Deontologists create concrete distinctions between what is moral right and wrong and use their morals as a guide when making choices. Deontologists generate restrictions against maximizing the good when it interferes with moral standards. Also, since deontologists place a high value on the individual, in some instances it is permissible not to maximize the good when it is detrimental to yourself. For example, one does not need to impoverish oneself to the point of worthlessness simply to satisfy one’s moral obligations. Deontology can be looked at as a generally flexible moral theory that allows for self-interpretation but like all others theories studied thus far, there are arguments one can make against its reasoning.
I will begin to illustrate what Waldron means by such a right. Before we even look at the meaning of “a right to do wrong”, Waldron clarifies that he is looking at “wrongs” from a moral view not a legal view. “A right to do wrong” means that an action is morally wrong but it is an action that an individual has the moral right to do. It is suggested that an individual should not act in an immoral way but has the choice to do so. Waldron wishes to answer the inconsistencies in the paradox of the moral right to do wrong.
This theory judges the morality of an action based on the actions adherence to a set of rules. It is explained as an action is morally right if it is required by duty, and should not conflict with any other action required by another duty. By doing our duty we do what is valuable, this theory focuses on the structure of moral judgment. One should act regardless of your own aims or self-interest. Kant formalism is based on deontology and are united and their opposition to purely oppose the consequentiality moral thinking; some even hold that a morally wrong may have entirely good consequences, and a morally right on entirely bad consequences (Frankena, 1973.
Morality involves what we ought to do regarding right and wrong and/or good and bad based on our values, virtues and principles (Gray, JW). Something is moral if it is the right thing to do or rational thing to do based on the facts presented in a situation. Objectivity is the state or quality of being true even outside of one’s individual biases, interpretations, and feelings (Wikipedia). Objective decisions are ones that are not based on personal feelings or opinions, but instead it is based on the circumstances and facts presented when considering a particular decision. I shall argue that morality that is case-by-case or situational can still be objective without universal or general rules.
We have to balance the question of our philosophical grounds for believing that the moral theory is in fact true — that it corresponds to the demands that actually exist for us in reality — rather than merely being an accurate codification of what we happen to believe. It could still turn out that the 'true' moral theory, the theory that comes closest to capturing the things one actually ought or ought not to do, coheres less well with our ordinary moral beliefs than another theory which is less revisionary in its consequences. The issue I'm addressing is the proof of a set of moral principles, the proof of the validity of a moral outlook or theory. Various attempts have been made to avoid this seemingly irrational consequence by supplying what often have been referred to as "proofs" of' moral principles. The term "proof" as so used had a widely variable meaning but in general what is intended is a set of considerations, other than the internal consistency and adequacy of the theory, which are particularly persuasive in making a choice of one theory or principle over another.
Two objections to utilitarianism will be examined, as well as Louis Pojman’s responses to those objections in Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong. It will be shown that Pojman presents an adequate defense of utilitarianism, and that utilitarianism succeeds as a worthwhile moral theory. Act-Utilitarianism is the thesis that “an act is right if and only if it results in as much good as any available alternative” (Pojman 110). One conspicuous problem with the thesis is that it suggests that correct moral actions will often clash with our intuitions about basic moral norms. For example, Pojman refers to Richard Brandt’s criticism in which he points out that the act-utilitarian seems to be committed to helping the needy above one’s own family, repaying debts only if there is no better use for the money, and ending the lives of those who are a drain on others (Pojman 110).
Then I will discuss the requirements of ethical egoism and the difference between ethical egoism general principle of self-interest and the notion of “whatever one wants.” I will then briefly suggest that Ethical Egoism is plausible but show the theory cannot be plausible in the same argument. Furthermore I will discuss the argument against ethical egoism that proves the theory to be arbitrary from the general principle concerning the treatment of others. Lastly I discuss why this arbitrary concept poses a problem for moral theory and reasons in ethics. Ethical Egoism states that we should pursue our best self-interests of the long run. Morally right actions are those, which benefits our-self.
Why do some not? How should we respond to behaviors that are either immoral or amoral? Do we possess an innate sense of morality, determined by our neurobiology? Or to put it another (more provocative) way, is morality absolute? To begin understanding the causes of moral behavior, we must understand what we mean by morality.
Making Moral Decisions: The Synergistic-Reflective-Equilibrium Model ABSTRACT: This treatise is a contribution towards the understanding of why humankind cannot agree on the foundation of morality and why moral pluralism is the logical constitution of moral reality. The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is the model that will describe how persons can make moral decisions as pluralistic agents. If this model is correct, then it will not be a new discovery, rather, it will be a new description of how pluralistic agents do in fact make moral decisions. This synergistic-reflective-equilibrium description should then be useful not only in giving a fuller understanding of how moral decisions ought to be made, but also how moral philosophy can be united into a pluralistic collective whole. The first part of this paper defines the synergistic-reflective-equilibrium mode.
These aspects include the duty to act as well as a consideration of the intention to do what is right against what is wrong, (Braswell, McCarthy & McCarthy, 2011). Deontological theorists argue that good intentions or good will is what informs the moral worth of an action and not just a consideration of the