What is Mind?
In philosophy, the majority of studies relate to the mind. Whether it is the main subject or just a helpful side topic to move the main subject along, this term is used often. Defining the term mind is difficult, and is a topic that is popularly studied and debated among philosophers. These qualified and knowledgeable people try to determine whether or not the mind is who people are or if they are their body or a combination. Although they have learned many helpful truths and defined other useful terms, the debate is still evident in the philosophical community today. Learning about how the mind relates to the body, and whether the mind and the brain are the same thing are other ways to look at the many options of how to discern
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Physicalism, also known as materialism, is a view on the relationship between the mind and the body. Physicalism states that the mind and body are connected; every nonphysical thing can be explained by physics and/or occurs in a physical form (Physicalism, 1999). Philosophers who have studied and trust this concept believe that things like feelings, thoughts, and other similar things are explainable through science. There are philosophers who argue that though one can know everything there is to know about the color red, while never having experienced red (Demircioglu, 2013). Though, in physicalism, red may not be solely scientific, it is also not just a concept. On the other hand, dualism claims feelings, thoughts, and the like are totally separate from the body because they are not physically there in the brain or elsewhere (Robb, 2005). Dualism, however, brings the mind body problem up for …show more content…
One is that of Qualia. Qualia is a belief that there are unexplainable, completely non-physical qualities, such as colors, tastes, pain, feelings, etc., that are apparent in our daily experiences (Metaphysics Part I − Philosophy of Mind Lecture 5, 2015). Describing these qualities is completely different from living them. This makes them appear as completely separate from the body. To reinforce physicalism, though, there is interactionism. Interactionism says that body stimuli causes mental states (Metaphysics Part I − Philosophy of Mind Lecture 5, 2015). Stimuli such as tickling or poking can cause a mental state like pleasure or pain. These things are not physical, but they have physical
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
In this paper, I will argue that it is more likely that the qualia of colour could be explained by physicalism rather than by property dualism. Qualia are subjective experiences, such as our senses (pg. 3). Physicalism views every property as physical, and can be explained by science (pg. 29). Property dualism refers to the philosophical view that minds are made out of one substance, but contain physical properties, and a non-physical mind (qualia) that are not related to each other (pg. 29).
Taylor, Richard. "The Mind as a Function of the Body." Exploring Philosophy. 4th ed. New York: Oxford UP, 2012. 131-138. Print.
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
Despite having contrary qualities and fundamentally opposing natures, the mind and body are intertwined and interact with one another. Interactive dualism hold the idea that the mind is eternal and has the ability to exist apart from the body. Descartes holds the idea that if the physical realm in which the body material body exists ceased to exist, the mind would still be. However, if a circumstance arose which annihilated his ability to think, he would cease to exist. Interactive dualism explores the idea that the body is simply an extension of the forms of the individual in the physical world, that the demise of the material body does not render its fundamental nature to be obsolete. Interactive dualism can seem to diminish the importance of the material body, but it does not. Descartes states that the mind and body are united and interact so closely that it seems to create one whole. This unity is expressed by when the physical body experiences pain. If the mind simply related to the body in the manner a sailor relates to a ship, the mind would simply perceive pain through
Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying "Dr. Lux is hungry," one would say "If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it." The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeley’s representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
Physicalism, to further specify, states that everything is dependent upon the physical world, and that there is nothing over and above the physical world. It states that everything can be defined in purely physical terms. This view has many implications, especially within the philosophy of mind, where it stands in stark contrast to dualism which puts the mind above the physical world. This focus on the philosophy of mind is, in part, due to it producing most of the objections that appear against physicalism. Within the philosophy of mind, physicalism states that all mental states can be equated to some physical state. Note that this does not necessarily imply the identity hypothesis, or the idea that a specific mental state is associated with a spe...
This paper aims to endorse physicalism over dualism by means of Smart’s concept of identity theory. Smart’s article Sensations and the Brain provides a strong argument for identity theory and accounts for many of it primary objections. Here I plan to first discuss the main arguments for physicalism over dualism, then more specific arguments for identity theory, and finish with further criticisms of identity theory.
While physicalism is taken for granted within Western science and philosophy where non-materialism is often times looked at as not being true and something that people not educated in science agree with, it is an inductive case where inductive cases can be argued against by showing counter-examples. Parapsychology provides a significant amount of empirical counter-examples to physicalism.
Johnstone, M., Primmer, J. (2014). [Lecture]. The Mind-Body Problem. PHILOS 1E03, Problems of Philosophy. Hamilton, ON, Canada: McMaster University.
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
While the great philosophical distinction between mind and body in western thought can be traced to the Greeks, it is to the influential work of René Descartes, French mathematician, philosopher, and physiologist, that we owe the first systematic account of the mind/body relationship. As the 19th century progressed, the problem of the relationship of mind to brain became ever more pressing.
Contrary to a long philosophical tradition, it is very important to emphasize that the mind is not a "substance" or res . If the mind were a substance its study would be beyond the empiricist domain of science and would belong to the extraempiricist domain of metaphysics. On other hand, if the mind were a substance it would be something individual.
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.