The Threat Of The Game Theory

Introduction
The prerequisite of the game theory requires at least two intelligent parties capable of making an intelligent decision based on the scenario of the task, which would be favorable for each of them. Business dependent on IT employs security manager or security administrator who are responsible for the allocation of the resources against fending off the possible vulnerability exploitation against the system.
While the security experts have to defend all the vulnerable parameters with the limited resources, the intruder only has to successfully exploit a single vulnerability to cause substantial damage. This can be analogous to a model of game, where security admin and the intruder compete against each other where both try to optimize their move for their best benefit; security administrator will focus on maximizing the mitigation against the probable vulnerability exploit, whereas intruder will try to maximize the probability of successful attack.

Background Related to the Problem
The cyber threat to the organizations (FBI, 2016) from late 2000s have left researchers and security professionals wondering over the mechanism for the defenses (Strassmann, 2009). While the defense mechanism is well researched, a field left out is the analysis and consideration of the attacking model. An IT company might have million-dollar worth of latest firewalls to prevent any digital threat, but if they just employ a simple lock to close their main gate, any intruder with proper information can trespass into their facility and transfer crucial information, physically present at the perimeter. The same analogy can be applied to their telephony or internet system.
To prevent any compromising against the Confidentiality, Availabi...

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...(Spaniel, 2016)
Calculating the utility for attacker when the defender is willing to play and the attacker chooses to attack:
Ux = a2(PD) + c2(1- PD) (iv)
Uy = b2(PD) + d2(1- PD) (v)
From equation (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) we can write; a2(PD) + c2(1- PD) = b2(PD) + d2(1- PD)
Solving for PD , we get:
PD = (d2 - c2) / [(d2 - c2) + (a2 - b2)]
We have calculated the probability that defender will defend his perimeter, from the payoff matrix, similarly calculating the probability for attacker (PA) we get,
PA = (d1 - b1) / [(d1 - b1) + (a1 - c1)]
Summary
This chapter established the relation and understanding of mixed strategy for two competing entities. In the next chapter, we will use the relation from this chapter into theoretical implementation on different scenarios that might occur in an IT organization.