The Milgram Experiment: The Relationship Between Obedience And Authority

In a series of experiments conducted from 1960 to 1963, American psychologist Stanley Milgram, sought to examine the relationship between obedience and authority in order to understand how Nazi doctors were able to carry out experiments on prisoners during WWII. While there are several theories about Milgram’s results, philosopher Ruwen Ogien uses the experiment as grounds for criticizing virtue ethics as a moral theory. In chapter 9 of Human Kindness and The Smell of Warm Croissant, Ogien claims that “what determines behavior is not character but other factors tied to situation” (Ogien 120). The purpose of this essay is not to interpret the results of the Milgram experiments. Instead this essay serves to argue why I am not persuaded by Ogien’s

Ogien defines “character broadly speaking, [as] a certain way of acting or feeling that is consistent, that is, stable over time and unvarying from one situation to the next” (Ogien 123). For Aristotle, “virtue, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean…relative to us, this being determined by…that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine…and acquired by repetition” (Aristotle 124, 129). Mark Timmons, a moral philosopher, also makes a slight distinction between character and virtue by defining virtue as “(1) a relatively fixed trait of character (2) typically involving dispositions to think, feel, and act in certain ways in certain circumstance, and (3) is a primary basis for judging the overall moral goodness or worth of persons” (Timmons 212). Additionally, bioethicists Tom Beauchamp and James Childress define virtue in terms of “a trait of character that is socially valuable and a moral virtue [as] a trait of character that is morally valuable” (Beauchamp 31). My reason for going through the ways in which different philosophers have defined virtue is to (1) show that Ogien critiques virtue ethics without correctly representing the term virtue in the theory or defining virtue at all and (2) to show that among moral philosophers (at least read for this week) there is commonality in defining virtue in some way or another as a fixed character. (3) Just because a person possesses a certain character trait that does not mean that that person is virtuous and (4) in regard to the Milgram experiments, there is no way to determine the virtuous character of the subjects involved based solely on this one experiment alone. Virtuous character requires consistency of a particular character trait. Virtue is not a one-time act or an act on occasion. From the point-of-view of virtue ethics, we can only “take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or