Leibniz writes in Monadology that his Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason are the basis of the theories found within the piece. While it can be said that the principles alone are rudimental, one may find that, in conjunction with the Principle of the Best, the Predicate-in-Notion Principle, the Complete Concept Principle, and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, the group of axioms cement a highly convincing argument. The Principle of Contradiction states that a proposition cannot be true and false at once. Truths can be understood as propositions in which the predicate is contained in the subject. Primary truths are most easily understood in this respect, as these truths are identities in which the predicate is not merely contained in the subject, but is itself explicitly identical to the subject (and vice versa): A = A. These sentences do not need proof because their negations (A is not A) create contradictions. However, Leibniz introduces the Predicate-In-Notion Principle to posit that in every true affirmative propositional sentence the notion of the predicate is contained somehow in that of the subject. The combination of these two principles proves that all affirmative propositional sentences may be reduced to primary truths by resolving the notions on either side into the simplest of ideas-- in the same way a mathematician reduces theorems into definitions, axioms, postulates, and finally, simple ideas, whose definitions cannot be given (AW, 278). However, the above example deals with truths of reasoning (which are necessary), but other propositions may be labeled truths of fact, or contingent truths-- these are truths whose opposites are conceivably possible. Yet even these truths--which refer t... ... middle of paper ... ...motion are not things but the phenomena of a perceiver. Corporeal substances follow efficient causes, or the laws of motion, but act in perfect conformity with monads and the rest of the world. Thus monads are related to a body in which they reside or which they perceive to be attached to. Each monad is thus a window created by God through which he may perceive the world form another perspective, and each monad and group of monad acts according to sufficient reason in its continuous change as its complete concept unfolds. Though Leibniz, in his Monadology, does depend on logical principles which appear to be quite obvious, the Law of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in coalition with other logical axioms, make sure that the philosopher’s metaphysical, ontological and epistemological theories are cohesive, consistent, and thoroughly explained.
In this paper I shall consider Spinoza’s argument offered in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, which argues for the impossibility of two substances sharing the same nature. I shall first begin by explaining, in detail, the two-step structure of the argument and proceed accordingly by offering a structured account of its relation to the main claim. Consequently I shall point out what I reasonably judge to be a mistake in Spinoza’s line of reasoning; that is, that the definition of a thing does not express a fixed number of individuals under that definition. By contrast, I hope to motivate the claim that a true definition of a thing does in fact express a fixed number of individuals that fall under that definition. I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken.
Reneì Descartes’ treatise on dualism, his Meditations on First Philosophy, is a seminal work in Western intellectual history, outlining his theory of the mind and its relation to the rest of the world. The main argument running through the Meditations leads from his universal methodic doubt through his famous cogito, to proofs of dualism, God, and the world. The Cartesian dualism is one of the most influential ideas to come out of the work; the style of the Meditations, however, is one of personal rumination, following what appears to be Descartes’ stream of consciousness , and it allows for mild tangential discussions. Hence alongside his more famous argument for dualism, which is based on doubt and then the properties of his mind as he discerns them, Descartes devoted a small space to outlining a very simple and straightforward supplementary argument for dualism, designed to be an independent verification of his ideas.
In this short paper I will examine the positions of foundationalism and coherentism, and argue that a form of weak foundationalism is the most satisfactory option as a valid theory of justification for knowledge and is therefore a viable way of avoiding any sort of vicious regress problem and skepticism.
“Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe”( Douglass). This famous quote epitomizes the philosophies of Frederick Douglass, in which he wanted everyone to be treated with dignity; if everyone was not treated with equality, no one person or property would be safe harm. His experience as a house slave, field slave and ship builder gave him the knowledge to develop into a persuasive speaker and abolitionist. In his narrative, he makes key arguments to white abolitionist and Christians on why slavery should be abolished. The key arguments that Frederick Douglass tries to vindicate are that slavery denies slaves of their identity, slavery is also detrimental for the slave owner, and slavery is ungodly.
The cosmological argument is the existence of God, arguing that the possibility of each existing and the domain collected of such elements in this universe. The inquiry is that 'for what reason does anything exist? Why as opposed to nothing? In this paper, I will explain for what reason does everything need cause? Why is God thought to be the principal cause?
The want for money drastically affected the Younger’s and changed their lives for the worst. In Lorraine Hansberry’s A Raisin in the Sun, A family in 1950s Chicago want for money was putting a negative strain on the family.
Hume distinguishes two categories into which “all the objects of human reason or enquiry” may be placed into: Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact (15). In regards to matters of fact, cause and effect seems to be the main principle involved. It is clear that when we have a fact, it must have been inferred...
Spinoza argued for substance monism. For the purpose of this paper, I will discuss Spinoza’s argument for substance monism. I will then explore how Spinoza’s view of substance monism is relevant to absurdist claims that there is no meaning in existence. I will then raise an issue with Spinoza’s seventh axiom. I will then conclude with why Spinoza’s substance monism is not entirely convincing in large part because of his definition of God and his seventh axiom.
Each section of this article will be explained in my own words, with the exception of some of the symbolic logic. Russell's own words are indicated by speech marks.
Atomic sentences have truth-values that evaluate the application of a concept to an object that is being referred. To find what the sentence refers to, the referent of the predicate must be applied to the referent of the subject. Connectives are vocabulary like “and”, “if”, and “not” that are functions from truth-values to truth tables. Each of these provide the basis for Frege’s language system such that we are able to speaking in our ordinary language, but still maintain the mathematical connection he attempts to establish early. Frege’s use of language and sentences being functions with variables is consistent with how he defines the basic constructs of what are needed in a human language.
Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Monadology in Classics of Western Philosophy Ed. Steven M. Cahn. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995.
The problem of substitutivity has always been a thorn in the side of the study of semantic logic. Why does it sometimes appear that terms that refer to identical objects cannot be replaced with each other in propositions without altering the truth value or meaning of said proposition? Leibniz's Law would seem to ensure that we could perform such an action without anything significant having changed, but this is clearly not so. I intend to look at the history, not only of this problem, but of the theories that have created an atmosphere in which these questions can be contemplated. Finally, I will offer some of my own insights and perceived problems.
so I keep the belief that when people die they are just dead, and keep
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus evolved as a continuation of and reaction to Bertrand Russell and G Frege’s conceptions of logic, which Russell has left unexplained. Wittgenstein developed a theory of language that was designed to explain the nature of logical necessity. For Wittgenstein, a factual proposition is true or false with no third alternative. He endorses a ‘picture’ theory of meaning: propositions are meaningful insofar as they ‘picture’ facts or states of affairs: if their structure mirrors the structure of the world. The book addresses the central problems of philosophy which deals with the world, language and thought, and proposes a solution to these problems which is grounded in logic and in the nature of representation. Language, thought and reality share a common logical structure, so understanding the structure of the language allows u...
In this paper I will describe the foundationalist structure of Descartes’ arguments in his work Meditations on First Philosophy. Foundationalism is the view that there are some beliefs are epistemologically basic and can be known without knowing anything else is true (Loeb, Lecture 1-14). For example, philosophers such as Descartes would acknowledge that geometric truths, such as 2 + 2 = 4, are so fundamental that they don’t need to be proven through argumentation. Thus, these truths can provide the basic foundation for further arguments. In my paper, I will show that two foundational claims of Descartes are first, the existence of the mind, and second, the existence of God. From these claims Descartes derives many others, including the argument for material objects and souls. As I lay out Descartes’ case, I will examine the philosophical soundness and validity of his foundationalist account, as well as its merits and potential weaknesses. In the end, I will conclude that Descartes’ foundationalism, while alluring in its simplicity, does not survive deeper investigation.