The Role Of Non-Intervention In The Spanish Civil War

In July 1936, the Spanish Civil War was sparked by an attempted coup of the Spanish Republic. The war lasted three bloody years with General Francisco Franco leading rebels against the Spanish government. Britain and other countries such as France and the US followed a policy of non-intervention throughout the war. The signing of the August 1936 Non-Intervention Agreement was upheld by these countries but where ultimately undermined by Italy, Germany, the USSR and Portugal who intervened despite the agreement. The reason for Britain’s commitment to this policy stems from both ideological and strategic factors. Crucially, the latter best explains the reasons for Britain’s adoption of this policy as they were interested in protecting British interests, diffusing the threats of Italy and Germany and most importantly, avoiding a European war whilst under the influence of ideological factors.
Arguably, ideology played a huge part in the adoption of the non-intervention policy. British aversion to the Spanish Republic had long existed before 1936. Graham (2005) indicated that Britain’s elite held great distaste for the Republic’s socially reforming agenda and the new Spanish political class, perhaps giving the governing elite the motivation to allow Spain to deal with their affairs internally. Romero Salvadó (1999) concluded that Non-Intervention Agreement was ideal in enabling the

Britain had adopted a policy of appeasement due to the effects of the economic depression, fear of Japanese and German expansion and fear of Communism (Durgan, 2007). The commitment to appeasement was featured heavily in British foreign policy, particularly towards Germany as appeasement aimed to limit German aggression by submitting to Hitler’s demands (Preston, 1996). Both Preston and Durgan (2007) argued that intervention in Spain would have compromised