Under long-term community recovery options, after a disaster the federal government has possibilities of conducting and allowing mitigation processes to ensure compensation for the affected victims. The government has various departments responsible for the mitigation process after a calamity (Roberts, 2007). FEMA, DHS together with the Department of Commerce are responsible for mitigation after a disaster occurs. The main function of the departments as directed by Stafford’s Act is it should ensure that there is social and economic impact assessment activity after the occurrence of a calamity (Roberts, 2007). In addition, the federal government should be responsible for preparing mitigation analysis and implementing the mitigation program.
Assignment 2; IA programs for controlling effects of hurricane Katrina
To ensure that citizens have been taken care of, the federal government formed a commission that would have looked into the plights of the affected victims together with the affected government officials (FEMA, 2011). The intentions of forming FEMA were to make sure the government distributed all the intended support materials that would have alleviated risk to the involved citizens. It also wanted to help residents attain the much needed disaster management by creating a foundation of transformation (FEMA, 2011). Using the group, FEMA helped the local authorities in the management and control of land use as stipulated in the local charters. The intentions of the planning programs were to ensure th...
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...o the fact that it has entered into partnerships with a number of organizations (NVOAD, 2011). The organization has signed partnership contracts with the government; the other organizations involved in the relationship are corporations, foundations and other non-profit organizations (NVOAD, 2011)
Works Cited
FEMA. (2011, Apr 11). Robert T. Stafford disaster relief and emergency assistance act (public law 93-288) as amended. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/about/stafact.shtm
NVOAD. (2011, Jul 26). NVOAD partnership policy. Retrieved from http://www.nvoad.org/partners/pp
Roberts, P. (2007, Feb 14). FEMA after katrina, hoover institution policy review. Retrieved from http://www.policyreview.org/137/roberts.html.
U S, Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2007, May). National response plan. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nrp.pdf
Royer, Jordan. “Hurricane Sandy and the importance of being FEMA”, Crosscut.com, Crosscut.com, Web. 1 Nov 2012, 3 May 2014.
Mitigation: Measures taken to lessen the consequences of disaster events upon our citizens and our
Even though it is the responsibility of the federal and state governments to aid citizens during times of disaster, the people devastated by Hurricane Katrina were not effectively facilitated as according to their rights as citizens of the United States. The government’s failures to deliver assistance to citizens stem from inadequate protection systems in place before the storm even struck. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Homeland Security were the two largest incumbents in the wake of the storm. The failure of these agencies rests on the shoulders of those chosen to head the agency. These directors, appointed by then president George W. Bush, were not capable of leading large government agencies through a crisis, let alone a disaster the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina. Along with the federal government, the state of Louisiana and the city of New Orleans did not do enough to lesseb the damage caused by the storm, and forced thousands of poorer citizens to remain in cramped and unsanitary conditions for extended periods of time. The culmination of federal, state, and local government’s failures in suppressing and repairing the damage of Hurricane Katrina to a level acceptable for citizens of the United States is a denial of the rights citizens of the United States hold.
FEMA. "Protection in the nuclear age." The federal civil defense act of 1950, as amended public law 920-81st congress (1950): 3.
Governments, the private sector, Non Governmental Organizations and Community Organizations play vital roles in recovery. The essence of a recovery effort is the resources captures to assist, the capability of assistance and other best practices for recovering from a disaster. Rubin and Popkin, (1990) in their report entitled Disaster Recovery after hurricane Hugo in South Carolina thoroughly outline many challenges to which organization and other bodies had face in Hurricane Hugo’s recovery effort. These inefficiencies cause a spiral of increase lost of life, property and livelihood for hundreds of people to which the hurricane affected.
In 2003, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was rolled into the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. FEMA’s responsibilities are to prepare, protect, respond, and recover from diminish all hazards. There was a mass coverage about the failure for FEMA to act immediately to Katrina, but once they were able to get things organized such as giving food and water, and setting up the tent and shelters communities can be strong and move on.
The Coast Guard, for instance, rescued some 34,000 people in New Orleans alone, and many ordinary citizens commandeered boats, offered food and shelter, and did whatever else they could to help their neighbors. Yet the government–particularly the federal government–seemed unprepared for the disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) took days to establish operations in New Orleans, and even then did not seem to have a sound plan of action. Officials, even including President George W. Bush, seemed unaware of just how bad things were in New Orleans and elsewhere: how many people were stranded or missing; how many homes and businesses had been damaged; how much food, water and aid was needed. Katrina had left in her wake what one reporter called a “total disaster zone” where people were “getting absolutely
The 109th Congress questioned the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after Hurricane Katrina. Congress called for mandatory reports from the white house, Inspectors Generals, the Government Accountability Office, and others. A common denominator in all of these findings were that some of the losses brought by Katrina were caused, at least in part, by deficiencies within FEMA; such as: questionable leadership decisions, organizational failures, and inadequate legal authorities. As a result of these findings, Congress further utilized their control strategies to reorganize FEMA, and restructure the way responsibilities were handled following emergencies. Congress passed the “Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006” in order to accomplish these revisions. This newly enacted bill reorganized FEMA, expanded its authority, established new leadership positions and position requirements within FEMA, and imposed new conditions and requirements on the operations of the agency. Congress also utilized the appropriations process to influence this portion of bureaucracy by enacting supplemental appropriations, one-time waivers of requirements and temporary
Federal intervention in the aftermath of natural disasters began after the San Francisco earthquake in 1906. This 8.3 magnitude earthquake killed 478, and left over 250,000 homeless. While the disaster itself was obviously unavoidable, the subsequent fires that burned throughout the city were a result of poor planning. (1, 17) In an effort to consolidate existing programs, and to improve the nation’s level of preparedness, President Carter created FEMA in 1979. Initially, FEMA was praised for improving communication between various levels of government, and multiple agencies during a crisis. (1,19)
Perry, R. W., & Lindell, M. K. (2007). Disaster Response. In W. L. Waugh, & K. Tiernery, Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government (pp. 162-163). Washington D.C.: International City/County Management Association.
Howitt, A. M., & Leonard, H. B. (2006). Katrina and the core challenges of disaster response. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 30:1 winter 2006.
Thesis statement: Hurricane Irma has proven that the DHS should step up its efforts to respond to emergencies.
August 29, 2005 was one of the darkest days for the residents of the State of Louisiana. Katrina, a category 3 hurricane, ripped through New Orleans and the surrounding areas causing catastrophic loss of life and property. The federal government’s disaster response team, which was formed in 1978, titled the Federal Emergency Management Agency, (commonly referred to as FEMA) responded to the needs of the survivors. Unfortunately the Bush administration through FEMA showed gross ineptitude in its response to the disaster. Pre-Katrina the lack of response resulted in a largely unsuccessful evacuation. After the storm, aid to the citizens of New Orleans was slow and inadequate. When we look back at the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, it appears that Bush’s FEMA botched much of the handling of the crisis and that overall, our “administration” could have responded to the situation much better.
As a result, to the slow response to Hurricane Katrina by FEMA, President Bush stated in the article “Shortfalls in the federal response to Hurricane Katrina highlight that our current homeland security architecture, to include policies, authorities, plans, doctrine, operational concepts, and resources at the Federal, State, local, private sector, and community level, must be strengthened and transformed” (Bush, nd).
After the attack, the United States hastily constructed the Department of Homeland Security and downgraded FEMA, whose main duty was civil protection. This attracted criticism from some public administration experts that the U.S. government concentrated too much on terrorism…[After Hurricane Katrina] Critics… charged that too many government officials were not familiar with the “National Response Plan” which was implemented in December 2004 after 9/11 terrorist attack. Planning and training for large natural disasters were insufficient after the implementation of the plan. In short, too great a focus on counter-terrorism undermined capacities for natural disaster mitigation, response, and recovery in the post-9/11 United States (para. 7,