Great-Souledness In Aristotle: The Father Of Political Theory By Aristotle

Whether in relation to action or knowledge, all things aim at some good. In Ethics, the father of political theory, Aristotle, initially establishes that the good is the best, most archicteonic, and choiceworthy end. He subsequently states that both the many and the refined concur that the highest of all goods related to action is happiness, essentially marking happiness as the definitive end. Ultimately, because the good is in relation to what something is, he addresses and elucidates on eleven moral virtues from the irrational part of the soul and five intellectual virtues derived from the rational part of the soul; these virtues are supposed to bring one closer to the good. Seemingly the magnanimousness or great-souledness (one of

Although he acknowledges that the great-souled man is excessive in terms of greatness, he recognizes that he has found a middle term in regards to action. “The equal is also a certain middle term between excess and deficiency… every science in this way brings its work to good conclusion, by looking to the middle term and guiding the works toward this,” states Aristotle, signifying the balance every virtue should idealize. Although it is said that the great-souled man may appear idle or procrastinate, his actions have found a middle term and therefore, his idleness does not take away or add to his great-souledness because his middle term in accordance with action has already been established. Essentially, because all things aim at good and the highest good in relation to action is happiness, finding a middle term in action is a pivotal determinant of one’s

Without this “equipment,” he says “it is impossible or not easy for someone” to do what is noble. In agreement, to be a great-souled man requires one to also be concerned with external goods—albeit in measured ways. The great-souled man is concerned with “wealth, political powers as well as all good and bad fortune.” These external instruments correspond with honor, yet they are not great honors so their presence or lack thereof does not cause much grievance to the great-souled man. In fact, honor, itself is deemed the greatest external good. More importantly, Aristotle introduces the natural segment of the conversation by inferring that the “wellborn” perhaps deem themselves superior and therefore worthy of honor. He makes the same point about those who are not by nature superior, but are deemed so by convention. They are the ones who possess political power or wealth and also view themselves superior and worthy of honor. Although these external prosperities bring honor to one, the person who is honored due to his goodness is as a result more honorable. Those who are both good and possess external goods are then deemed to be the truly great-souled so long as they maintain the middle term and discharge in measured