Introduction
The scientific revolution started in the 16th and 17th century with development of the scientific theories (Hatch, n.d.). These Scientific theories are detailed explanation of some aspect of the natural world, based on knowledge that has been repeatedly duplicated through observation and experimental procedures. The understanding or the attempt to understand the human’s perspective of the world through scientific theories is the birth to the philosophy of science (Okasha, 2002). Several perspectives of scientific theories have been postulated by many on the history and philosophy of science. One of such is the Kuhn theory of science development postulated by Thomas Kuhn. His theory brought about a new perspective where scientific theories are placed in an umbrella of a grand theory called the paradigm. Thomas Kuhn who was born in 1922 in Cincinnati, studied physics at Harvard, graduating summa cum laude in 1943, applied his knowledge of quantum physics to humanities of science developing the Kuhn theory of science development (Bird, 2012). Although, earlier perspective of the process for the development of science is based on the ideology of linear cumulative addition to existing theory, the focus of this essay will on Kuhn’s view of process of science development; where normal science undergoes a periodic Paradigm shift as a result the questionable accumulation of anomalies (Okasha, 2002). This essay will give a brief analysis of the Kuhn theory of scientific development, also discussing the strength as applied to social sciences as well as its weaknesses in biological sciences; which is centered on the argument of incommensurability and paradigm replacement.
Kuhn’s paradigm and paradigm shift
According to Kuhn, ...
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...d. New York: W.W. Norton.
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The unificationist account of explanation and the notion of ad hoc-ness as posited by Popper are very similar concepts, but there is a nuance between the two that is worth explaining. Although both notions seem to show why we choose certain explanatory theories over others, they differ in that the model of unification shows us what type of theory we should accept, while Popper’s notion of ad hoc-ness shows us what type of theory to reject. Together, these concepts help us better understand the explanatory model of unification which leads us to a better understanding of why we are inclined to accept certain scientific theories over others. In this paper, I will attempt to show that falsifying theories based on Popper’s ad hoc-ness criteria strengthens the idea of unification by giving people a more specific way of eliminating competing scientific theories in search of the most unified one. First, I will briefly describe the unificationist account of explanation, then I will explain the idea of ad hoc-ness as laid out by Popper, and finally I will show how ad hoc-ness can be used to strengthen the account of unification by means of increasing its objectivity and by providing simpler explanations.
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Directions: Read the essay entitled The Scientific Revolution: The Disenchanting of the Universe and respond to each of the following questions as thoroughly as possible. Your answers can be either hand-written (in ink) or word-processed. However, you must paraphrase—answer in your own words. If you quote directly from the essay, you should then interpret the quote.
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In the essay “Studies In the Logic of Explanation”, Carl Hempel attempts to break down scientific explanation into its fundamental components in pursuit of defining what it means to explain a phenomenon scientifically. In doing so, he proposes a set of rigorous criteria that he believes constitute a true explanation. He starts by separating an explanation “into two major constituents, the explanandum and the explanans” (136). The explanandum is the phenomenon that is to be explained, while the explanans represent a series of statements which “account for the phenomenon” (137). According to Hempel, the explanans can be further subdivided into particular antecedent conditions and certain general laws which can be combined in such a way to
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A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn. "Science and Non science: Defining the Boundary." Part 1. Pages 6-19. [...]
The Deductive-Nomological (D-N) Model gives an account of explanation through its basic form, the Covering Law Model. The D-N Model asks the basic question “What is a scientific explanation?” The aim of this paper is to answer that question and further develop the definition of an explanation by problematizing the D-N Model’s account of explanation, providing a solution to one of those problems, and then further problematizing that solution. By examining the details of an example that the D-N Model explains well, we can see why this model was popular in the first place before describing two of its major problems. Then, by looking at Wesley Salmon’s account of scientific explanation, we can see just how problematic the flaws in the D-N Model
This essay aims to discuss the problems of the common view of science which was presented by Alan Chalmers by Popperian's view and my personal opinions. Chalmers gives his opinion about what science is and the judgment will be made in this essay through the Popperian hypothetico-deductive and my arguments will be presented in this essay. Popperian is an important philosopher of science who developed hypothetico-deductive method, which is also known as falsificationism. In my opinion, I disagree Chlamer points of view of science and this will be present in essay later. I will restrict my arguments into three parts due to the word limitation. Three aspects will be discussed in this essay: justifying the view through the Popper's view, my agreement about the Popper's objections and additional personal opinions.
Charlesworth, M. (1982). Science, non-science & pseudo-science : Bacon, Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend on defining science. Vic: Deakin University Press
Kuhn’s book was focused on the scientific world. He said that normal science “means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievments, achievments thatsome particular scientific community aacknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (Kuhn 10). These achievments needed to be unprecedented and open-ended so as to attract a group away from competing ideas and to leave all sorts of problems for this group to resolve. these achievments are called paradigms. a paradigm is defined by Kuhn as “an accepted canon of scientific practice, including laws, theory, applications, and instrumentation, that provides a model for a particular coherent tradition of scientific research” (Trigger 5).
The two fundamental components of Kuhn’s proposition of scientific revolutions are the concepts of paradigms and paradigm shifts. He defines paradigms as “sufficiently unprecedented [theories] to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity” (Kuhn, 10). Through this interpretation, Kuhn constructs the argument that possessing the ability to convince other scientists to agree with a novel proposal serves as the most crucial aspect for establishing scientific advancement. Kuhn reasons that the task of discovering “one full, objective, true account of nature” remains to be highly improbable (Kuhn...
This essay will discuss differences in motives which have driven ancient and modern science, arguing that 17th century alterations of power structures led to the ultimate division between modern and ancient science and the eruption of modern science as it is today. Comparisons will be drawn regarding knowledge accessibility, prevailing philosophies and ideologies, and the relationship between science and the church.
Thomas Kuhn's book The Copernican Revolution effectively demonstrates how the conceptual schemes of science are constantly changing and being replaced. Kuhn was able to recount the past with diagrams, and full explanations of the different theories and systems that lead up to the Copernican revolution. He also gave a full explanation of the theories that followed. This book was surprisingly enjoyable to read, and should be read by anyone interested in the evolution of science and western thought.