Much like the course any sporting event is bounded by the rules of the game, the course of any philosophical discussion is bounded by the ideas accepted as axioms. A game of soccer in which the players were permitted to hold the ball in their hands would be radically different, even incomparable to a traditional game, even if all other factors (weather, location, player’s skill) were physically identical. In much the same way, although both begin with the same set of facts (materially closed universe, constant physical laws) Jaegwon Kim’s view on mental causation is radically different from Searle’s, because they approach the issue from different philosophical perspectives. Neither is wrong, if you reason using their principles. Neither is right, if you reason using the opposing principles.
Kim’s principles are this: mental states are macrostates (which may be multiply realized), supervenient on physical microstates. This supervenience can be seen as a sort of “vertical causation,” in which a microstate causes macroproperties to exist. He also allows for “horizontal causation,” in which physical states cause or compel other physical states, according to physical laws. His contention is that if a microstate, say m(F) of object X both vertically causes a macrostate F and horizontally causes another microstate, m(G) (which then causes its own macrostate G), it would be a mistake to say that the supervenient macrostate G is caused by F, even if (on the macro level) one appears to cause the other. That sort of macro causality Kim would describe as epiphenomenal causation, and therefore causally inert.
Searle takes a different approach. He begins by rejecting completely the distinction between physical and mental, folding in all menta...
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... in” certain aspects (mental aspects) that would otherwise be inexplicable in a sound theory. Searle’s account, in which singular events have multiple aspects, is appealing. However, it appears that by claiming that “mental” is an aspect of a larger physical event, one aspect of an event can have an ontological uniqueness that is not present in the other aspects. And since all aspects are facets of one physical process, it seems that Searle is saying that by simply thinking of an event one way, you can imbue it with properties not otherwise present. This seems too easy. In addition, Searle states in his response to Kim “there are no causal powers of [mental state] that are not causal powers of the neural structure.” If the ontologically irreducible aspect of a physical state confers no additional causal power, then that mental aspect is simply “along for the ride.”
The other issue that is being discussed between the two philosophers is determinism. Also determinism must be defined before interpreting their views. Determinism according to the Encarta encyclopedia is "A philosophical doctrine holding that every event, mental as well as physical, has a cause, and that, the cause being given, the event follows invariably. This theory denies the element of chance or contingency." Also like to other definition for free will this is confusing and incomplete to the reader. I think that determinism is a theory that every event has a cause and effect and that once a cause is stated than the event will follow.
Searle’s argument is one against humans having free will. The conclusion comes from his view on determinism and his view on substances. His view on substances is a materialist one. To him, the entire world is composed of material substances. All occurrences can be explained by these materials. This is a view that is very attuned with (accepting) determinism. Determinism states that necessary causes must be for the occurrence to be. This deterministic cause and effect relationship is apparent in the physical world. Hard believing determinists see determinism as being exclusive of free will. Searle, being a materialist, views humans as just another material substance. He accepts determinism and rejects (libertarian) free will.
ABSTRACT: Davidson argues (1) that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" (2) precludes the possibility of their being any type-type identities between mental and physical events. However, there are radically different ways to understand both the nature and content of this "constitutive ideal," and the plausibility of Davidson’s argument depends on blurring the distinction between two of these ways. Indeed, it will be argued here that no consistent understanding of the constitutive ideal will allow it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it.
Searle's argument delineates what he believes to be the invalidity of the computational paradigm's and artificial intelligence's (AI) view of the human mind. He first distinguishes between strong and weak AI. Searle finds weak AI as a perfectly acceptable investigation in that it uses the computer as a strong tool for studying the mind. This in effect does not observe or formulate any contentions as to the operation of the mind, but is used as another psychological, investigative mechanism. In contrast, strong AI states that the computer can be created so that it actually is the mind. We must first describe what exactly this entails. In order to be the mind, the computer must be able to not only understand, but to have cognitive states. Also, the programs by which the computer operates are the focus of the computational paradigm, and these are the explanations of the mental states. Searle's argument is against the claims of Shank and other computationalists who have created SHRDLU and ELIZA, that their computer programs can (1) be ascribe...
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
John Searle’s Chinese room argument from his work “Minds, Brains, and Programs” was a thought experiment against the premises of strong Artificial Intelligence (AI). The premises of conclude that something is of the strong AI nature if it can understand and it can explain how human understanding works. I will argue that the Chinese room argument successfully disproves the conclusion of strong AI, however, it does not provide an explanation of what understanding is which becomes problematic when creating a distinction between humans and machines.
This leaves a particularly large hole in identity theory. From neural dependence and the causal problem, it is almost impractical to endorse any type of dualism. But multiple realizability makes identity theory suspect as well. Also emotional additives, and the fact that epiphenomenalism is self undermining but not impossible, lead to slight suspicion of physicalism in general. Basically, this paper set out to endorse and defend identity theory but has concluded nothing definitively.
In this paper I will present an argument I have found in the Second Analogy for the necessity of presupposing the causal determination of each event. I will begin by briefly describing Robert Paul W...
In “Can Computers Think?”, Searle argues that computers are unable to think like humans can. He argues this
First order theories are a challenge to any higher order thought theories; consequently I will briefly look at some of them, for they are the other type of theories contesting the explanation of consciousness. Also, one of this FO theories is strongly supported by Ned Block, who is the main objector to Rosenthal's HOT Theories in this essay.
At the end of chapter two, Searle summarizes his criticism of functionalism in the following way. The mental processes of a mind are caused entirely by processes occurring inside the brain. There is no external cause that determines what a mental process will be. Also, there is a distinction between the identification of symbols and the understanding of what the symbols mean. Computer programs are defined by symbol identification rather than understanding. On the other hand, minds define mental processes by the understanding of what a symbol means. The conclusion leading from this is that computer programs by themselves are not minds and do not have minds. In addition, a mind cannot be the result of running a computer program. Therefore, minds and computer programs are not entities with the same mental state. They are quite different and although they both are capable of input and output interactions, only the mind is capable of truly thinking and understanding. This quality is what distinguishes the mental state of a mind from the systemic state of a digital computer.
Hume distinguishes two categories into which “all the objects of human reason or enquiry” may be placed into: Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact (15). In regards to matters of fact, cause and effect seems to be the main principle involved. It is clear that when we have a fact, it must have been inferred...
John Searle developed two areas of thought concerning the independent cognition of computers. These ideas included the definition of a weak AI and a strong AI. In essence, these two types of AI have their fundamental differences. The weak AI was defined as a system, which simply were systems that simulations of the human mind and AI systems that were characterized as an AI system that is completely capable of cognitive processes such as consciousness and intentionality, as well as understanding. He utilizes the argument of the Chinese room to show that the strong AI does not exist.
Carla Washburn, an incredible, inspirational woman that has sadly witnessed the 3 closest male figures in her life all pass on. This has resulted in Carla becoming depressed over the unbearable experience. Carla embraced in giving back to the community and that’s not surprising because she’s a person of spirituality. While, Carla is the client and is suffering through grief, it’s likely she’d benefit immensely from creating a program to work with the kids in the community and may give her a sense of worth she’s been seeking since these 3 tragedies.
...lligent, intentional activity taking place inside the room and the digital computer. The proponents of Searle’s argument, however, would counter that if there is an entity which does computation, such as human being or computer, it cannot understand the meanings of the symbols it uses. They maintain that digital computers do not understand the input given in or the output given out. But it cannot be claimed that the digital computers as whole cannot understand. Someone who only inputs data, being only a part of the system, cannot know about the system as whole. If there is a person inside the Chinese room manipulating the symbols, the person is already intentional and has a mental state, thus, due to the seamless integration of their systems of hardware and software that understand the inputs and outputs as whole systems, digital computers too have states of mind.