name; nonoriginalism allows the interpreter to stray from the purview of the Constitution for the sake of social progress, while originalism holds the interpreter within the limits of the text, in order to preserve traditional values. To begin with, Scalia’s originalist understandi... ... middle of paper ... ...nstitution allowed by nonoriginalism. These may go unnoticed or at least unaddressed seemingly without consequence, until one day we may be shocked to realize that our Constitution and our traditional system of government have been trampled by the enormous weight of many overlooked intrusions by nonoriginalist interpretation. References Dworkin, R. (1996). Freedom's law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Madison, J. (1788). Federalist No. 51: "The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments." New York Packet. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980) Scalia, A., & Gutmann, A. (2001). A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law.. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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