Value in Nature

1994 Words4 Pages

Our classical humanist ethic requires that all duty attach itself to an individual “self”, a value-able entity with rights and duties of its own. But nature operates on a different basis: “there are no rights in the wild, and nature is indifferent to the welfare of particular animals” (Rolston, p.75). In order to formulate an autonomous environmental ethics, then, we must be able to move beyond the humanist focus on the self, towards a new source of value and a new type of value. In this essay, I intend to examine the idea of value in nature, drawing especially on Holmes Rolston III’s concept of systemic value and ecosytemic ethics and Aldo Leopold’s land aesthetic (as presented by J. Baird Callicott). There are striking similarities between these two accounts that seem to point to an ethical/aesthetic consensus that it is the unity, interconnectedness, and interdependence of nature that is to be valued. A move beyond the “self” is a move towards the system, the biotic community. However, I also want to examine the potential challenges posed to the idea of ecosystemic ethics by Leopold’s noumenon. Rolston’s argument has three parts: first, that ecosystems are the “fundamental unit[s] of survival,” second, that given this, “all value is generated within the geosystemic and ecosystemic pyramid,” and third, that this generated value is neither instrumental nor intrinsic, but systemic (Rolston, pgs. 82, 86, 84). We will examine each in part and see how Rolston’s argument matches up with Leopold’s. Both Leopold and Rolston realize that nature is not isolated; rather organisms are “interlocked in one humming community of cooperations and competitions, one biota” (Callicott, p.138). There is a “rare,” “orchestrated,” music to ... ... middle of paper ... ...ying point of Rolston’s systemic ethics and Leopold’s land aesthetic is clear: humans must respond to nature on the level of the ecosystem and not just on the level of the individual organism or even at the level of the species. This is not always easy since the ecological interconnections of nature are not readily apparent to the human senses. It is possible to attack ecosystemic ethics from Evernden’s nature-as-miracle standpoint: what is important is not our faith in “abstractions” (ecosystems), but our sense experience of particulars (frogs) (Evernden, p.198). Still, there is something compelling and instinctually right about a focus on how it all fits together, and Rolston seems correct when he urges that “no environmental ethics has found its way on Earth until it finds an ethic for the biotic communities in which all destinies are entwined (Rolston, p.81).

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