In Thomas Nagel’s book, Mind and Cosmos, Nagel argues that physical sciences cannot provide a full picture of life. A few of his arguments are that consciousness is naturally assigned to the brain, [Nagel 35] materialist arguments denying the mind means that the premise is false, [Nagel 15] and lastly, high cognitive functioning such as thinking can only be performed by beings that have a mind. [Nagel 73] When it comes to the consciousness being assigned to the brain, Nagel states “Subjective appearances, on the other hand- how this physical world appears to human perception- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers.” (Nagel 35) What he means when he says this, is that the way we see the world isn’t objective; another being could see the world in a completely different way. The …show more content…
[Nagel 71] He also states that their existence cannot be explained by a physically reductive evolutionary theory. Nagel stated “Even in the wild, it isn’t just perception and operant conditioning that have survival value. The capacity to generalize from experience and allow these generalizations, or general expectations, to be confirmed or disconfirmed by subsequent experience is also adaptive. [Nagel 71] His argument can be summed up by saying that natural selection would favor creatures that have higher-level cognition. In addition to this, higher-level cognition warrants the need for a mind. While this sounds good, it doesn’t prove that high-level cognition causes or requires consciousness. It still leaves the possibility open for life to operate, just without an operator, perhaps similar to a computer that can be programmed to loop a task and still be operating without the
This paper briefly looked at the structure of Nagel’s overall argument and then outlined and analyzed the part of his argument where it seems inconsistent.
...what Richard Taylor might have already done. Nagel at no time in his essay made any strong points on the mind and brain being separate, but his points were built to disprove Taylor’s last point. Nagel’s statement about Martians being able to learn more about our brains than us allows us to reach the conclusion that at no point there is the necessity to believe that there is a soul or a mind separate from the body. What it proves is that science is still trying to better itself and cannot currently explain private psychological states or experiences, but that the mind is the brain and the brain is the body.
This very intricate nature of consciousness led reductionist to not adequately addressing the difference between mind and body. For Nagel, what makes consciousness or the mind so difficult to grasp is its subjectivity. In the article “ What is it like to be a bat?”, Nagel argues that although science allows us to understand certain attributes and of their behaviours, one simply understands what it would be like to be a bat from a human perspective. This understanding is thus flawed as it is subjective to individual’s preconceptions. Angel asserts that the subjective nature of the minds acts as a barrier to understanding what it is truly like to be anything, other than one’s self. This subjective theory does not simply apply to animals, Nagel gives the example of a blind individual, although constitutionally similar to an individual with sight, there is no way a blind person could perceive or understand what the experience of seeing colour entails. As one’s perception of colour is described in a subjective point of view. One cannot to any sufficient detail, objectively describe what it is like to experience anything, as all experiences as based on
An important precondition for Hegel's examination of the sensual is his caveat that sense-certainty must not use complex concepts of any kind to express that which it knows. In this sense, Hegel treats sense-certainty as the realm whose truth is expressed as pure being or ISNESS, as opposed to mediated forms that understand ISNESS in a wider context of meaning (Hegel, 91). By insisting on this limitation, Hegel treats sense-certainty as stripped down to bare assertions of sensual experience, allowing the phenomenologist to examine the sensual based solely on what it is capable of showing us on its own. Indeed, it is this litmus test of self-sufficient communication that sets the stage for Hegel to return sensuality to the universal conceptual framework that supports it once it has been seen to fail in its own right.
Thomas Nagel begins his collection of essays with a most intriguing discussion about death. Death being one of the most obviously important subjects of contemplation, Nagel takes an interesting approach as he tries to define the truth as to whether death is, or is not, a harm for that individual. Nagel does a brilliant job in attacking this issue from all sides and viewpoints, and it only makes sense that he does it this way in order to make his own observations more credible.
... sciences to be firm believers in organicism, the idea that the people were all part of a larger whole, a characteristic found in the hierarchy of all biological organisms. Another similarity they shared were their views that their current society was a compilation of the past and had evolved with the ever-changing needs of society and the individual’s quest for knowledge and truth.
In accordance to the argument from analogy, although an individual may experience the same sensations or feelings as I do, this does not mean that we share the same conscious experiences. For example, let’s consider the conscious experiences between a blind man and a man with normal eyesight who partake in the same routines and/or activities throughout their day. In this scenario, both men cannot claim that they know what it is like to be the other person based on their different experiences with their sense of vision. In other words, the man who has normal eyesight is usually able to understand what he is reading, eating, or doing at a certain time throughout his day. However, for the blind man, he does not have the ability to rely on his sense of vision in order to understand what activities he partakes in. Therefore, although both men have the ability to understand how each other’s senses work and/or feel, their experiences with vision, taste, smell, touch, and hearing can only be shared with themselves and no one else. For this reason, Nagel would say that both men could not know what it is like to be the other person because of the lack of prior knowledge, memories, or
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
In ?What is it like to be a bat??, Nagel attempts to distinguish between objective and subjective conscious experience. He begins his paper by explaining how ?consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem intractable? (p. 534) and why reductionists must use this in order to come to a true conclusion about the mind. He uses the ?what is it like to be a bat? example to support this argument because he wants to prove that the mind has a subjective aspect to it. However, this argument already begins with a flaw. This argument presupposes that a bat is a thinking, conscious being. He even states this prior to the bat example when he states ?Conscious experience is a widespread pheno...
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Arnold V. Miller, and J. N. Findlay. Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford [England: Clarendon, 1977. Print.
Nagel looks at life from two perspectives—internal and external. In his opinion, life is only meaningful from an internal subjective standpoint in which we can explain the reasons behind what we do in life. For instance, we can say that we go to school to get smarter, or we apply for jobs to earn more money for the family. In this way, we can attribute meaning to most of the everyday events that occur in our lives. Nagel categorizes this as meaning within a life because we internally and subjectively assign meaning to the activities in our lives. H...
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that Materialism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality.