Understanding and Accepting Parfit's Nature of Persisting Persons

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Parfit’s view on the nature of persisting persons raises interesting issues in terms of identity. Though there are identifiable objections to his views, I am in favor of the argument he develops. This paper will layout Parfit’s view on that nature of persisting person, show support as well as argue the objections to the theory. In Derek Parfit’s paper Personal Identity, Parfit provides a valid account of persisting persons through time through his clear account of psychological continuities. He calls people to accept the argument that people persist through time but people do not persist or survive by way of identity. Here is a brief summary of the argument of persisting persons. Parfit, with the help of the work of David Hume, believes that there is no enduring self. That is to say, that the person I am when I was born of the mother’s womb is not the person I am today, and the person I am today is not the same person ten years, ten days or perhaps ten minutes from now. Parfit argues for a perduring self. People are able to persist through time through overlapping psychological mental states. This is similar to Hume’s Bundle Theory, which argues that the self is made up of a bundle of overlapping experiences, conscious events, rather than a central person. When Parfit talks of persistence, what he means by persistence is these ongoing psychological states. For people seeking answers about the big life and death questions about identity, Parfit does not provide any answers here. In fact, he wants people to get over the idea of identity through time because it assumes that there is a right answer concerning identity. Essentially, it is a waste of time to worry if you are going to be the same person or not. I was surprised b... ... middle of paper ... ... it’s not about the destination but the journey. Works Cited Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. Hume, David. "6: Personal Identity." Treatise of Human Nature. 132-40. Hestevold, Scott. Class Lecture. Metaphysics. University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Al. 23 February 2011 Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. 5. Hestevold, Scott. Class Lecture. Metaphysics. University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Al. 23 February 2011 Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. 15. Hestevold, Scott. Class Lecture. Metaphysics. University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Al. 25 February 2011 Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. 13. Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. 27.

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