In this sense, the inductive reasoning used in the scientific method is justified, as our understanding of scientific truths and all scientific advancement relies on its existence. While Popper’s qualms about inductive reasoning appear to be justified, it nonetheless proves itself to be the less-problematic approach to scientific learning. This approach need not be flawless for it to be functional in its practical application in the world, and for us to justify its continued use. It simply needs to allow progress, which Popper’s overly-cautious deductive approach evidentially does not allow, at least not on a comparable scale.
“Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism” is Bas van Fraassen’s attack on the positive construction of science. He starts by defining scientific realism as the goal of science to provide a “literally true story of what the world is like;” and the “acceptance of a scientific theory” necessitates the “belief that it is true”. This definition contains two important attributes. The first attribute describes scientific realism as practical. The aim of science is to reach an exact truth of the world.
In fact, it is entirely possible, though non likely, that the premise is true and the conclusion be proven false due to the existence of an unobserved Emu which is not flightless. However, it seems as thought this type of reasoning is plausible and even reliable if we ensure that the sample of observed Emus is sufficiently large and representative. Meaning that the Emus have been observed in a variety of locations over a long period of time. Thus induction is matter of “weighing evidence and judging probability not of proof”. It is clear that induction plays a crucial role in the advancement of scientific theories, however is it possible to justify inductive inferences and if so, how should we go about doing thi... ... middle of paper ... ...fend his theory against refutation.
In Chalmer’s first claim that “scientific knowledge is proven knowledge”, we can see that this contradicts heavily with Popper’s falsificationism*. The... ... middle of paper ... ...ith deductive refutations which, by nature, must also be based on experience. The difference between the two arguments lies in the extent of testing before the hypothesis can be considered true. The Popperian view would be that it is impossible for it to be proved as new evidence may falsify the hypothesis whereas Chalmer infers that, at some point, it can become proven knowledge. The next comparison I will make refers to Chalmer’s statement that “science is based on what we can see and hear and touch, etc.”.
In this case, a convincing theory is the one that has more arguments to support its validity than arguments that oppose. As stated before in the definition, theories are never completely true. So we ask ourselves, why do we consider some theories as completely accurate? One possible reason for this is the scientific method in which these theories are tested, this methods are co... ... middle of paper ... ...understand both its positive and negative aspects. This is the way in which we understand what is it of both natural and human science theories that might make them convincing to certain people and why is it that some are considered as facts even if they are only bare theories.
In turn, knowledge is a belief that is justified (Vaughn, 254). But how do we justify a belief? Even though most philosophers will agree that we have knowledge, the source of this knowledge varies. Some will argue that we possess knowledge of the external world, other minds, the past, and the future. Other will embrace skepticism, the view that we lack knowledge in some fundamental way (Vaughn, 254).
The Reference of Theoretical Terms ABSTRACT: A popular explanation of the success of theories of science is that of scientific realism. It maintains, besides that the theories of a mature science are typically approximately true, that observational terms and theoretical terms refer to or denote entities. Therefore it is part of the realistic claim that "reference" explains "success." But if the realist is not able to clarify "reference" and a fortiori the reference on theoretical objects, the realist comes to a vicious circle, for there is no further criterion as the success of the theory to show that the term is referential. So it is necessary to clarify the notion "reference."
Having a Definite Answer to a Question Some questions do not have definite answers and are usually judgments of value. This means that they cannot be proved true or false, they include; religious judgments, aesthetic judgments and moral judgments. They aspire to be as definite as judgments of fact. However it is debatable as to whether them not having a definite answer makes them more or less important. We find that as we discover the answers to new scientific questions we can expand our knowledge.
However before that, I will define some keywords that will be essential in my approach. I have defined accepted as gaining the approval of society and authority, discarded as being completely rejected or forgotten, today as being the present and tomorrow the future. Now, considering the first issue raised by the statement; to what extent is the statement correct in depicting the nature of science in general? I find it as a rather pessimistic view of the nature of scientific theories. It may be true that the history of science shows that many of what we considered as mature knowledge 100 years ago were to a certain extent false.
Thus, inductive arguments can be described as “weak” or “strong” (Copi). Since an inductive argument is probabilistic, it is still the case for the conclusion to be false even if the premises are true. Because inductive arguments provide with new ideas and knowledge beyond what is already known, unlike deductive arguments which do not provide anything new, inductive argument is seen as necessary in the scientific method, in order to arrive at new explanations (Cline). Moreover, Bacon introduced the use of induction in the Scientific Method since induction would be adequate for observations of specific issues to a broader issues. Induction was also seen as adequate for scientific experimentation as it would allow to generalize the findings in such experiments.