Divine Hiddenness: The Problem Of Reasonable Nonbelief

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The problem of divine hiddenness, also called the problem of reasonable nonbelief, is an argument that has been discussed for a short period of time, but has been thought of for years. “How long, O LORD? Will you forget me forever? How long will you hide your face from me?” Not only has divine hiddenness been brought up in the bible, but also be earlier philosophers such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. There is no simple way of completely describing the problem from reasonable nonbelief. However, the way Schellenberg first introduces his argument is as follows:
If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.
If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.
Reasonable nonbelief occurs.
No perfectly loving God exists.
There is no God.

Schellenberg states in Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason that there are two ways in which his argument could be successfully rebutted. First, if it is shown Conclusively that an offsetting good necessitating the permission of reasonable nonbelief exists, or second, if it is shown to be plausible that an outweighing good requiring the permission of reasonable nonbelief exists. Before looking at the argument, Schellenberg claims six different assumptions that must be looked at and considered equal to the argument …show more content…

However, this does not mean that the foundations of the argument are sound. There are three traditional ways of approaching the argument from reasonable nonbelief. They are the freedom response, which states that “God hides in order to enable people to freely love, trust, and obey God.” The proper-motivation response, which simply put states that “God hides in order to discourage a human response based on improper motives.” And the Divine Purposes Reply, “God restrains divine manifestations, at least for a time, to at least some humans to enhance satisfaction of God’s own diverse morally serious and loving purposes regarding

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