Analysis Of Thomas Locke On Personal Identity

(i) In Locke’s argument for Personal Identity, he has faith in that we are not mere substances or souls, but consciousness’. Firstly, Locke makes a vital point in noting the terms “man/human” to be differentiating from “person” (BonJour & Baker, 2008, pg.221). He defines a “man” to be a living body similar to an animal’s body, and that a “person” is an intelligent thinking being (BonJour & Baker, 2008, pg.221). Locke points out a complication with those who define “man” in terms of possession of a soul (to explain why a human at an earlier age would be identical to the same human at a later age), in that if the concept of reincarnation would be accepted then the soul of a human would allow it to be reborn perhaps into the body of an animal,

Reid’s first criticism begins by noting as to what a “person” is defined by Locke. As stated previously, Locke states that a person is a “thinking intelligent being” (BonJour & Baker, 2008, pg.221); however, Reid notes that Locke will not fully commit to the notion that a person is preserved through consciousness and memory (BonJour & Baker, 2008, pg.227). The problem here is that Locke’s definition of “person” seems to show that he is committed to the concept of person being a thinking substance, however, at the same time, Locke argument is structured around the belief of personal identity in terms of memory and consciousness (BonJour & Baker, 2008, pg.227). Furthermore, Reid states that Locke was aware of the some of the consequences of the memory doctrine, such as that it is possible for a person to be “transferred from one intelligent being to another,” or for “two or twenty intelligent beings to be the same person”, therefore, this is inconsistent with Locke’s characterization of a person being a “thinking intelligent being” (BonJour & Baker, 2008,

For illustration, if person A were to be divided into separate two persons (the brain would split in half), we would have two new individuals, to whom we can refer to as “person B” and “person C” (Rocca, 2014). Now if both of these individuals have the same kind of continuity with ‘A’ and both remember the thoughts and actions of ‘A’, then both ‘B’ and ‘C’ would be equally good candidates for being ‘A’ (Rocca, 2014). However, note that both ‘B’ and ‘C’ cannot be identical to ‘A’ because ‘B’ and ‘C’ are not identical to each other (Rocca, 2014). Therefore, it would arbitrary if one of ‘B’ and ‘C’ would be identical to ‘A’, and this would have too much continuity, thus neither is identical to ‘A’ (Rocca, 2014). As stated by Derek Parfit, “How could a double success, twice the continuity, result in a failure of personal identity over time?” (Rocca,