The U.S. was under-prepared for the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor due to the nascent intelligence community's inability to determine the time and place of the attack. The question of preventing the attack is beyond the scope of an intelligence agency, such an action is the product of policy. That being said, the intelligence community provided the President with insufficient information to mitigate U.S. losses on the eve of the U.S. entry into World War II. This result was not wholly the responsibility of the underfunded and under-supported intelligence and military assets working in the field. The treatment of U.S. intelligence assets during the interwar period set them up for failure when the test came, and the inability for Washington to recognize these deficiencies, even as the threat of attack become increasingly clear, is ultimately at fault for Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short's insufficient defense posture. It is unrealistic and dangerous to assume the possibility of omniscience on the part of any intelligence service and doubly foolish to rely on an intelligence apparatus that is clearly under-resourced for the challenges it is expected to confront. The narrative of an intelligence failure at cause for Pearl Harbor is tempting, as it conveniently scapegoats little known groups to the benefit of the nation's myopic defense policy makers. It is also understandable, the attack was unexpected by the American public and gave the Japanese the initiative. The attack was a massive blow to America's pride, especially when it came from an “inferior race,” like the Japanese, who were regarded as “cultivated and mannerly” to the point of being essentially harmless before the war.1 While this assumption did not inhibi...
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This paper will discuss similarities between 9/11 and Pearl Harbor that describe the Presidential responses to the attacks, as well as investigate the roles that class, culture, religion, and nations of superiority played in these attacks on the United States.
Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harbor followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed, there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual character outside the realm of reasonable suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf….These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor. The information sought and obtained, with such painstaking detail had no other conceivable usefulness from a military
To begin, the attack on Pearl Harbour was devastating to U.S. naval capabilities in the Pacific at the onset of their entry into the war. Japanese officials had grown tired of the U.S. oil embargo, which was meant to limit their territorial expansion and aggression in South-East Asia as well as China, and as negotiations weren’t reaching any conclusions they decided that the only course of action was a first strike on the aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbour to cripple U.S. naval capability in the Pacific (Rosenberg 1). The attack, which lasted about two hours, had resulted in the sinking of four battleships, among ...
Previous to the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7th 1941, tensions had been forming between the USA and Japan in the pacific. The US had cut of most supplies to Japan with the fear of Japanese expansion. The conflict that had been escalating between Japan and China since 1937 had the US treating Japan with great cautiousness. They had been monitoring Japanese Americans in anticipation of a surprise attack. However the attack on Pearl Harbour still shocked and outraged the American nation and affected the American psyche. After being assured that “a Japanese attack on Hawaii is regarded as the most unlikely thing in the world”(1), the sudden mass destruction of the U.S Navy’s Pacific fleet and deaths of roughly 2400 U.S soldiers and civilians as a result of such an attack undoubtedly lead to confusion and racial hatred amongst many US citizens. The assumption on the War Department’s behalf that Japan’s Navy were incapable of launching a full scale assault on the US Navy’s chief Pacific base was more than inaccurate. As a result, the US Naval base was unprepared and was quickly taken out. A hidden bias would soon become evident in both average civilians and higher positioned government officials. This bias against Japan aided in the formation of the Executive Order 9066, signed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) on February 19th 1942.
Planners of the first strike at Pearl Harbor, including Admiral Fukodome, argue that the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was as successful as it could have been, stating that the United States needed two full years to begin any significant offensive in the Pacific. 1 pg 83 If their assessment was correct, and many will argue that it was, the question arises of whether any Japanese war strategy could have led to a successful war termination for Japan.
Zimm, Alan D. Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions / Alan D. Zimm ; Graphics by Matt Baughman. Philadelphia, [Pa.: Casemate, 2011. Print.
The author of this essay is Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He was the president of the United States at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. The purpose of this speech was to inform the entire United States about what had happened the day before at Pearl Harbor. The nation was to be warned that the United States was going to declare war against Japan. The intended audience is everyone in the United States. President Roosevelt ef...
“AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.” This is the message sent out by radioman Kyle Boyer at 7:58 a.m. Sunday December 7, 1941; a date which will live in infamy. The empire of Japan had attacked the United States’ Pacific Fleet based in Pearl Harbor. For months the US Intelligence community, as well as others around the world, had been intercepting and decoding transmissions from mainland Japan to their diplomats and spies in the US. We had cracked their Purple Code, and knew exactly what military intelligence was being transmitted back and forth. The Dutch also cracked Purple and informed our government of the Japanese plan and were shocked to hear reports that we were taken by surprised. Even more disturbing, months before the attack a British double agent, Dusko Popov, codenamed Tricycle, turned over to the F.B.I. detailed plans of the Japanese air raid, which he had obtained from the Germans. The government had the information, and did nothing with it.
Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: Penguin Books, 1981. Print.
Over the year and a half between Pearl Harbor and Midway the United States made headway with various technological and military advantages. One of the most important of which was the code breaking efforts of Commander Joseph J. Rochefort Jr. “Most of the U.S’s information [on Japan] came from Rochefort. R...
In the morning hours of December 7, 1941 the Japanese attacked the Hawaiian islands at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had been feeling the pressures of World War II (WWII) as did many others. With the resources of the Japanese dwindling, the Japanese decided to attack the U.S. while simultaneously planning the attack during the negotiations of continued peace between our two countries. The Japanese were able to cover up there planning for nearly a year. Planning for the attack and ultimately war in the pacific, started in January of 1941, and was finalized during the war games in November of 1941. The U.S. on the other hand would become a reactive force after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The inability to crack the Japanese code lead, to a lack of intelligence during this time making the plan of attack for the Japanese a successful one. It would seem that the year of planning and the strategies laid out in the “Combined Fleet Operations Top Secret Order 1” of the Japanese navy would become a reality in the pacific, allowing for an easy sweep of the military targets for the Japanese fleet.
Hunt, Jonathan. "In Darkness." The Horn Book Magazine Mar.-Apr. 2012: 111+. Academic OneFile. Web. 29 Apr. 2014
This paper will compare Gordon W. Prange's book "At Dawn We Slept - The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor" with the film "Tora! Tora! Tora!" directed by Richard Fleischer, Kinji Fukasaku, and Toshio Masuda. While the film provides little background to the attack, its focal point is on the Pearl Harbor assault and the inquiry of why it was not prevented, or at least foreseen in adequate time to decrease damage. Prange's book examines the assault on Pearl Harbor from both the Japanese and American viewpoints to gain a global view of the situation and the vast provision undertaken by Japanese intelligence.
Introduction – Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to attack because of the obstruction of defense and warning.
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