The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit. GEN McClellan may not have been a great war time General but he excelled at training Soldiers, getting his men ready to fight and raising the morale of the Armies he commanded. Multiple historians and various political leaders agreed on this point about McClellan. In a statement, President Lincoln told John Hayes,” There is no man in the army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops into shape half as well as he” . As it can be seen from a statement from a prominent figure such as the President during the war, GEN McClellan was a Soldiers General, but the ability to get political leaders on his side was another story. His cautious attitude towards war soured his reputation with both congress. McClellan’s biggest political obstacle was Edward Stanton, the Secretary of War. He started to work on a petition that would end McClellan’s career. The petition charged McClellan with incompetence, as evidenced by the failure of his campaigns and their heavy losses, “And also because by recent disobedience to superior orders and inactivity he has twice imperiled the army commanded by General Pope, and while he continues to command will daily hazard the f... ... middle of paper ... ...United States Government US. Army Doctrine Reference Publication Adrp 6-0 Mission Command May 2012. Washington DC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012. Heidler, David Stephen, and Jeanne T. Heidler, eds. Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: a Political, Social, and Military History. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002. Kouzes, James M., and Barry Z. Posner. Credibility: How Leaders Gain and Lose It, Why People Demand It. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011. Sears, Stephen. “McClellan at Antietam.” www.civilwar.org. http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/antietam/history/mcclellan-at-antietam.html (accessed November 10, 2013) Sears, Stephen. “The Roar and Rattle’: McClellan’s Missed Opportunities at Antietam.” MHQ, April 26, 2010 Slotkin, Richard The Long Road to Antietam: How the Civil War Became a Revolution. London: Liveright, 2013.
Mission Command as defined by the United States Army consists six distinct and critical principles. During World War II there were many examples of exemplary mission command that led to stunning victories for the Allies but also many examples of failure. The Battle for Arnhem or Operation Market-Garden was such a failure. Major General Robert Elliot Urquhart, the Commander of the 1st Airborne Division failed in not only in tactics but the ability to lead his division to victory. He did not completely misunderstand the principles of mission command, but four main areas in which he made critical mistakes were; Build a Cohesive Team Through Mutual Trust, Create a Shared Understanding, Accept Prudent Risk, and Exercise Disciplined Initiative.
The purpose of this paper is to perform a mission command analysis of the Battle of Gettysburg, honing in on Pickett’s Charge. The Battle of Gettysburg took place on July 1st through July 3rd in 1863 in the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The belligerents were the Army of the Potomac, led by MG George G. Meade and the Army of Northern Virginia, led by GEN Robert E. Lee. The goal is to analyze the decisions of GEN Lee using the six mission command principles described in the Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 and then assess the outcome of those decisions.
The 7th Cavalry Regiment's destruction at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in June 1876 is the subject of over a century of debate. LTC George A. Custer failed to exercise four key responsibilities that were expected of him as the regiment’s commander. He failed to understand the problem and environment, visualize a feasible solution, clearly describe it to his subordinates, and effectively direct his forces. These four aspects of mission command are integral to the operations process and help Soldiers understand and execute their commander's intent. Custer's failure to properly fulfill his role in the operations process resulted in his death and a strategic defeat for the nation.
General Lee said, to be a good soldier you must love the army, to be a good general you must be prepared to order the death of the thing you love, and therein lies the great trap of soldiering. When you attack you must hold nothing back." Thomas J. Jackson was both a good soldier and a good general. In the Mexican War he fought with all his heart for his country. When the Civil War came, he was a general. He never hesitated to send his men forward. He held nothing back. George McClellan also fought with all his heart for his country in the Mexican War. When the time came to send his men forward in the Civil War, he couldn’t do it. He loved the army to much to order its death.
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
It is far easier for us in the present than it was for those at Gettysburg, to look back and determine the path that the leaders should have taken. As students, studying battles such as this, we have the advantage of hindsight, knowing the outcome. Nonetheless, we can still learn valuable lessons from it. To do so, this analysis will explore some of the decisions of the leaders at Gettysburg, and how they were affected by the operational variables. This essay will scrutinize some of the leaders at Gettysburg, and the impact of their actions. The outcome of this analysis will show that what was true in 1863 is still true today. While many variables are vital to a successful army on the battlefield, none should be neglected. Each variable discussed in this examination will prove to be important, but the information battle will be paramount in the battle of Gettysburg.
“Their differing perceptions of the nature of war form the backbone of the difficult relationship between these two men.” Lee, an older soldier, values much of an offensive warfare approach, while Longstreet values a defensive warfare approach. Both men consistently argue about the best option for the Confederacy. However, “no matter how much he might disagree, Longstreet defers to Lee’s decisions.” In an argument as to who was right, none of the developed tactics provide clear evidence as to what was going to work, especially with a military of lesser men, considering the war in 1863. Although General Lee’s tactics did not work during the Battle of Gettysburg, there is no evidence that General Longstreet’s defensive strategy would have worked significantly better. Therefore, neither of the generals exceeded the other when it comes to military strategies, which rather debunks Shaara’s depiction of Longstreet’s advanced knowledge of modern warfare. Despite of the importance of the Battle of Gettysburg, often marked as the turning point of the war, General Longstreet should not obey an order that results in a significant loss of men that would be extremely difficult to replace at this time. Already limited by the amount of men still able to fight, pushing additional forces in an open battle would just nearly deplete the confederate soldiers completely, and
...didn’t over step his authority or attempt to subvert the army for his own purposes. Instead, George Washington sets the example of the military commander who was subservient to civilian political leadership. He also showed patience and coolness in the face of adversity. On many occasions in the book, the author cites Washington’s expressions of doubt and fears of failure, yet Washington never showed fear or doubt in action in front of his troops.
Therefore, neither of the generals exceeded the other when it comes to military strategies, which rather debunks Shaara’s depiction of Longstreet’s advanced knowledge of modern warfare. Despite of the importance of the Battle of Gettysburg, often marked as the turning point of the war, General Longstreet should not obey an order that results in a significant loss of men that would be extremely difficult to replace at this time. Already limited by the amount of men still able to fight, pushing additional forces in an open battle would just nearly deplete the confederate soldiers completely. Since this battle was one that went on until a majority of ones sided were depleted, the south should have played it safe against the Unions nearly surplus supply of
The significance of this battle showcased the importance of good decision-making as well as bad decision-making. General Sherman practicing good mission command enabled a quick defeat of the Savannah region by quickly taking over Fort McAllister; whereas General Hardee’s bad decision to abandon Fort McAllister to keep the Savannah line augmented would cost not just the fort itself but the city of Savannah as it feel back under Union control.
Luvaas J., & Nelson H.W. (1987). The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Antietam The Maryland Campaign of 1862. (pg. 302). 3/21/2014
General George McClellan was a very qualified general. He graduated second in his class from west point, had new clever organization ideas for the army and had to command his army without helpful help of other people. McClellan was an "accomplished soldier and able engineer (Document D)". He had the best qualifications for the job as general; his removal was not a military improvement but an interference of politicians. President Lincoln never studied military tactics or commanded on a battlefield as McClellan had. Any advice that was given to McClellan by politicians did not help the army, McClellan believed that he owed no thanks to any people in Washington because if the army was saved it would be because of him because the politicians were telling him to sacrifice the lives of the soldiers (Document D), which in the end would only damage the army. General McClellan was the best man qualified and his removal was a loss to the army.
Abraham Lincoln was very ashamed of General George B. McClellan because he had continuous amounts of defeats and his possible lack of dedication. On November 7, Lincoln replaced General McClellan with General Ambrose E. Burnside even though Burnside did not think he was right for the job. General Burnside was a very well-trained soldier and Lincoln was very impressed with his amount of battles won. Before General McClellan was fired by Abraham Lincoln had ordered an attack on General Robert E. Lee, general of the Confederate army, but even though he was fired, the battle still had to go on and General Burnside had to won this battle.
Fifteen months of tense relations between President Abraham Lincoln and General George McClellan resulted in the dismissal of the Union Army’s once promising leader of the Eastern theater. While McClellan believed that he did not have the support of the President, and therefore resisted orders, what were the underlying factors that led to this decision? Why did the general all but ensure the end of his military careen with months of ignoring orders and bantered correspondence with his Commander-in-Chief? This research discusses the army that McClellan built in the early stages of the war, but failed to use as the President commanded, as well as, provides insight into the final reasons for his removal.
Kouzes, J. & Posner, B. (1995). Credibility How Leaders Gain and Lose It, Why People Demand It (Revised Edition). California: Jossey-Bass.