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Does behaviorism reject or accept cartesian dualism
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The science of mind philosophy
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When we view the philosophy of mind we encounter many problems, the main being that although there are many theories on this topic it is impossible to prove any of them and thus this problem is still unresolved. How is it that we can understand more about the universe and science than ever before but do not understand what it is that enables us to understand, that is the mind? To answer this rather complicated problem there are many solutions, or theories, each with their good points but none which are totally convincing, though some seem more though than others. These theories are Dualism, the belief that mind and matter are different substances, behaviourism, the belief that for every mental state you can observe a behaviour, physicalism, the belief that mind is brain, and functionalism, the belief that is something puts out the right outputs or acts like it ahs a mind then it is conscious. Added to this are the problems of whether other people have minds, and what constitutes personal identity. Each of these areas has its own arguments for and against and, it seems, is highly criticised.
The first theory in the philosophy of mind is dualism, which in basic terms, is the belief that mind is a different substance to matter. Dualists use Leibniz’s law, if A = B then A must have the same properties as B, to argue that because matter is subject to the physical sciences while mind is not, then they must be different ‘stuff’s. Mind and matter are also different in other ways. Firstly we can, to a point, locate a piece of matter in time and space and observe that piece of matter. But mind is totally different, you can’t locate a though and it’s generally believed that the mind is private and can’t be observed. So you can easily conclude that mind is different to matter because they have different properties, A doesn’t equal B. And because mind is some kind of substance, it can’t be nothing, it only fits that there is two kinds of substances, mind and matter.
However although dualism is the most straight forward of the theories it is also one of the most criticised views. Critics of dualism generally use the problem of interaction to deny this view. Under this two bits of matter can interact because they are the same substance, but two fundamentally different substances, such as mind and matter, could not possibly interact. The problem is they clearly do inter...
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... class, there is now a slight doubt in my mind as to this.
As to what I believe in the case of personal identity, I myself am not quite sure what it is I think. I believe a continuation of the brain is important, as well as behaviour and preferences. The problem is even I can not be sure that I am the same Rebecca as the one who wrote the previous paragraph just two minutes ago, not for certain. I believe I am her, have her body and her thoughts, but how can I be sure? I think I’ll just assume then that it may be enough for a combination of animalism; the brain must be the same, as well as a continuation of memories preferences and personality. I couldn’t be that same Rebecca of tow minutes ago if I were to like marshmallows and she didn’t.
To conclude this essay it must be said that each of the theories, dualism, behaviourism, physicalism, and functionalism are complicated, and all of which are believed by different people. Each ahs arguments for and against and is quite believable and none are able to be proven. The problem of other minds and personal identity is still unresolved, as is the entire philosophy of mind. This topic will probably remain unresolved for some time.
Personal identity, in the context of philosophy, does not attempt to address clichéd, qualitative questions of what makes us us. Instead, personal identity refers to numerical identity or sameness over time. For example, identical twins appear to be exactly alike, but their qualitative likeness in appearance does not make them the same person; each twin, instead, has one and only one identity – a numerical identity. As such, philosophers studying personal identity focus on questions of what has to persist for an individual to keep his or her numerical identity over time and of what the pronoun “I” refers to when an individual uses it. Over the years, theories of personal identity have been established to answer these very questions, but the
This paper will discuss the dualism’s Divisibility Argument. This argument relies on Leibniz’s Law and uses a different property to prove the distinctness of brain states of mental states. Mary, who is a materialist, presents several objections to that argument. Her main objection corresponds to the first/third-person approach. She believes that Dave presents that argument only from the first-person approach, which is introspection, and totally disregards the third-person approach, which is observation of another mind. Mary’s objections will follow by the Dave’s response on them from the dualist’s point of view.
Richard Taylor explained why the body and the mind are one, and why they are not two separate substances. In the article “The Mind as a Function of the Body”, Taylor divides his article in a number of sections and explains clearly why dualism, or the theory that the mind and the body are separate is not conceivable. In one of these sections it is explained in detail the origin of why some philosophers and people believe in dualist metaphysics. As stated by Taylor “when we form an idea of a body or a physical object, what is most likely to come to mind is not some person or animal but something much simpler, such as a stone or a marble”(133). The human has the tendency to believe a physical object as simple, and not containing anything complex. A problem with believing this is that unlike a stone or a marble a human (or an animal) has a brain and the body is composed of living cells (excluding dead skin cells, hair, and nails which are dead cells). The f...
Along with an argument usually comes a counter-argument or rebuttal. The main question about the mind-body issue is how can us humans determine the interaction between mind and matter. I believe property dualism is a logic, justifiable response because it separates the mental entity from brain states, and shows how it can be related to physical substances. The knowledge argument helps convey this view because it shows how non-physical properties such as consciousness, can be proven in any given person. The problems of interaction argument is a well structured rebuttal against property dualism, mostly because it brings about the issue that the mind is not a physical entity, thus it 's not possible for a non-physical substance to interact with a physical substance. According to scientism, this statement is correct but it can be refuted through a different perspective. A dualist could respond to this and bring out multiple points. The first one being that yes, the mind does act upon or bodies and the issue is only apparent, and does not exist. A good example of this can be pain. If a human breaks a bone, the pain is brought to the mental state of the person, then passed on to the brain for processing. This is direct evidence for the argument, and shows how the mind and body can interact. A second point I would consider a rebuttal for this argument, a dualist could
Descartes’s approach to understanding the difference between mind and matter initially began by him doubting all truths which he had grown up believing to be true. He believed that if anything he held to be true was ever deceiving, he would reject its reliability all together. This extreme doubt resulted in Descartes
Fodor develops the idea of functionalism by combining certain parts of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory. From logical behaviorism, Fodor incorporates the idea that mental processes can be represented by physical if-then statements. As such, behavior and mental causation are no longer distinct and unable to interact. Also, logical behaviorism provides a way for mental causes to interact with other mental causes. This, in turn, may result in a behavioral effect. The last point is also a characteristic of the central-state identity theory. One doctrine of the central-state identity theory is called "token physicalism." Token physicalism states that all mental states that currently exist are neurophysiological. Thus, token physicalism does not place physical restrictions on the type of substance capable of having mental properties. When the points of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, as described here, are combined, functionalism is the result. The theory of functionalism supposes that a m...
The mind versus the body has been a debate for many years, debate has always proven to be an extremely controversial discussion between various people and their beliefs. For many the idea of the mind being separated from the body is impossible to even think about and unreasonable, yet others may argue that mind can in fact be an entity apart from a physical body. Those who are monist believe that the world is simply made up of one substance, and minds must be contained in a tangible body in order to exist (“Monism”). Contrastingly, dualists emphasize the idea that the mind and the body are each compsed of different substances, allowing the pair to be separate. While these ideas have been unde scrutiny
Dualism is the theory that mind and matter are two distinct things. The main argument for dualism is that facts about the objective external world of particles and fields of force, as revealed by modern physical science, are not facts about how things appear from any particular point of view, whereas facts about subjective experience are precisely about how things are from the point of view of individual conscious subjects. They have to be described in the first person as well as in the third person.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
So, in conclusion theory of mind is a method of explaining human social interaction, which goes some distance to explaining our somewhat seemingly planetary unique ability to empathise, comprehend, and guess others actions and behaviour. It has been researched by a number of psychologists in the field, and is an extremely useful and viable tool in explaining some of the complexities of the human condition. It has a central position in the field of evolutionary psychology, and will continue to do so; with good reason, for without its presence a large amount of the remainder of the psychological spectrum would have difficulty understanding anything about the human mind.
Every since Plato introduced the idea of dualism thousands of years ago meta-physicians have been faced with the mind-body problem. Even so Plato idea of dualism did not become a major issue of debate in the philosophical world until the seventeenth century when French philosopher Rene Descartes publicized his ideas concerning the mental and physical world. During this paper, I will analyze the issue of individuation and identity in Descartes’ philosophical view of the mind-body dualism. I will first start by explaining the structure of Cartesian dualism. I will also analyze the challenges of individuation and identity as they interact with Descartes. With a bit of luck, subsequently breaking down Descartes’ reasoning and later on offering my response, I can present wit a high degree of confidence that the problems of individuation and identity offer a hindrance to the Cartesians’ principle of mind-body dualism. I give a critical analysis of these two problems, I will first explain the basis of Descartes’ philosophical views.
Briefly, we can conclude by deduction that body, brain, and soul are not sufficient to explain personal identity. Personal identity and immortality will always cause questions to arise from philosophers, as well as other individuals, and although many philosophers may object and disagree, the memory criterion offers the most sufficient explanation.
Physicalism of the human mind is a doctrine that states that the world is ‘entirely physical’, and can be described in various ways. One way it can be described is that minds, mental properties and mental processes are visibly not physical phenomena. Terms such as “mind,” “thinking,” and “feeling” do not play in the theories of fundamental physics. For example, in this slim sense of “physical,” a lung is not a physical object, inhalation is not a physical property and diffusion is not a physical process; as in the terms “lung,” “inhalation,” and “diffusion” do not have a role in the theories of fundamental physics. Acknowledging that mental phenomena are not physical in this slim sense is not vastly acknowledging. However, certainly there is an open sense of the word “physical” in which a lung, inhalation, and diffusion are certainly physical phenomena. Physicalism of the human mind proclaims that human minds, mental properties and mental processes are physical in this open sense of “physical.” A clear open sense of “physical” is contentious in the philosophy of the mind. A common view is: “An individual item (e.g., object, property-instance, or process) is physical in the broad sense if, and only if, it meets either of two conditions: (1) it’s an item of a kind that can in principle be defined in the distinctive vocabulary of fundamental physics; or (2) it’s a physically realized item of a functional kind.” The first condition is straight forward, but the second condition evidently demands clarification. Accordingly, a “functional” kind of thing is one in which its existence entails in the actuality of “something or other” that encounters a convinced measurement where the structure and functioning of the “something or other” does not matter as long as it encounters the functioning in request. For instance, a lung is a functional kind of object in my sense. Therefore,
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows: