On January 28, 1986 the Space Shuttle Challenger destined for space came to a crashing halt after just 73 seconds into liftoff. What would the first thought of any normal person be? Why? What went wrong? All seven crew members aboard The Challenger perished. While the physical cause of the Challenger is now known as the failure of mechanics, the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident revealed that the primary cause of the disaster was “flaws in the decision making process” (Hughes, 66).
After finding that the O-rings were the mechanical causes of the disaster, the Commission examined all the available data, did multiple tests and experiments by “NASA, civilian contractors, and various government agencies” (Lewis). While it was discovered that there was a gas leak in the right Solid Rocket Motor aft field joint, it was determined that no sabotage had occurred. 24 hours prior to the actual launch, there were concerns of the very cold temperatures and the accumulation of ice on the launch pad (Esser,Lindoerfer 170). These concerns were brought up in a variety of meeting, and teleconferences involving NASA management and engineers. It was also discovered that there might be a seal leakage during previous flights. The issue with the O-rings was that they could not withstand the cold. The O-ring could not return to its normal shape because of the cold temperatures. It was “probable the O-ring would not be pressure actuated to seal the gap in time to preclude joint failure due to blow-by and erosion from hot combustion gases” (Lewis). As the shuttle increased upwards, there were puffs of black smoke suggested that the “grease, joint insulation and rubber O-rings in the joint seal were being burn...
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... larger issue at hand lies in the decisions and the disregard for warnings that were made prominent to people who had the power to delay the launch. Instead, the intense need for a general consensus overruled the warnings of the few.
Works Cited
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Accident:Toward a Quantitative Case Analysis." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2.3 (1989): 167-177. Business Source Complete. Web. 16 Apr. 2014.
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15 Apr. 2014. http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/explode.html
Hughes, Patrick, and Erin White. "The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster: A Classic Example Of
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NASA has faced many tragedies during their time; but one can question if two of the tragedies were preventable by changing some critical decisions made by the organization. The investigation board looking at the decisions made for the space shuttle tragedies of the Columbia and Challenger noted that the “loss resulted as much from organizational as from technical failures” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 191). The two space shuttle tragedies were about twenty years apart, they both had technical failures but politics also played a factor in to these two tragedies.
Lack of support from the Democratic Congress: To effectively complete any type of project, time and money are very important in order to solve any project risks. There was limited funding due to budgetary cuts and no support from the Democratic Congress.
A. Preventing "Groupthink" Psychology Today. 20 Apr. 2011. The. Psychology Today.
The topic of this paper is Irving Janis’s concept of groupthink. There has been an increase in the utilization of groups or teams of people who come together in the decision-making process. There are many benefits to group decision-making with each member brings their own perspectives, beliefs, and ideas to the table. However, there are also negative dynamics such as groupthink that can hinder this process. Groupthink can lead to members believing that their opinions don’t hold as much weight as their peers, a group becoming overconfident in their knowledge of what is right, and the minimization of threats. Lack of thorough analysis of all available options or opportunities can have costly and long reaching negative consequences. Proactive
The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.
Two tragic incidents, the Challenger Space Shuttle crash of 1986, and the Three Mile Island near meltdown of 1979, have greatly devastated our nation. Both these disasters involved failures of communication among ordinary professional people, working in largely bureaucratic companies. Two memos called the “Smoking Gun Memos,” authored by R. M. Boisjoly, of Morton Thiokol, and D. F. Hallman, of Babcook and Wilcox, will always be associated these two incidents. Unfortunately, neither of these memos were successful in preventing the accidents of the Challenger and the Three Mile Island near meltdown.
On a cold winter’s morning on the 28th day of January in the year 1986, America was profoundly shaken and sent to its knees as the space shuttle Challenger gruesomely exploded just seconds after launching. The seven members of its crew, including one civilian teacher, were all lost. This was a game changer, we had never lost a single astronaut in flight. The United States by this time had unfortunately grown accustomed to successful space missions, and this reality check was all too sudden, too brutal for a complacent and oblivious nation (“Space”). The outbreak of sympathy that poured from its citizens had not been seen since President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. The disturbing scenes were shown repeatedly on news networks which undeniably made it troublesome to keep it from haunting the nation’s cognizance (“Space”). The current president had more than situation to address, he had the problematic undertaking of gracefully picking America back up by its boot straps.
Accidents are an inevitable part of life. Children learn this at an early age by bumping their head, scraping their knees, or falling off the swings. They learn that sometimes painful experiences just happen, seemingly without cause or reason. These children carry these lessons into adulthood, and then project their tolerance for accidents onto their families and occupation. The chemical industry, while one of the safest industries, has the potential for catastrophic accidents. Through experience and renewed focus on the conservation of life, the chemical industry has improved its safety considerably. In 2005, chemical industry fatality rate (the number of fatalities per year per total number of people in the applicable population) was the third lowest when compared to industries such as agriculture, coal mining, and construction1. However, accidents still occur, sometimes with regrettable repercussions. In 2005, Formosa Plastics Corporation in Point Comfort, Texas experienced an accident with severe consequences.
It was on January 28, 1986 at 11:38 A.M. that the shuttle Challenger, NASA flight 51-L, the twenty-fifth shuttle flight, took off. It was the "Teacher in Space" mission. At lift-off, the temperature at ground level was 36° Fahrenheit, which was 15° Fahrenheit cooler than any previous launch by NASA. It was the Challenger's tenth flight. Take-off had been delayed several times. Finally the shuttle had taken off. The shuttle had climbed high in the sky thirty-five seconds after take-off, and it was getting hit by strong winds. The on board computers were making continuous adjustments so the shuttle would stay on course. About eight miles in the air, about seventy-two seconds after take-off, people watched in fear and horror as the shuttle was engulfed by a huge fire ball. All the crew members were killed instantly.
For this assignment we will discuss some theories on organizational change learned during this class and how they relate to the case study of NASA (The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disaster). First we will look the images of managing change used by NASA in the case study. Then we will discuss the types of change(s) NASA under took. Next we will look at some of the challenges of change that NASA faced. Next we will discuss some of the resistance to change that NASA dealt with. Then we look at how NASA implemented change. Next we will discuss vision and change and the impact in the case study. Finally we will discuss sustaining change as it relates to the changes implemented by NASA in the case study.
This tragic accident was preventable by not only the flight crew, but maintenance and air traffic control personnel as well. On December 29, 1972, ninety-nine of the one hundred and seventy-six people onboard lost their lives needlessly. As is the case with most accidents, this one was certainly preventable. This accident is unique because of the different people that could have prevented it from happening. The NTSB determined that “the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew.” This is true; the flight crew did fail, however, others share the responsibility for this accident. Equally responsible where maintenance personnel, an Air Traffic Controllers, the system, and a twenty cent light bulb. What continues is a discussion on, what happened, why it happened, what to do about it and what was done about it.
Robbins, S. Judge T. 2012, Groups in the organizations, Essentials of Organizational Behavior, 12(12): 188.
...easier to blame the O-rings than to blame people for the disaster. There was a lack of communication and a sense of desperation from the managers to make sure the shuttle launched as they did not want any further delays. The challenger disaster was certainly avoidable, the warning signs were there but the people in charge did not heed them. Thiokol had an opportunity to steer clear of disaster during the meeting with (GDSS) before the launching of challenger. If the pressure to launch in combination with communication breakdowns had not occurred or had been managed better this disaster would not have happened. It seems that leadership was more concerned with public relations instead of being concerned with the problem of the O-ring. So, I believe that bad decision making on launching the Space Shuttle Challenger on the day of January 28 caused by human error.
As stated above, accidents can happen to anyone, but it seems like the most accidents occur within the younger population. I chose to look at motor
United States of America. Department of Transportation. FAA. Human Error and Commercial Aviation Accidents: A Comprehensive, Fine-Grained Analysis Using HFACS. FAA, July 2006. Web. 22 Mar. 2014. .