Actors make choices in order to further their political interests, yet they cannot always get what they want. One actor´s political outcome depends on the choices of other actors. When actors´ choices combine to produce political outcomes it is product of interactions. The interests of relevant actors combine to produce interactions. Interactions are divided into two classes: Bargaining and Cooperation. Bargaining is an interaction where actors choose from outcomes in which none can be better off without making others worse off (51). In a dispute over territory, a decision that resulted in one country becoming independent form another is beneficial to the newly sovereign nation but will make the former worse off having lost territory and other resources. Interactions can be cooperative when actors share an interest in mutually beneficial outcomes. Cooperation is an interaction that involves actors working together and adopting policies to achieve a preferred outcome (42). This results in at least one actor better off without making others worse off. There are two types of cooperative interactions: coordination and collaboration. Coordination results when actors benefit from making the same choices and results in few incentives to deviate from an order once it is established (53). The Gold Standard during the 19th and 20th centuries is an example of coordination in which gold was the world’s global currency standard for international trade. Once the global currency standard was set, there was no incentive to not comply. Collaboration results when actors gain from working together but have incentives not to comply because it requires that they sacrifice something they already have for greater benefits in the future (53). The Prisone...
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..., resolve ambiguities in the agreement and allow mutually beneficial cooperation” (67). If a state thought that another state was violating an agreement they could take that case to an institution that contains explicit resolution procedures to interpret the agreement, identify the violator and the victim, take measures and defuse dispute from escalating.
Institutions face two major limitations when trying to encourage states to cooperate: They cannot hold states accountable and are limited by the interests of their member states. Institutions cannot directly enforce cooperation. States alone must choose whether and how to penalize those who fail to cooperate. Institutions are also heavily influenced by the interests and agendas of their member states. The more powerful states and hegemons have a greater say in the making of rules and standards of the institution.
” Before I go on, I feel it necessary to define some key phrases in this resolution: ? Economic sanctions- the deliberate, government inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations. "Customary" does not mean "contractual"; it simply means levels of trade and financial activity that would probably have occurred in the absence of sanctions. ? To achieve- to fulfill ?
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Shiraev, Eric B., and Vladislav M. Zubok. International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Silver, Larry.
Decisions are difficult, especially between two opposing parties determined to get their way. Most likely, some sort of agreement called a compromise is reached. Compromise, a seemingly perfect concept, can be an essential part of success as it resolves conflicts on both an international or personal level and benefits both sides of any argument. However, if this tool is used incorrectly by means of overuse, underuse, or simply wrong timing, that perfection turns into detriment.
Supported by the domestic intuitional framework, which details that political outcomes are results of a variation in the “rules of the game,” producers are the ones to benefit from a floating exchange rate. Interests are translated into policy via domestic institutions. For example, Congress and farm subsidies. Individuals are interested in their own well-being. Winners gain by lobbying because they prove better than their opponent. In this framework, politicians decide based on majority principles and an increased demand for a country’s products. With more money flow, businesses have incentives to increase domestic prices (Wellhausen 10-2-14). Being so, exchange rate policy is homily political in that it is chosen by a differentiation in the “rules of the game.” Again, everyone sets out to seek their own best interests. Within this same framework, politicians find themselves in a catch-22: although they choose that which is to come, in doing so, they face vast amounts of pressures. Special interest groups and mass public opinions alone carry enough weight to affect any course profoundly and profusely (Frieden, p.
which infers working towards a goal in harmony. The Maastricht Treaty sounds like an ideal proposal on paper, but in reality it can't work. In order to adopt the treaty several countries will have to make sacrifices. The sacrificial. Nobody likes to make sacrifices.
...by all countries. Disagreements between countries should be handled tactfully so as to avoid wars and resultant occupation. The United Nations should have more powers to enact resolutions passed. The spread of democracy should be encouraged on so that several sovereign governments can deal with problems amicably.
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
However, the structure and process of international relations, since the end of World War II, has been fundamentally impacted through an immense growth of a variety of factors at multiple levels, which leads to the liberalist theoretical perspective of global complex interdependency. The complex interdependency is constructed from the liberalist theoretical perspective emphasizing interdependence between states and substate actors as the key characteristics of the international system (Ray and Kaarbo 7), which means that cooperation can be made more te...
Globalization and the increasing role of non-state actors have shifted the position of states, the traditional “main players” in global governance. However, whether this change undermines states is debatable. In one sense, states’ roles have somewhat diminished: Non-governmental entities – namely transnational corporations (TNC), but also global non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others – have an increasing voice in global policy debates, which may lessen states’ influence in governmental affairs. But in several other key ways, states’ retain their powerful role. For example, states remain the key negotiators and entities in major global governance entities. Additionally, states retain compulsory power over their subjects or constituents, a form of control that new players in global governments have generally not obtained.
The international system is an anarchical system which means that, unlike the states, there is no over ruling, governing body that enforces laws and regulations that all states must abide by. The International System in today’s society has become highly influential from a number of significant factors. Some of these factors that will be discussed are Power held by the state, major Wars that have been fought out in recent history and international organisations such as the U.N, NATO and the W.T.O. Each of these factors, have a great influence over the international system and as a result, the states abilities to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development”.
Realist perspective explains globalization in terms of the relative distribution of power (Nau 2007, 278). In their opinion, trade and economic activities thrives “only under favorable security conditions,” and those conditions rely on the relative distribution of power (Nau 2007, 279). They believe that alliances and hegemony are the two most affirmative security conditions. “’Free trade is more likely within than across political-military alliances; and …alliances have had a much stronger effect on trade in a bipolar than in to a multipolar world.’” (Nau 2007, 279) In other words, the fewer dominating states with power there are in the system, the stronger is the alliance and its effect on trade. In a multipolar world, countries cannot trust each other in trade because alliances are rarely permanent and therefore, countries might use the gains from trade to increase its military power and threaten to cause damage to the other country. Thus, realists argue that,
There are three main arguments concerning the discussion over the amount of power regimes have in the international system. The neo-realist argument is the first one where regimes are not merely considered as inadequate, but sometimes deceptive. This perspective is regarded as conventional structural. Keohane and Stein support the second argument, which states that regimes have certain worth, but only under particular conditions. Finally, the Grotian argument perceives regimes as an essential, secondary phenomenon feature of human nature. The connection of international and domestic stakeholders, through benefits, influence, standards, societies, and knowledge lead to the likely development of regimes.
Today's world is full of problems present on an international scale. Yet, differences amongst states compel them to eschew cooperation. The division between the global North and South is the greatest challenge to global governance. The contrast in economic welfare, political stability, and culture among states creates many dilemmas for the international community. The economic differences between highly developed economies and the rest of the world deters cooperation. In addition, social differences between North and South create cultural clashes that breed violence, and adds difficulty to forming international norms. Moreover, the political weakness of some states in the global South create security dilemmas and keep global governance initiatives away from success. The international order is skewed in favour of the global North and serves to empower them. However, international leaders can solve these issues by promoting global equity. In order for global governance to achieve its fullest potential, the world must first address the inequality of states.
Joel R Campbell, Leena Thacker Kumar, and Steve Slagle. "Bargaining Sovereignty: State Power and Networked Governance in a Globalizing World." International Social Science Review 85.3/4 (2010): 107. Print.