Lakatos and MacIntyre on Incommensurability and the Rationality of Theory-change ABSTRACT: Imre Lakatos' "methodology of scientific research programs" and Alasdair MacIntyre's "tradition-constituted enquiry" are two sustained attempts to overcome the assumptions of logical empiricism, while saving the appearance that theory-change is rational. The key difference between them is their antithetical stand on the issue of incommensurability between large-scale theories. This divergence generates other areas of disagreement; the most important are the relevance of the historical record and the presence of decision criteria that are common to rival programs. I show that Lakatos' rejection of the incommensurability thesis and dismissal of actual history are motivated by the belief that neither are compatible with the rationality of theory-change. If MacIntyre can deny the necessity of dispensing with the historical record, and show that incommensurability and the consequent absence of shared decision criteria are compatible with rationality in theory-change, then Lakatos' argument will lose its force, and MacIntyre will better honor the intention to take seriously the historicality of science.
I. Inconsistency and Deductive Closure One cannot accept both that it is rational to accept inconsistent sets, and that the set of propositions that one rationally accepts is closed under logical consequences. Together these two propositions imply that it is rational to knowingly accept a logically contradictory statement. But clearly it is not rational to knowingly accept a contradiction. Thus, we must give up the principle that our rational acceptances are closed under logical consequences, or else deny that it is ever rational to accept an inconsistent set. This dilemma is sometimes appealed to as a premise in an argument for the claim that it is irrational to accept each element of an inconsistent set.
Normalizing Naturalized Epistemology ABSTRACT: The most trenchant criticism of naturalistic approaches to epistemology is that they are unable to successfully deal with norms and questions of justification. Epistemology without norms, it is alleged, is epistemology in name only, an endeavor not worth doing (Stroud, Kim, Almeder, Rorty). What one makes of this depends on whether one takes epistemology to be worth doing in the first place (cf. e.g., Kim and Rorty). However, I shall argue, it is possible to account for justification within a naturalistic framework broadly construed along Quinean lines.
I personally agree with Gauthier's argument made in the beginning of his work about interdependent people being irrational because of the reasons that he has provided, such as the agreement made by the interdependent people being considered rational only when it brings the optimal outcome, the contradiction that interdependent actions create and the agreements made by interdependent people not being able to reach to the mutual equilibrium. I found Gauthier's later arguments, about why interdependent actions can be considered rational, very hard to follow and vague. Therefore, I believe that independent actions are irrational when it comes to maximizing the expected utility.
Kant claims that humans cannot see things in themselves due to the cognitive limitations that they have, (Grier). Using his theory of transcendental idealism, he proves transcendental realism wrong. Kant’s ‘Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics’ constitutes his theory of knowledge, while disproving any scepticism caused by Hume, by claiming that knowledge of objects are independently determined by how they are perceived by us. To better understand its meaning, transcendental idealism needs to be defined against other forms of idealism. Idealism, in general, is the claim that reality is dependent on the mind and their ideas, (Morrison).
The relationship between problem-solving theory and neo-realism is that they share the flawed notion of assuming that theory can be universally valid. His stance on the outgrown position neo-realism has within IR shows through his dismissiveness towards problem-solving theory and his likeness towards critical theory. Cox gives pros and cons of both problem-solving and critical theory, describing the relationship between them as “the strength of one is the weakness of the other” (Cox, 1981: 129). However, when disproving the value-free status of theory, he focuses mainly on problem-solving, concluding that its strength of assuming a fixed point of reference is actually an ideological bias (Cox, 1981: 129). He comes to this conclusion by labelling problem-solving theory as conservative and value bound to the prevailing order.
Goodman's hypothesis of 'grue' is quite different from the above two indeterminacy in terms of both objective of introducing the concept and the usage of it. Goodman's issue is to search for the rules in screening out 'bad' assumptions in induction. This induction issue is not indeterminacy of Wittgenstein's skeptic arguments or Quine's radical translation. Wittgenstein and Kripke's conclusion that that rules are brute facts seems to be questionable. Form of life is one of Wittgenstein's key concepts in his theory on rules and is linked to rules in some crucial ways.
CQR incorporates the elements from phenomenological approach, grounded theory as well as comprehensive process analysis. The consensual qualitative research has a number of essential components. Firstly, it includes the implication of the open-ended questions in the semi-structured techniques of data collection, which allow the consistent data 's collection across the individuals as well as in-depth examination of their experiences (Hill, 2012). Secondly, it involves several judges throughout the process of analysis of data, in order to foster numerous perspectives. Third is the consensus for arrival at judgments concerning the data 's meaning that sets aside the researchers ' biases (Hill, 2012).
Rhythmic Foundations, and the Necessary Aesthetic in Peirce’s Categories ABSTRACT: There has been a tendency in scholarship to steer quite clear of discussions of Peirce and Aesthetics, and I believe that the main reason that Peirce’s works lacks, perhaps even intentionally, a clear aesthetic theory is because his entire architectonic of experience is aesthetically founded. This thesis is based, in part, on the necessary aesthetic descriptions one is forced to use when describing something such as the categories. For example, Secondness necessarily elicits aesthetic descriptions of relations and tensions, Thirdness is described most accurately with words such as harmony and arrangement, and the process by which we come to attain a belief is an "aesthetic" endeavor aimed at satisfaction. Focusing particularly on the categories, and secondarily on the method for attaining belief, I hope to show that Peirce’s foundation is, itself, an aesthetic awareness of life. There has been a tendency to steer quite clear of discussions of Peirce and Aesthetics.
In particular, Quine’s standards for a clear explanation prohibit the explanandum and the explanan from belonging to the same circle of interrelated concepts. Third, they also point out that Quine arbitrarily assumes the impossibility of explanation of analyticity based on the failure of only the few cases that he considers. Additional Reasons for Holism Thesis. However, the argument... ... middle of paper ... ...a. Grice, P., Strawson, P., 1957. “In Defense of a Dogma,” Philosophical Review 65: 141-58.