David Lewis finds a puzzle within the realm of possible objects known as the problem of temporary intrinsics. In our everyday view of objects, contractions arise with their properties. If objects are wholly present (at every moment in time) and contain within them all possible properties, how is it possible that objects, such as an apple, bear contradictory properties (being green and red)? In what follows is a discussion of this problem in detail, as well as, Lewis's perdurance solution. After the presentation of his new ontology, I will explore an objection Thompson believes severely damages the notion of temporal parts.
There are three non-negotiable theses that express some of our most firmly held beliefs and intuitions about the world in regards to persistence. First, no object can contain within it incompatible properties. Second, change involves incompatible properties. And lastly, objects sometimes persist through change. There are three broad approaches that attempt to merge all three theses into one working theory in order to resolve the tension between them. They are: perdurantism, exdurantism, and endurantism. For purposes of this paper I will discuss both perdurantism and endurantism.
Let's look at change more closely. When an object undergoes change, for instance an apple, it goes from one property (being green) to another, incompatible, property (being red). Objects have properties just in virtue of what it is like (the cat is clever) and they have properties that are partly in virtue of what other things are like (the cat is larger than the mouse) (Lewis 204). Objects appear to change from one intrinsic state to another throughout its lifespan. The job of the ontologist is to determine how this is so.
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...it makes one wonder how the stages are really related to one another. That is to say, how is stage t1 identical to t2? While, Lewis does respond saying that they share causal relations (Lewis 218), it seems that four-dimensionalism is not without its worries.
Temporary intrinsics is a worrisome concern when one adopts the ontology of three-dimensionalism. The idea of an object being wholly present when we look at it is our intuition, but when we peer more closely we see a contradiction that emerges. Lewis attempts to resolve this contradiction by developing a whole new ontology that states that time is an analogy for space. While this method does dissolve the worry of temporary intrinsics, it does, however, bring forth more metaphysics concerns about the state of objects. Perhaps, as Thompson has stated, four-dimensionalism is just an overreaction to the problem.
...eality. Our knowledge will only allow us to go so far, but we have accomplished so much in the discovery of time and space. Technology will soon advance as to where these theories could be proven and physically be possible.
The notion of Persistence gives way to several predominant theories; of which, attempt to account for many possible questions that arise from it. As in most cases of debate, when more than one account of such is held to be true, there will clearly be much disagreement. Two views that claim to account accurately for persistence that remain widely known are , that of an endurantist (Threeist) and that of a perdurantist (Twoist). The endurantist will hold that objects are wholly present at all times, a persistent object ‘endures’ over time. The conflicting view of a perdurantist claims that objects are actually composed of temporal parts, more precisely, proper temporal parts. Further, a Twoist (vs. Oneist), will say that a name most often refers to the sum of one’s temporal parts, whereas a Threeist believes a name to refer to one who is wholly present during all times of its existence. The two opposing theories stated very simply, as above, give insight as to the nature of their arguments against one another. It does seem, however, that the Twoist’s account of persistence gives an exceedingly useful notion in regards towards many more subjects of philosophy, as well as an explanation that accounts for much more in terms of the problems associated strictly with persistence itself.
However, the permanent changes are only applicable to physical objects. In Descartes argument, he observes a piece of wax, from a hive, and using his judgment and senses, analyzes the structure and properties of the wax. This argument is an attempt to prove that the essential properties of things are not perceived through the senses, but through the mind. With this, Descartes reminds me as a human being to avoid being dependent to the senses. Though through matter by which we can be able to know something, depending on our senses is sometimes unreliable. The most interesting part of this discussion is that despite of the changing characteristics of physical objects, there will still be that character that will be stayed the
According to the chosen priority, either object in general, or change in general, usually two types of metaphysics have been distinguished: Object Ontology and Process Ontology.
ABSTRACT: Many philosophers have lost their enthusiasm for the concept of supervenience in the philosophy of mind. This is largely due to the fact that, as Jaegwon Kim has shown, familiar versions of supervenience describe relations of mere property covariation without capturing the idea of dependence. Since the dependence of the mental on the physical is a necessary requirement for even the weakest version of physicalism, it would seem that existing forms of supervenience cannot achieve that for which they were designed. My aim is to revive the concept of supervenience. I argue that if we construe supervenience along Davidsonian lines — as a relation connecting predicates rather than properties — then it avoids the shortcomings of the more familiar varieties.
This paper aims to endorse physicalism over dualism by means of Smart’s concept of identity theory. Smart’s article Sensations and the Brain provides a strong argument for identity theory and accounts for many of it primary objections. Here I plan to first discuss the main arguments for physicalism over dualism, then more specific arguments for identity theory, and finish with further criticisms of identity theory.
In this paper, I will explain and argue for two-way interactive substance dualism. Dualism is a term referred to the idea that there are only two basic kinds of things and everything real is categorized under those two things. Dualism is split into two types, substance dualism, and property dualism. Substance dualism is the idea that the mind and body are two different sorts of basic substance, whereas property dualism is our mental and physical properties are two separate types of basic properties even though they may be properties of the same thing (lecture). Branching from dualism, mind-body dualism argues that the mind and body are two separate entities. Although they are two different substances, i.e. brain/body being material and
Locke viewed the identity of living entities in a different light. Above, change in mass constituted a change in identity. But, in living entities a change in mass does not affect the identity of the object. Locke uses the example of the oak tree. It starts off as a sapling and grows into a huge oak tree, with a massive change in mass. That oak tree could be subjected to the cutting of branches, and the winter fall of leaves, however it still remains an oak tree because it continues the life of a tree. It maintains the same functional arrangements of components (Blackburn, 1999: 125-126). An interesting example is raised by Blackburn in assessing “how much change to tolerate while still regarding it as the same ‘thing’” (Blackburn, 1999:127). ‘Theseus’ ship’ is used to illustrate this. The ship goes on a long voyage and is in need of constant repair and maintenance. By the end of the voyage, all the components of the ship have been changed.
. Its most famous defender is Descartes, who argues that as a subject of conscious thought and experience, he cannot consist simply of spatially extended matter. His essential nature must be non-m...
The what it is like to undergo an experience is essential to understanding that experience. Known by philosophers as subjective qualia, these characteristics are part of what makes a felt experience exactly that experience. If we introspect our own mental states, this seems apparent and incontrovertible. Most philosophers are unwilling to grant that subjective qualia are non-physical states, and attempts to face this problem and maintain physicalism must address arguments from qualia. While differing physical explanations for these subjective qualia exist, I will only briefly refer to them here as qualia will serve only as a means of leading the reader to the Explanatory Gap(1). The Explanatory Gap is a uniquely puzzling problem for physicalist philosophies of mind.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
If a two-way communicator existed across time for this to be achieved the two metaphysical considerations must be met. Firstly, Lewis highlights the that “time is one dimension of four”, in the fourth-dimensional world, suggesting that time is just as perceptible as any place and potentially where the time traveller will send the message. Second, fourth-dimensional spectrum also considers causation and possible reverse causation, that is there must be awareness for earlier events to be causally dependable on the future events, and therefore how communication will take place between two different times. Lewis argues that his grandfather paradox can provide solidarity with the past, only if a time traveller was to travel to the past, they would not be able to make any changes that may potentially lead to them never
Consciousness is one of those topics that are in the position of trying to understand one’s own organism with one’s own organism. The topic of consciousness is so elusive that it mirrors child hood games of trying to catch your own shadow. In the World of philosophy, discerning the truth about consciousness is no childish game. Materialist J.J.C Smart and philosopher Thomas Nagel agree that qualia exist, but are diametrically opposed when it comes to what consciousness is. In this paper I will argue for Nagel’s point of view that consciousness falls outside the nucleus of scientific explanation. Physicalism cannot objectively uncover consciousness using scientific methods because consciousness cannot be reduced to material parts. If Smart’s reductionist view points were correct, where as physics can explain all there is to know about everything in the universe, then why does consciousness seem to evade physical laws of investigation? Explaining consciousness provides physicalism with challenges that place limits on scientific knowledge, and what it can uncover about consciousness.
Many accounts support the possibility for objects genuinely to persist yet change their intrinsic, natural properties. Intuitively we think that it would be possible: the assumption that this claim is true, Loux argues, ‘underlies some of our most fundamental beliefs about ourselves and the world around us’ (1998: 203). In this essay I shall focus solely on the account of David Lewis’s ‘Doctrine of Temporal Parts’ that it is possible for objects to persist through change by having different temporal parts. By briefly examining intrinsics and extrinsics and the problem of change you will be able to see how successful Lewis’s solution is to this problem, before viewing some weaknesses of the account and then ultimately concluding that Lewis solution successfully achieves the possibility that objects genuinely persist yet change their intrinsic, natural properties.
The first idea presented in the story is that of a fourth dimension. I wasn’t exactly sure what the fourth dimension was because it is not something that is dealt with a whole lot in every day living. The story begins with the time traveler sitting in a room with some guests. We never learn what the time traveler’s name is, he is simply referred to as the time traveler in the story. I thought the explanation of the fourth dimension that the time traveler gave to his guests was easy to understand and very interesting. The time traveler explains, “ ‘You must follow me carefully. I shall have to controvert one or two ideas that are almost universally accepted. The geometry, for instance, they taught you at school is founded on a misconception.’