The United States and Irregular Warfare Challenges

In order to protect national security interests as outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. armed forces must rebalance and be capable of conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict in order to win against both a regular and irregular adversary, combating a wide scope of tactics and strategies ranging from terror tactics to full scale, multi-phased conflict against a peer or near peer by maximizing the capability of the force and nation. When comparing and contrasting U. S. military operations and capabilities with regard to regular versus irregular warfare it is important to understand the definition of irregular and the spectrum of conflict. In recent history, the term “irregular warfare” has been used interchangeably with or alongside insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. This usage and comparison is too narrow. ... ... middle of paper ... ... range of problems and conflict.

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of conflict. Regular or conventional warfare is defined as war “typically between uniformed, state sponsored armies with high casualties, a high tempo, and a high consumption of resources.” Irregular warfare is a broad term that includes many different aspects of conflict against mostly irregular forces.

To paraphrase the quote attributed to Trotsky, “We may not be interested in insurgency but insurgency is interested in us.” The United States faces this dilemma. The question remains how to prepare for this amidst competing interests and threats. The U.S. military should prepare for both conventional and irregular warfare, while prioritizing conventional warfare, recognizing irregular warfare as the most significant short term threat to national interests and conventional warfare the most threatening in the long term. This paper will compare and contrast the considerations for these types of warfare, explain why the U.S. should prioritize conventional operations while preparing for both, and describe the short and long term threats to national interests. Before examining recommended U.S. strategic priorities and challenges, a discussion of definitions and current strategy is appropriate.

Additionally, each insurgency is due to its historical, cultural, and regional context unique and requests a different preparation to be successful, which points out the unpredictable risk of each conflict. In conclusion, the United States should increase its SOF and highly trained military personnel to strengthen American irregular warfare capabilities. In contrast, the USA should limit its conventional warfare abilities to an ‘initial entry element’ consisting of 18 active maneuver elements to strike globally with conventional means if necessary. A reserve system tailored to the U.S. budget is a prerequisite to ensure mobilization and additional capabilities. The counter insurgency conflict is the biggest challenge for the American national strategic objectives due to its risk, resource intensity, and undermining effect.

The liberalist’s strategy is known as compellence and the realist strategy is deterrence a... ... middle of paper ... ...er in other forms that their military strength cannot uphold. This is visible in the Vietnam War and terrorist attacks launched against the U.S and other dominant countries. Therefore, Military is strong and cohesive and helps dominant states enforce their desires on weaker but one thing it cannot sustain is asymmetric power. Works Cited 1. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter.

Combating terrorism is not only a battle of the swords but also a battle of brains. Thus, the response to terrorism must be a combination of both direct military responses (hard power) to terrorism and indirect responses (soft power) to terrorism. Both policies must be carefully intertwined and must work in tandem with each other in order to avoid contradictions between policy and action. Military responses will sow the seeds for soft power to be effective “Soft power strategies have utility but they are ineffective absent hard power” (Rubin 235). If the military threat is credible then it usually enough to coerce and change terrorist behavior.

The Army has transformed several times during its history. Adapting to the operational environment is a necessity for the force called upon to prosecute its adversaries. The Army must do what is necessary to protect the U.S. against all enemies, and advance the national interests of the American people. To accomplish this, anticipation of threats is crucial and victory against its adversaries is an imperative. The nation relies on the military for strategic level deterrence and expects that it will be decisive in combat operations.

By exposing the details, truth commissions allow states to focus on the future and prevent the repetition of mistakes. A challenge that outside actors must consider when choosing between punitive and reconciliatory measures in the post-Cold War environment is the type of infrastructure the outside actors want to establish. Establishing functional judicial practices is critical to long term stability. Unlike challenges of the past, current generation of conflicts tend to involve states with a significantly depreciated infrastructure and usually involve intra-state friction. I think one of the first challenges to address before initiating a truth commission is to analyze how the state will gather the information and what the infrastructure capacity goal is at the same time.

In unconventional warfare civilian populations may be targeted as a means to reduce the legitimate power of the government or political party that it has targeted. Unconventional warfare targets the commander’s area of responsibilities through any means in order to disrupt, discredit or expel the force from the area. This forces the commander to conduct operations against logical lines of operations (LLO). These LLOs are not the same for conventional engage... ... middle of paper ... ...ors in the evolution of the MAGTF; previous tactics, techniques, and lessons learned in order to respond to the next threat or region. There will be enhancement in equipment, training (both cultural and tactics), personnel (adding civil affairs, economic and infrastructure subject matter experts, agricultural specialist, and an array of other specialist that are needed for the mission.)

Within democracies there is great dilemma between security (keeping the country and citizens safe) and liberty (honoring individual rights and freedoms). Many would attest that having both is vital to having a democracy. However, during specific periods, the government may value security above liberty or vice versa. In the particular scenario where a country goes to war, the true significance of the debate between security and liberty unveils. More specifically in a situation where a country orders a draft and enacts laws ordering those who protest against the war to be thrown in jail.