Corporate Buybacks Case Study

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Market Failure in Corporate Buybacks In recent years, American CEOs at S&P 500 corporations have taken up a particular practice—with startling consistency. Through the use of “corporate buybacks”, or purchasing outstanding shares of a company’s own stock, CEOs and their board members have artificially boosted share prices. This increases the value of the stock for shareholders, and particularly for those who conduct the practice, who often receive a large portion of their compensation in company stock. Yet, their gain comes at a cost: rather than investing back in their workers or services, firms have inflated stock prices with nothing more than hocus pocus. Research and development—a key component in driving innovation and long-term economic …show more content…

Firms, in his view, cannot always resolve interpersonal encroachments on liberty. Coase leaves open the possibility for government intervention under three conditions: when administrative costs are too high, an issue implicates a “vast number of people”, or no “single firm” can resolve the dilemma. Governments—through statutes, court systems, administrative agencies, decrees, or regulations—can force change and inflict penalties for disobedience. That is where the conventional view on dealing with externalities comes in, pioneered by Arthur Pigou: deploy taxes to best account for social costs. In the case of a cattle rancher whose cows destroy the crops of neighboring farmer, Pigou would suggest taxing the rancher to stop the impropriety. However, Coase would rebut this point, saying that unless the rancher was blatantly negligent, the farmer should pay the rancher to control his livestock in a private settlement. Under a mutually beneficial agreement, the farmer would pay a settlement above the marginal utility of the excess cows, averting the damages to his own …show more content…

Market failure, to start, has been investigated heavily by Francis Bator. As he writes, “[market failure is] the failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain desirable activities or to estop “undesirable” activities,” determined through the maximization of welfare. Essentially, efficiency drives corner cutting, and corner cutting drives myopia. Sometimes, the long-term impact of a private transaction or contract does not take into account the long-term results or side effects on people who are not directly involved in the exchange. Bator begs the question: Will a “decentralized price-market game…sustain a Pareto-efficient configuration”? In other words, does the price system truly encompass all of the effects of a good or service, or does it leave gaps? Economists Marshall and Pigou would answer in the negative and suggest the following: “harmonize private production decisions with public welfare, tax the latter set of industries and subsidize the former.” For the example of corporate buybacks, the setup of CEO compensation within firms is much to blame. Companies usually tie a portion of an executive’s pay to stock options, as a way of adding skin in the game. Not unsurprisingly, the average CEO had roughly a third of his or her pay come in the form of stock options in recent years. Coupled with their

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