United States Armed Forces were able to accomplish their mission during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. However, there were quite a few deficiencies in the conduct of the first joint operation since Viet Nam. This paper will evaluate command and control during the operation using the attributes of commander’s intent, mutual trust and understanding. It will also evaluate the joint functions of intelligence, protection and fires.
Commander’s intent establishes a clear and concise expression of the operation and the desired end state. This intent binds understanding, the mission, and the direction to subordinate elements.
Although the invasion of Grenada was a success, there were problems with the commander’s intent. Since the contingency operation had a very short planning timeline, it appears elements of the commander’s intent were not clear. During the planning process, Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) was unable to design a suitable concept for the joint operation. Stewart postulated that the Command was neither trained nor manned to mount this type of operation as the Command’s main focus was to reinforce Europe after a Soviet attack.
There was also confusion over unity of command. Admiral McDonald, commander of LANTCOM, made two errors in command and control. He did not assign one his subordinate commanders to act as the overall director of ground forces no matter what the service and he did not select the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps as the leader of Army forces. The lack of a single commander meant that coordination between the Marines and the Army was minimal. The lack of a designated ground force commander and the omission of XVIII airborne Corps muddied the commander’s intent. The services would have been ...
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...AQ&usg=AFQjCNFIz4HQNnSs6HZIQunxtZDCoxiIRw (accessed December 24, 2013), p. 5.
Richard W. Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008), 32.
Ibid, 33-34.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), V-17.
Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 34-35.
Ibid, 34.
Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command White Paper”
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-1.
Ibid, III-20.
Ibid, III-21.
Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 32.
Ibid, 15.
Joint Operations, III-29-30.
Ibid, III-32.
Joint Operations, III-22.
Ibid, III-24.
Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 22.
Ibid, 24.
Mission Command as defined by the United States Army consists six distinct and critical principles. During World War II there were many examples of exemplary mission command that led to stunning victories for the Allies but also many examples of failure. The Battle for Arnhem or Operation Market-Garden was such a failure. Major General Robert Elliot Urquhart, the Commander of the 1st Airborne Division failed in not only in tactics but the ability to lead his division to victory. He did not completely misunderstand the principles of mission command, but four main areas in which he made critical mistakes were; Build a Cohesive Team Through Mutual Trust, Create a Shared Understanding, Accept Prudent Risk, and Exercise Disciplined Initiative.
Mission command is the commander's use of authority and direction to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It helps subordinates exercise disciplined initiative when operating within their commander’s intent. To facilitate effective mission command, commanders must accomplish four consecutive stages of the operations process. They must thoroughly understand the problem, visualize a solution that achieves a desired end state, and then accurately describe this visualization in order to direct the organization. Commanders continually lead and assess their organizations and provide input and influence to their subordinates and staff.
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
Global Security. 05 March 2011 < www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/desert_storm.htm>. ---. 06 March 2011 <www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/.../11ada-bde.htm>.
Commanders must be able to describe their operation visualization to staffs and subordinates. It fosters a working relationship and a shared understanding of the situation, mission and intent. Without description of mission command from the commander, a unit may not be able to accomplish their task or mission.
HQs, Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008.
Lucas, George. New Rules for New Wars. Rep. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Military Ethics and "Irregular Warfare" Web. 16 Apr. 2013. .
...all the mistakes that took place during Operation Urgent Fury, it showed that we need to continue to conduct joint training with all the other branches. The US won the battle in Grenada and showed the world that we can be ready within just hours and assault any needed target very fast. The American people gained a sense of confidence from this conflict and I’m sure that it was a big morale booster for the American Soldiers. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General John W Vessey, said “We planned the operation in a very short period of time--in about 48 hours. We planned it with insufficient intelligence for the type of operation we wanted to conduct. As a result we probably used more force than we needed to do the job, but the operation went reasonably well....Things did go wrong, but generally the operation was a success. The troops did very well”
On an evening in 1983 a truck bomb exploded near marine barracks in Lebanon at the Beirut National Airport thus causing the US invasion of Grenada (Lacey). This caught the US off guard and forced President Reagan to take action. The action would take place in Grenada not Lebanon. Grenada is a small island nation in the Caribbean Sea .Grenada’s problems started after a military coup took place in the country that allowed the N.J.M.P (New Jewel Movement Party), a corrupt government, to take control in the small island (Dupuy). This concerned many of the other Caribbean countries surrounding Grenada. On October 21st ,six small countries Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Antigua. These countries composed the organization of eastern Caribbean states had decided to take action and asked the US and Jamaica for help. The US agreed to help the small countries. President Reagan had approved to start operation Urgent Fury which would send troops to Grenada (Lacey). The US would have an advantage in the war and that would be new advancements in technology. One of the most useful and advanced technologies then was the night vision goggles which allowed US soldi...
Amid the snow-covered hills in the tiny village of Chipyong-Ni, Korea, a battle ridden 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division made a decisive stand from February 13-15, 1951 that would lead to the first operational win against a much stronger and larger force. In what some considered being the Gettysburg of the Korean War, the Battle of Chipyong-Ni was a bitterly contested engagement between the X Corp, 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, under the command of COL. Paul Freeman the North Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Communist Forces’ (CCF). This analysis will demonstrate that COL Paul Freemans’ ability to properly use mission command ultimately led to the first operational defeat of the enemy since the Korean War had started.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
The United States (1988). Army Field Manual 100-1, Washington, DC: Headquarters. Dept.
The most effective commanders through their leadership build cohesive teams. Mutual trust, shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk serve as just a few principles for mission command. Mutual trust is the foundation of any successful professional relationship that a commander shares with his staff and subordinates. The shared understanding of an operational environment functions, as the basis for the commander to effectively accomplish the mission. While my advice for the commander on what prudent risks to take may create more opportunities rather than accepting defeat. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate.
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.