Truman's Blunder: The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb

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The atomic policy against Japan was closely related to the fear of Soviet expansion in Asia. U.S. leaders were strongly conscious of Russia’s agreement at Yalta to join the war against Japan three months past Germany’s surrender on May 7, 1945 (Fogelman, 124). Among the U.S. invasion of Japan planned for November 1, 1945, U.S. officials were doubtful about the cooperative mission with Russia in which Russia would have power at the peace table. However, the successful detonation at Alamogordo had transformed everything. The bomb guaranteed that the U.S. no longer required Russian aid to win in the Pacific (Wainstock, 132). In reality, Russian involvement would now only threaten American postwar interests. If successful, the atomic bomb had clear long-term political and diplomatic repercussions. Nearly all of the president’s primary consultants on were in agreement regarding the issue (Robert Jay Lifton, 216). The overall agreement was that the bomb would be a radical new force in influencing American policy and assist in dealing with numerous problems of the postwar world. Anti-Asian bigotries, with their origins in the 19th century, added to the way Americans rapidly radicalized World War II within Asia. Racist beliefs concerning the Japanese reached its highest in the aftershock of the destructive surprise attack at Pearl Harbor (Maddox, 138). Americans started to classify World War II as two very different wars, the Pacific war and the European war. In Europe, Hitler and the Nazis were identified as enemies and were distinguished from the German people as a whole. On the other hand, in the Pacific, American antagonism was usually targeted the entire Japanese race or the “Japs” as they were called. Throughout the war, the Ja... ... middle of paper ... ...ure negotiations with the Soviets, the bomb had the opposite result. Instantly after Hiroshima, Stalin commanded Soviet nuclear scientists to catch up with the technology obtained by their rival, establishing the race for world dominance (Alperovitz, 416). The Soviets successfully tested its first atomic bomb on September 23, 1949; and the changeover to the atomic age had been established (Alperovitz, 419). One thing is clear; the atomic bomb was not necessary in winning the Pacific war. Nevertheless, the dominant statement in both the Roosevelt and Truman administration was that the bomb would be utilized against the enemy. The bomb functioned with a double role in quickly ending the war and instituting U.S. hegemony worldwide. However, the severe repercussions of the bomb’s utilization are far greater than the weapon’s accomplishment of concluding World War II.

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