This paper aims to endorse physicalism over dualism by means of Smart’s concept of identity theory. Smart’s article Sensations and the Brain provides a strong argument for identity theory and accounts for many of it primary objections. Here I plan to first discuss the main arguments for physicalism over dualism, then more specific arguments for identity theory, and finish with further criticisms of identity theory. Physicalism is the theory that the universe contains nothing other than the physical. Therefore, the universe can be fully explained in physical terms. In terms of the mind, mental states globally supervene on physical states, meaning that there are no changes in the mental without changes in the physical. Identity theory is a …show more content…
Complete physical explanations can account for all experience and once all the physical facts are set/known then nothing can add to or detract from experience. That being said, a scientist can learn all of the physics behind lightning, every detail of cause and effect, even see photographs of lightning bolts, without ever seeing lighting first hand. If this is true he should have a complete physical understanding of lighting. So if identity theory is correct, he should gain no new experience from witnessing lighting. This, however, does not seem true. It may produce no new information but it seems plausible, even logical, that it would have an impact at least …show more content…
Then if they stimulate the brain in a certain way they can control what people are thinking and create experiences. Therefore, if one person had never seen, heard of, tasted, or smelled a cookie, a neurologist should be able to create that exact experience through brain manipulation. Also, there should be no added mental response when the subject eats his “first” cookie. This, however, seems entirely false. Neuroscience has progressed and shown that rudimentary brain manipulation is possible, but it is counter-intuitive to believe that triggering F-fiber can suddenly result in entirely new tactile and emotional knowledge. It is more plausible to consider that people describe sensations as what its like to experience something of which they already have knowledge. So, when they receive the real product they would likely have an emotional response or attachment to it that cannot be accounted for in identity
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
In this paper I will explain and argue for functionalism. Functionalism is another form of mind-body physicalism, it accepts that many of our mental concepts are defined partly in terms of behavior and stimuli. What caused the rise of functionalism is the multiple realization theory. This theory objects to the identity theory because humans are able to feel pain due to a stimulus response in the ACC. Other animals and organisms are able to also feel pain because pain in their brains can be detected in different regions that are different from a human brain. The basic idea of functionalism is that our minds are organized in a functional way. The roles are defined by how we respond to a certain stimuli such as pain. Pain causes body damage,
Have you ever been eating something and thinking at the same time that it tastes like heaven. This essay is about a problem that has been around for a lot of years, and although it is not base in taste in general, it is base in the example of what chocolate tastes like extracting from (Nagel, 1987). The problem is the Mind- Body problem. This essay is going to explain the three points of view in Nagel argument: dualism, physicalism or materialism, and dual aspect theory.
Type identity theories are mainly concerned with the premise that the brain and the mind are identical and discuss mental states and reduce them to the physical. Saul Kripke made some influential criticisms to type identity theory. Kripke’s criticisms rely on views about essentialism, modality and possible world semantics, (Hanks) Kripke’s argument is directed at the thesis from Identity theory that each physical state is identical to an undifferentiated mental state, Kripke relies upon the concept of a rigid designator, and the necessity of this rigid designator to disprove statements of identity. Kripke states these “analytic tools go against the identity theory.” (Munitz,1971:163)
There are many theories about the mind and body. Many philosophers argue whether the mind and body are two separate entities or are in fact one thing. There are five main arguments for this accounts they are, dualism, logical behaviorism, methodological behaviorism, identity-theory, and lastly functualism. There are many similarities and differences between these five theories. Dualism is the main focus that I will be recounting, then comparing and contrasting it against identity-theory and logical behaviorism.
Dualism is the view which states that there exists two types of substances. An immaterial entity that is responsible for our mental life, and a material body . It claims that both are able to interact and affect one another. In Difficulties for the Dualist by Smith, P. and Jones, O.R. , many problems are raised against dualism. I will focus on the nature of the mind/body interaction. The argument claims that the mind/body causal interaction is mysterious, and therefore materialism is the more attractive argument. I will disagree with the authors by arguing that body/body interactions are equally mysterious considering that both types of interactions both boil down to a rock-bottom explanation in which we can no longer further explain. I will then conclude that dualism is valid in claiming
In this paper, I will be discussing Frank Jackson and his knowledge argument. The knowledge argument is presented to support property dualism. Property dualism is the view of only physical substances with two different properties: mental property and physical property. Property dualism is a form of dualism, which is the theory of two kinds of phenomena in the universe: physical and mental. The connection between the mind and body has been debated by many philosophers. The mind has different mental states that can be understood through different forms. The consciousness state forms qualia from different events. Qualia is the true feelings of an experience by an individual, such as the touch of sunlight
Type identity theory is a subcategory of physicalism. In physicalism it is understood that physical things form the basis for all things that exist. When this approach is taken it is incorrect to distinguish the mind from the body. The mind in a sense is not regarded as a thing. When discussing the mind it would be a better representation to reference mental states and particular processes that the brain performs. These properties, states and processes are physical objects which may be referred to as processes of the brain, opposed to the idea that said properties are linked to the mind. This is the general view taken by physicalists however there is disagreement on what a mental property actually is and furthermore their relation to physical
In regards to identity, Smart believes that sensations and brain processes just so happen to be the same. Referring to sensations and brain processes as identical factors would indicate that one is suggesting that the identity is strict. An example of strict identity is Smart’s use of a metaphor that compares lightning with an electrical discharge, just as sensations equate to brain processes. Smith belief contradicts dualism, which is a concept that refers to the mind and body as two distinct
Every since Plato introduced the idea of dualism thousands of years ago meta-physicians have been faced with the mind-body problem. Even so Plato idea of dualism did not become a major issue of debate in the philosophical world until the seventeenth century when French philosopher Rene Descartes publicized his ideas concerning the mental and physical world. During this paper, I will analyze the issue of individuation and identity in Descartes’ philosophical view of the mind-body dualism. I will first start by explaining the structure of Cartesian dualism. I will also analyze the challenges of individuation and identity as they interact with Descartes. With a bit of luck, subsequently breaking down Descartes’ reasoning and later on offering my response, I can present wit a high degree of confidence that the problems of individuation and identity offer a hindrance to the Cartesians’ principle of mind-body dualism. I give a critical analysis of these two problems, I will first explain the basis of Descartes’ philosophical views.
The knowledge objection to identity theory intense deals with what experiences are like and that we cannot know what they our like for others. For example when we experience pain and a creature who is out of this world and not like us go though pain, we can not predict how is for them. The reason for this
Physicalism is the position that nothing can exceed past what is physically present, and what is physical is all that there can be. This idea is reductive in that it suggests there is no more to the universe than physical matters, including brain processes, sensations, and human consciousness. J.J.C. Smart explains sensations as a means of commentary on a brain process. He believes that, essentially, brain processes and what we report as sensations are essentially the same thing in that one is an account of the other. He writes in “Sensations and Brain Processes” that “…in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes,” (145). Though
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
While the main problem for dualism is explaining how two distinctly different properties of mind and body enter into causal relationships, the ongoing mind-body debate has spawned many more problems relating to subjective experience and free will (Hardnad, 1992; Jaworski,
In a world of science, religion, ignorance and opinion common perception on whether or not the mind is separate from the brain has switched more times than one can track. A dualistic view on the body/mind relationship continues to be scrutinized day in and day out. As I will explain throughout the argument dualism is facing increasingly more constraints as time goes on. An evaluation of the mind/body argument from a Humean perspective proves dualism to be flawed in key aspects, where in contrast a materialistic approach is not affected.