What philosophers had been saying could simply not be said. Their philosophy was beyond the scope of what could be said and was therefore nonsense. By plotting the limits of language, Wittgenstein expected to be able to deal with the problems of philosophy finally. Outside the limits of what can be said lies nonsense, so any theory of language must occur within these limits. Wittgenstein thought that the nature of language could tell us what can and cannot be done with it.
A Unified Theory of Names ABSTRACT: Theoreticians of names are currently split into two camps: Fregean and Millian. Fregean theorists hold that names have referent-determining senses that account for such facts as the change of content with the substitution of co-referential names and the meaningfulness of names without bearers. Their enduring problem has been to state these senses. Millian theorists deny that names have senses and take courage from Kripke's arguments that names are rigid designators. If names had senses, it seems that their referents should vary among possible worlds.
W.T. Stace uses his paper “The Refutation of Realism” to argue that we have no good reason to believe in the existence of objects unperceived by any finite mind. His argument reflects one of exhaustion, in which he claims that the only two ways to argue for the existence of these unperceived objects, is either by inductive or deductive methods. Because both of these fail, we have no way to provide good reason for the belief that objects exist while unperceived. In this paper I will explain why Stace’s argument fails, more specifically his approach to inductive reasoning.
(1) This view holds that in understanding a text, historical event, cultural phenomenon or perhaps anything at all, objectivity is not a suitable ideal because there does not exist any one correct interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation. In Gadamer's words, "understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity as well" (G 280; E 296); it is a "fusion of horizons" of the past and present, objective and subjective (G 289; E 306). At the same time, Gadamer wants to steer clear of an "anything-goes" relativism. In other words, in Gadamer's view, understanding is a process that invites and even demands a plurality of interpretations, but not at the expense of giving up criteria that distinguish right ones from wrong ones. What exactly are Gadamer's grounds for denying the existence of a uniquely correct interpretation of a text, object, or event?
After discussing the relevant possibilities, I conclude that there is no category within the limits of his system that can accommodate the faculties and allow them to do the work Hume assigned to them. I then note that Hume’s rejection of substantival mind rests upon the assumption that something like substantival mind exists; for the action of the latter is required for the proper functioning of the process of fabrication which creates the fictitious notion of substantival mind. My concluding argument is that if the existence of substantival mind is implicit in Hume’s argument against substantival mind, then his argument resembles an indirect proof, and ought to be considered as evidence for, rather than against, the existence of substantival mind. It is well known that David Hume rejected any idea of a 'substance of the mind' that would account for, among other things, personal identity. I will attempt to show that Hume's argument against the existence of substantival mind presupposes that such an entity actually ... ... middle of paper ... ...ated into complex by chance, should at the level of impressions have recourse to no other 'agent'.
Davidson argues for "the folly of trying to define truth" and claims that Tarski's "accomplishment was accompanied by a proof that truth cannot (given various plausible assumptions) be defined in general" (Davidson, 1996:269). Tarski's plausible assumptions are that his "semantic conception of truth" can be formulated only for formal languages which are not semantically closed. But these assumptions are not so plausible as they seem since it can be shown that if we accept them it is impossible to formulate a theory of truth because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations (Nesher, 1996). Yet Davidson concludes from Tarski's theory of truth that "there cannot be definition of `For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if ... s ... L'."
Following Hume's recognition that we cannot in principle have any experience of an experience transcending objectivity as such, Husserl's Phenomenological Epoche (1) suspends judgement on whether or not such a realm of "things-in-themselves" exists. Thus our experiences of material objects and descriptions thereof can no more be shown to correspond to such an "objective" standard than can our experiences and descriptions of immaterial objects and conscious states. Consequently interpersonal and intercultural communications concerning the supposedly "public" objects etc. of the material world seem no less problematic than Wittgenstein (2) and others have shown communication concerning the "private" objects of the immaterial world (of fantasies, dreams etc.) to be.
While Wittgenstein’s Tractatus keeps issues of metaphysics and ontology at arm’s length, the world it presents seems altogether monistic in character. In Wittgenstein’s account, it is a world of objects and facts, a world which lacks selves, values, cognitive relations (such as belief), and God. I argue that the Tractarian world is nevertheless dualistic. I defend the view that the Tractatus points away from monism towards dualism and that Wittgenstein’s concepts of thought, sense, and understanding are an essential part of its structure. The language Wittgenstein uses was necessitated by his project of giving a sharp account of the nature of description.
Yet, before Chalmers claims that bedrock concepts are somehow primitive, so it does not seem like they could be translucent to us, if by translucent he means that they regress into a mere verbal dispute! Thus, there is no way to resolve bedrock disputes in a general story that is parallel to the general story of resolving verbal disputes. References Works Cited (1) Chalmers, David J. 2011. Verbal Disputes.
Davidson argues that metaphor is somehow a matter of bringing out similarities between things or states of affairs. Davidson argues that this “bringing out” is purely causal and no way linguistic and that hearing the metaphor has the effect of making us see a similarity. Davidson theory is quickly thrown out by the positivists’ verificationism because such sentences are not verifiable in an ordinary empirical way, which makes them not cognitively meaningful (Lycan, 177). Following this view “metaphorical meaning” does not exist and there is only emotive or affective significance. Davidson contends that these sentences do have meaning and that the meanings they have are just their literal meanings.