Philosophers say this proves that it cannot have been just random chance. Design qua purpose looks at the evidence of design in terms of how all ... ... middle of paper ... ... to change your beliefs. I.e. it won't convince an atheist. However, the idea of the universe just being here, a brute fact, a product of blind chance and nothing more is a personally unsatisfactory one due to the extraordinary nature of the universe and so whist the Design Argument may not conclusively prove the existence of God it suggests that the existence of a Designer, who we know as God, is a more probable likelihood than not.
Henry feels that these three propositions are true and that the Skeptics themselves follow these rules. Thus skepticism is incorrect and we can have knowledge. Skeptics disagree with Henry since they believe we can act with only belief. According to Plato knowledge is a justified true belief(Nozick 1981,170). Skeptics believe that is impossible to verify truth, thus we can have no knowledge since do not have truth(Henry 2002,101-102).
In this paper I will explain why Stace’s argument fails, more specifically his approach to inductive reasoning. In doing so, I will also dispute Stace’s proposed thesis that the only things that exist are minds and sense data; his denial of the existence of material objects. Stace reasons that when one uses deduction to prove the existence of unperceived objects, it results in two assertions about the object that turn out to be inconsistent when held in conjunction: object X exists now and that it does not exist when no one is experiencing it. Stace then goes on to explain why reasoning by induction does not result in a justified reason to believe in unperceived objects as well. His argument goes something like this: To reason from induction, one must have “found certain observed cases true that will also be true in unobserved cases.” According to Stace, this also fails because there are no observed cases of an unobserved object.
The subject becomes very sloppy and seemingly endless to the point of no solid conclusions on free will and determinism. In response to both sides I remain neutral and believe both sides are flawed in their argument's because even though incompatibilists bring a slightly stronger argument to the table there is also a lot of underlying confusion such as the Libertarian Dilemma. Compatibilits have a weak argument because they believe free will and determinism can co exist but I do not see how it is possible because they are conflicting ideas. How can free will exist in a pre determined society when we do not have a clue if we are part of a causal chain or physical chain? There are no real facts or conclusions on both sides.
When you go through McCloskey’s argument it shows many flaws in his reasoning as he wanted to show that it is impossible that there is a God. Throughout McCloskey’s article he refers to that theist do not a proofs that there is a God, thus they should not be used. The problem with this is that atheist and theist would have to purge of most of their arguments for the reason that most everything does not prove the argument. McCloskey is correct that the “proofs” do not completely establish that there is a God, but they do give us a better understanding about the world and if there is a God. The cosmological and the teleological arguments are only argument, thus they do not completely prove that there is a God as Dr. Foreman says, “that these argument give us a best explanation” (Foreman).
H.J McCloskey’s article, “On Being an Atheist,” is an attempt to show atheism as a more practical alternative to the Christian belief. McCloskey reasons against the theistic beliefs of the cosmological argument, the teleological argument and design. He references the presence of evil in a world created by God and the absurdity of living by faith. This article is an attempt to reason that God does not exist because He is perfect and the world is not perfect; evil exists therefore God cannot exist. McCloskey’s article labels these arguments as “proofs” and concludes none of these arguments would be evidence of God’s existence.
Verifiability can’t reach absolute truth because of the complications with induction. Falsifiability can’t reach absolute truth for a couple reasons. First, proving that a theory is false only verifies that the negation is true. That’s not much concerning scientific advancement. Second is because of falsifiability identification, with the demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science, a (supposed) true theory can’t be scientific, because it can’t be falsified.
The second was is efficient because, nothing brings its self into existence. The third is, possibility and necessity [!]. Aqunhias’ has two more ‘ways’ but for the purpose of this essay I won’t be focusing on them heavily. These ways have started philosophers to debate and question his arguments ultimately made the cosmological argument debatable. The cosmological argument is however not a valid argument in explaining the existence of god because the conclusions do not logically follow the premises.
His counterclaims to some theories are rather redundant and weak. He clearly disagrees with Nietzsche’s take on truth, but did not provide convincing backup claims to defend his position of why the question “What is truth?” is unnecessary. In addition, Lynch’s argument towards the redundancy theory is also not clear and satisfactory enough because simply dismissing objections as blind generalizations gives a sense that he has nothing better to say to defend his position. One of the theories mentioned believes that power is the source of motivation behind truth to which I have to disagree. There are many factors, like self-interest, morality, and knowledge, that motivate the will to truth and power is only one of the many and cannot be used as the overarching factor.
Laudan's Theory of Scientific Aims I criticize Laudan's constraints on cognitive aims as presented in Science and Values. These constraints are axiological consistency and non-utopianism. I argue that (i) Laudan's prescription for non utopian aims is too restrictive because it excludes ideals and characterizes as irrational or non-rational numerous human contingencies. (ii) We aim to ideals because there is no cogent way to specify in advance what degree of deviation from an ideal is acceptable. Thus, one cannot dispense with ideals.