Nature of the Case The Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence disputing that the Government was negligent in disclosing a purported promise of leniency made to Robert Taliento, their key witness in exchange for his testimony. At a hearing on this motion, the Assistant United States Attorney, DiPaola, who presented the case to the grand jury admitted that he promised the witness that he would not be prosecuted if he testified before the grand jury and at trial. The Assistant (Golden) who tried the case was unaware of the promise. The defendant seeks to overturn his conviction on the grounds that this non-disclosure was a violation of his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Facts …show more content…
The Government 's evidence at trial showed that in June 1966 officials at the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. discovered that Taliento, a teller at the bank, had cashed several forged money orders. When interviewed by FBI agents, he admitted furnished the petitioner with one of the bank 's customer signature cards which was used by Giglio to forge $2,300 in money orders; Taliento then processed these money orders through the regular channels of the bank. When Taliento related this information to the grand jury, the petitioner was indicted; thenceforth, he was named as a co-conspirator with the petitioner; however, he was not …show more content…
Holhan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). In Napue, the court had held that the same result occurs when the State although not soliciting false evidence allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. In Brady, the Supreme Court had held that irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution, suppression of material exculpatory evidence required a new trial. In Giglio 's case, the Court found that neither DiPaola 's authority nor his failure to inform his superior Hoey or his associate Golden was controlling. The Court held that, regardless of whether the failure to disclose was intentional or negligent, disclosing the information remained the obligation of the prosecutor in its position as spokesman for the government; ergo, a pledge made by one attorney on the case must be attributed to the
The defense the defendant raised was he had not monitored financial transactions within The Sommit Group and denied any knowledge of stolen money clients and government. He had admitted to guilt of not being fully aware of the financial transactions, but nothing more than that.
...om. The Court found Officer Flagg took and used against him, Gerald Gault’s confession without his parents or any counsel being present and never notifying the juvenile of his right to remain silent.
The Supreme Court used this evidence, and the fact that the pants and the blood had been transported to the crime lab in the same box, and that a vial and a quarter of autopsy blood were missing, to rule that, if known by the jury, could have created reasonable doubt (House V. Bell, 2006). This, along with the evidence, presented by House, that Mr. Muncey had a history of spousal abuse against Mrs. Muncey, and the fact that he had fabricated an alibi to cover his whereabouts for the time of the murder, could have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, had it been presented at trial (House v. Bell, 2006). It was with these facts in mind that the Supreme Court reached a final ruling in this case. The Court’s final ruling was that while House had not presented sufficient evidence to exonerate himself completely, he did present enough evidence to create the question of his actual guilt, and warranted a new trial (House v. Bell, 2006).
3. The court stated: "We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
On October 24th 1993 in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Robert Latimer was convicted of second degree murder for the intentional killing of his 12 year-old daughter, Tracy Latimer, who suffered a severe form of cerebral palsy since she was born. Tracy endured seizures five to six times a day, could not take pain medication because it would interfere with her epilepsy medication, and underwent painful surgeries throughout her life to stabilize her body weight and correct spinal abnormalities. Just weeks before her death, her doctors planned to surgically remove her hipbone, which had become dysfunctional as a result of a previous surgery and spinal complication, and would have taken at least a year of recovery and been extremely painful. Her father,
In this paper I’m going to discuss what is the 6th amendment right, the elements of ineffective counsel, how judges deem a person as ineffective counsel from an effective counsel, cases where defendants believed their counsel was ineffective and judges ruled them effective. I will also start by defining what is the 6th amendment right and stating the elements of an ineffective counsel. The 6th amendment is the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury if the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause if the accusation; to be confronted with the witness against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense (U.S. Constitution). There were two elements to ineffective assistance of counsel: a defendant must prove that his or her trial attorney/ lawyer performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the results of the proceeding would have been different (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 1984).
The Exclusionary Rule is a law passed by the United States Supreme Court. It demands that “any evidence obtained by police using methods that violate a person’s constitutional rights be excluded from use in a criminal prosecution against that person” (Ferdico, Fradella, and Totten, 2009). Before this rule, under common law, evidence was acknowledged in court as long as it satisfied evidentiary criteria for admissibility such as relevance and trustworthiness. Any evidence meeting these principles was admitted because it was considered to be helping to achieve justice. Under common law, evidence that was attained by illegal searches and seizures was allowed (Tinsley & Kinsella, 2003). During this period, the protections of the Fourth Amendment were unfilled words to persons condemned until 1914 in the case of Weeks v. United States.
Charles O. Bonet, a prosecutor told a co-defendant witness that charges against him would not be prosecuted if he took the stand and pled the Fifth Amendment when called to testify. The judge held an in hearing, during which co-defendant witness testified that the final deal was that Mr. Bonet would make the charges go away, if co-defendant witness took the stand and pleaded the Fifth Amendment. The jury found Mr. M guilty and the Court of Appeals upheld the decision. Mr. Bonet’s conduct ethic violation,
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth-Amendment to many American citizens and law makers is considered abstract. The complexity of this concept can easily be traced back to its beginning in which it lacked an easily identifiable principle. Since its commencement in 1789 the United States Judicial system has had a hard time interpreting and translating this vague amendment. In many cases the courts have gone out of their way to protect the freedoms of the accused. The use of three major Supreme Court disputes will show the lengths these Justices have gone through, in order to preserve the rights and civil liberties of three criminals, who were accused of heinous crimes and in some cases were supposed to face up to a lifetime in federal prison.
Issue 1: The right of an indigent defendant to appointed counsel is a fundamental right, crucial to a fair trial. Failure to make an attorney available to an indigent defendant is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Judge Leslie Tiller and Judge Simon Skinner serve on the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, respectively. Each judge has an involved history with Minnesota’s governor, Joyce Cooper. In this paper, I address whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause bars Skinner and Tiller from hearing two unique cases to which Cooper is a party: the Sierra Club Case and the Cooper Corruption Case. I address each of the two cases in two distinct parts of the paper, labeled II and III, respectively, and in part I, I detail the relevant facts that frame this question. Subheading each of those three parts is two additional subparts, A and B. In all sections, subpart A concerns Tiller
It is however important to note that there are times when the defendant can be tried for the same crime a second time by the same government without the government violating the Fifth Amendment which protects the defendant from double jeopardy. It is possible for a defendant for example to be tried by both the federal and the state government for the same crime or for other crimes that arise from events surrounding the original crime. Another scenario though very rare in occurrence is a situation whereby the jury may find the defendant guilty but the jud...
Procedural History: In 1987, the plaintiff, Michael Romano, was seeking declaration for the violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in his firing from his position as the facility advisor of an extra-curricular, school funded newspaper, The Crow’s Nest. The plaintiff stated his due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment rights was not provided to him as well. The defendant stated the termination of the plaintiff was due to the role he played in the releasing of the article and his First Amendment rights was not violated. The court rejected the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because of the third party standing of the plaintiff regarding his First Amendment rights and his Fourteenth Amendment right for due process contains factual issues that should be taken into consideration during a court or trial.
Richey, W. (2003). Can a Defendant Be Denied the Right To Confront Witnesses? Christian Science Monitor , 2.
"That in all capital or criminal Prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for Evidence and be admitted counsel in his Favor, and to a fair and speedy Trial by an impartial Jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, (except in the Government of the land and naval Forces in Time of actual war, Invasion or Rebellion) nor can he be compelled to give Evidence against himself. "