According to Ned Block, Functionalism is concerned with finding the answer to the question (“what are mental states?”), ("What are mental states?”) One of the features of the functionalism is that it sees each form of mental state as being a state which includes the tendency to behave in particular ways in addition to possessing particular mental states. Functionalists are usually preoccupied with the individuation of mental states, partly on the basis of causal relations to other mental states. As Shoemaker explains, in the 1975 work, functionalism, from the philosophy of mind view is the conviction that psychological or mental terms can be done away to a certain extent. Functionalists have been known to treat terms related to mental states as a mental state functional characterization which differs from input and output terms. Therefore in a (“simplified Turing –machine version of the theory,”) mental states are associated with the states of the Turing-machine, which own on their own are clearly defined by a machine table which mentions outputs and outputs that are explored nonmentalistically. Additionally functionalism empathizes that characterization of mental states ought to include descriptions of outputs and inputs in both its non-machine and machine versions. The variation between Psychofunctionalism and Functionalism brings forth a difference in specifying outputs and inputs. Functionalists are restricted to specification of outputs and inputs that constitutes common-sense knowledge; Psychofunctionalists are not bound by such restrictions. Whereas both sides lay emphasis on physical specification outputs and inputs, Functionalists are keen on classifications that are externally observable. Psychofunctio... ... middle of paper ... ...rocess of counting impulses of neurons to give the entries of inputs and outputs helps avoid the dilemma just sketched, because the brains contained in bottle, and paralytics would bear the right impulses of neurons, though without bodily movements. The objection, however, would be, there is a possible paralysis which affects the body’s nervous system, and this can therefore affect the neural impulses. Psychofunctionalism therefore presents the same problem that is presented by Functionalism. A sound reply would be, diseases of the nervous system have the potential of changing one’s mentality, for example, they cause the victim never suffer the feeling of pain. Therefore, there is a probability of reliability in finding, that a widespread disease of the nervous system which brought about intermittent paralysis caused people to be incapable of various mental slates.
Ned Block in Troubles with Functionalism offers his Absent Qualia Argument. The argument provides a counter example to functionalism. The essential aspect to the functional theory of mind defines mentality in terms of its functional states of a system. The functional states of a system match states according to their inputs, outputs, and internal states. Block’s counter example argues for the possibility of two systems to have the same functional states which determines their functional equivalence. In addition to functional equivalence, the two systems have distinguishable mental states. If functionalism is as adequate account of mentality, then functional equivalence entails mental state equivalence. Block argues against the consequent of
Logical behaviorists believe that there are no inner mental states but we know mental states because of behavior we see through others. The problem with this is that we cannot analyze beliefs and desires through inner states because that would be too easy. Mental states to behaviorists are not inner states, this is because if they were then we would not be able to identify within others. The argument is that because we can see the mental states through others they are real but because we cannot see inner mental states they are not real. Dualists would disagree with this method of thought. They would think that just because others cannot physically see your inner mental states does not mean they aren’t there. Inner mental states are what makes us who we are. Seeing behaviors through others, to dualists, is just another way of their inner states
Everyone goes through stages of life and everyone goes through them differently, there are some people that will go through life and not have any problems. While there are some people who will go through life and then will get a disease that will slowly kill them. Does getting a disease in old age make it harder for a person to live the rest of their life out? The functionalist perspective would best explain the expected outcomes, because it tries to help out society and make sure there is some stability.
The Psychodynamic FOR generate it’s theoretical base from Psychiatry, and Psychology and from the work of Freud, Jung, Adler to name but a few (Reed, 1984). Reed and Hagedorn also describe this FOR as reductionist, as “[the] person is not capable of rational choices…. [but] behavior is being determined by unconscious drives” (Bruce, 1987) as well as feelings. The function-dysfunction criterion is thus based on symptoms the patient is displaying and assessment is through observation and identification of the symptoms.
Fodor develops the idea of functionalism by combining certain parts of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory. From logical behaviorism, Fodor incorporates the idea that mental processes can be represented by physical if-then statements. As such, behavior and mental causation are no longer distinct and unable to interact. Also, logical behaviorism provides a way for mental causes to interact with other mental causes. This, in turn, may result in a behavioral effect. The last point is also a characteristic of the central-state identity theory. One doctrine of the central-state identity theory is called "token physicalism." Token physicalism states that all mental states that currently exist are neurophysiological. Thus, token physicalism does not place physical restrictions on the type of substance capable of having mental properties. When the points of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, as described here, are combined, functionalism is the result. The theory of functionalism supposes that a m...
Functionalism is basically a theory that describes the mental state of human beings through the combination of both behaviorism theory and the identity theory of the human mind. According to this theory, mental states of people are majorly identified or rather defined by what they frequently do and
Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psychology encompassing properties realized for humans and alien psychology encompassing those mental states realized in the alien way etc. I will demonstrate that even if one supports and allows the principles behind Kim’s argument they do not result in his final conclusion of psychology failing to be a science. By attacking his principle of Casual Individuation of Kinds I will show that Kim has failed to find the correct conclusion. Furthermore, I will consider a possible objection that Kim might have to my stance and give a short rebuttle. I will conclude by explicating Jerry Fodor’s account of what is Kim’s essential problem is. By showing that Kim’s conclusion fails it will entail that Fodor’s conclusion is more viable in reality.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
...ught experimental essay, “Where Am I?” Each approach he touches on has viability but also is subject to criticism depending on the lens the audience can interpret the approach under. Functionalism is an approach through physicalism that would glaze over the more mental priorities of identity, since the body functions are what is relevant to this lens. The body view falls under the functionalist and physicalist argument. There is a touch of soul view in interpretation of the mind-body relationship, but it held little evidence for foundation and under scrutiny the soul view does not hold up as strongly as the mind-body pair view does for interpretation of Dennett’s essay. It is not easy to decipher the meaning of identity and mind-body relationships, but using this thought experiment one could iron through some creases to clear up an argument for either position.
Functionalism is the oldest and most commonly used theoretical approach used to understand social issues. Functionalism is a macrosociological perspective that presents the idea that society consists of different components working together to help a society function as one. Sociolog...
...r differences between particular humans and changes within one particular brain. One obvious example of this objection is that stroke victims lose brain function and the mental states associated with them, but in time they are able to relearn mental states using different parts of their brain. This certainly discounts the fact that one mental state is identical to one brain state.
As mentioned earlier, behaviorism is essentially a reductionist theory that attempts to explain mental events in terms of observable physical events. In doing this is produces a theory of mind which is basically materialistic.
Functionalism, an early school of psychology, focuses on the acts and functions of the mind rather than its internal contents. Its most prominent American advocate is William James. William James is the author of ?The Principles of Psychology? a book that is considered to be one of the most important texts in modern psychology.
The progression in scientific discoveries made Descartes theories seem more superstitious than based on facts and soon they disappeared. The materialistic theories started flourishing in the middle of the twentieth century and Behaviorism was among them. This theory stated that the science of psychology is more concerned with finding a pattern of the stimulus and response. According to Watson and Skinner, behavior is shaped by the physical inputs human beings get and the private mental states of humans are irrelevant. Behaviorism also did not last very long and soon it was replaced by “Cognitivism” which fell under the investigative research methods of psychology. Another theory put forth was the “The Mind-Brain Identity Theory” which claimed that the mental events human beings experience are neurological rather than behavioral or ghostly. Introspection is considered an inner process since firing of neurons is not in any way connected with the input from the body. The neuron firing can be considered as a type which is further subdivided into different token types. The type-type Identity theory being that when an individual is in pain, a particular type of neuron is firing whereas the token-token identity states that every instance of physical pain is identical with a particular physical state and is
...were not accepted by modern Psychology, modern psychology will not be known as it is today if structuralism and functionalism were not founded as schools of thought.