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There has been a growing trend among philosophers to consider consciousness as being a strictly material phenomenon with no transcendent characteristics. Consciousness is, to those who subscribe to this school of thought, merely the effect of matter and energy interacting. This trend owes its origin to the recent advancement of neuroscience coupled with certain philosophical trends. Though neuroscience has provided many answers to ancient questions about the mind, it cannot explain the source of consciousness. The philosophical trends are, much like the appeals to neuroscience, also flawed. This philosophical camp, which will henceforth be referred to as materialists, has much popularity, but cannot explain a highly important phenomenon that …show more content…
It is an incredibly common phenomenon, something so common that it is rarely ever defined. Michael Tye, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, states that when an individual experiences something with the senses, he is “the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character” (“Qualia”). Color, taste, mood, and sound are all considered to be qualia, according to Tye. He also elucidates the standard definition of qualia, stating that it is “the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives.” Qualia is experienced only subjectively, and it is essentially impossible to say what it is. Tye references a thought experiment about the exact nature of qualia that makes this clear; one can know all objective knowledge about a color, but until one actually sees a color, one knows nothing of it. The essence of the thought experiment can be expressed in this rhetorical question: is it possible to explain what a color is without using examples? This seems like a simple question, but it boggles the mind. We must conclude that qualia is a strange …show more content…
Eliminative Materialists believe that “the concept of mental events forms part of a theory we use to interpret and apply our experience” (Freeman 94). Therefore, they would claim that qualia is merely a theory we use. But, how does this explain qualia away? Whether it is a mental construct or not, it still seems to exist. An eliminative materialist may be able to claim that qualia is merely an illusion, but this is ultimately of no importance. An illusion of qualia is still qualia. Such of a claim would be merely the addition of another layer, so to speak, in a theory of the mind. It can reasonably be concluded that any attempt to explain qualia away is incoherent at best, and begging the question at worst. The failure of Strong Eliminative Materialism, along with the failure of Reductive Materialism, means that Weak Eliminative Materialism suffers from the worst of both
In this paper, I will argue that it is more likely that the qualia of colour could be explained by physicalism rather than by property dualism. Qualia are subjective experiences, such as our senses (pg. 3). Physicalism views every property as physical, and can be explained by science (pg. 29). Property dualism refers to the philosophical view that minds are made out of one substance, but contain physical properties, and a non-physical mind (qualia) that are not related to each other (pg. 29).
...equence of the fact that certain happenings in the brain cause both. The physical changes observed in Mary after experiencing color may be the result of these enigmatic occurrences. While interactions with qualia may precede physical changes, it is in violation of Humean philosophy to claim that correlation indicates causation.
Even though there are many cases and arguments for Dualism concerning mind - body, such as Descartes’ substance dualism, the theory does not often have hard, physical evidence to back up such premise like science does. The continued scientific progress over the past centuries has allowed us to better understand universal truths and the functions of the mind-body that were not able to have been explained scientifically in the past. Many complex, unexplained complexities have been simplified or “reduced” through chemistry,biology, or physics. Through both comparison of arguments supporting dualist theories and counter arguments, I will prove that Dualism is a concept of the past and the continued scientific progress is inevitable and will one day allow us to understand many Dualistic explanations with hard evidence and scientific proof that we have failed to do so in the past.
U.T. Place and J.J.C. Smart defend the view that a sensation state is a type of brain process. The ‘Sensation-Brain Process Identity Theory’ states: For any type of sensation state S, there is a type of brain state B such that: S = B. For Place, conscious experience is nothing but a brain process. Place and Smart argue against the view that acceptance of inner processes entails dualism (Place 44). Instead they hold conscious qualities can effectively be reduced to physical processes which are conscious states. A sensation state is an inner process. Inner processes according to Place and Smart are nothing ‘over and above’ brain processes. Under their view, the experience one has when tasting vanilla is the same thing as the object undergoing the corresponding type of brain process. The ‘Brain Process Identity Theory’ argues the ‘feel’ we associate with exposure of vanilla to the tongue is identical to a type of brain process cause by said exposure. To postulate non-physical properties to explain conscious states would bear the burden of proof.
Webster dictionary defines synaesthesia as “a subjective sensation or image of a sense other than the one being stimulated” (Wyld,1963). Synaesthesia is a condition that causes someone to have associations of usually color with certain everyday things, such as numbers or letters. There are several different types of synaesthesia that will be discussed in this paper digit-color synaesthesia, odor-color synaesthesia, and person- and music-color synaesthesia. A common effect that is discussed when talking about synaesthesia is the McCollough effect. This effect is a wonder of humans and their visual perception where colorless gratings appear to have a color.
In this essay I will argue that Rosenthal's Higher Order Thought Theory provides a possible account of conscious awareness, in doing so addresses and gets to solve the mind-body problem for that particular mental phenomenon.
In the “Knowledge Argument” also Frank Jackson proposed known as Mary’s room, in his article called Epiphenomenal Qualia, Jackson argues against physicalism and the view that the universe, including all that is conscious/mental is fully physical. While Jackson no longer consents to it, it is still known as one of the most significant arguments in the philosophy of mind. In this paper, I will explain the argument, assess the argument for validity and soundness, explain what problem it presents for physicalism, the basic structure for Lewis’s reply, and if Lewis’s reply is convincing.
Mind-body interaction and the problems associated with it lie at the heart of much of modern philosophy, despite having been discussed for many centuries. A formal definition for mind-body interaction is hard to establish, but it generally implies the existence of communication or an interface between the immaterial mind and material body. The idea of mind-body interaction and its obstacles are virtually only of concern for dualists since, “dualism and the mind/brain identity theory share the assumption that the mind is a thing, a non-physical Cartesian substance…” (1). Physicalists are unconvinced that the mind is anything but physical; therefore, they see no problems with a physical-physical interaction.
“Contrary to what is commonly assumed by contemporary philosophers, there is no genuine conflict discovered so far between our natural understanding of what it takes to be conscious on the one hand and what we know about the world on the basis of physics, biology and neurobiology on the other. If this is correct, then the strong conviction so common among philosophers today that subject body dualism need not even be seriously considered as a theoretical option has no solid rational basis” (2).
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Speculations on the origin of the mind have ranged from ghosts to society. Each new theory brings about more speculation and disagreement than the last. Where the mind resides, where it came from and if the brain has any involvement with the concept are common questions that fuel theory paradigms. Those questions are also the foundation of the debate about the roll of experience versus the existence of innate capacities. Steven Pinker theorizes the mind as a computing system created by the brain to fill the gap between innate capacities and capacities missing using common sense and learned critical thinking skills.
The mind-body problem, which is still debated even today, raises the question about the relationship between the mind and the body. Theorists, such as René Descartes and Thomas Nagel, have written extensively on the problem but they have many dissenting beliefs. Descartes, a dualist, contends that the mind and body are two different substances that can exist separately. Conversely, Nagel, a dual aspect theorist, contends that the mind and body are not substances but different properties. However, although Nagel illustrates the problems with Descartes= theory, Nagel=s theory runs into the problem of panpsychism. In this paper, both arguments will be discussed to determine which, if either, side is stronger.
While the main problem for dualism is explaining how two distinctly different properties of mind and body enter into causal relationships, the ongoing mind-body debate has spawned many more problems relating to subjective experience and free will (Hardnad, 1992; Jaworski,
perceptions that are not obvious, such as the taste of food. Colours can also enhance the