Overall, Russell’s position in this essay is that philosophy is worth studying and is beneficial for people through philosophical contemplation and questions. Outline the principle arguments made in support of Russell’s opinion. How is each argument supported by facts or evidence? In the conclusion of the essay Russell outlines, clarifies and summarizes his primary arguments in the support of his thesis. Unfortunately, he doesn’t give many evidence that is factual, yet that is the nature of the subject, he is a philosopher and these are only theories.
Is 'light' the same as being as understood by Íadrå? How does Suhrawardí understand the distinction and relate it to his metaphysics of contingency? i) Wujúd and Existence in Suhrawardí Suhrawardí sets out in the logic of Óikmat al-Ishråq, 'The wisdom of illumination' his mature magnum opus, to deconstruct the distinction through a critique of the Peripatetic theory of definition.
Mind, Soul, Language in Wittgenstein ABSTRACT: I show that the latter Wittgenstein's treatment of language and the mind results in a conception of the human subject that goes against the exclusive emphasis on the cognitive that characterizes our modern conception of knowledge and the self. For Wittgenstein, our identification with the cognitive ego is tantamount to a blindness to our own nature — blindness that is entrenched in our present culture. The task of philosophy is thus transformed into a form of cultural therapy that seeks to awaken in us a sensitivity to different modes of awareness than the merely intellectual. Its substance of reflection becomes not only the field of conscious rational thought, but the tension in our nature between reason and vital feeling, that is, between culture and life. It is well known that Wittgenstein is responsible for two great moments in the philosophy of this century; the first initially and incorrectly identified with logical positivism, and the second even now considered as paradigm of Analytic philosophy.
Plato’s Unwritten Doctrines from a Hermeneutical Point of View* ABSTRACT: In this paper, I will show the deep roots of dialogue in Plato’s thought, in order to examine the validity of the so-called ‘esoteric Plato’. The confrontation between dialogicity and unwritten doctrines is the main theme of this article. These two views — Hermeneutics and Tübingen School — are not far away on concrete contents, with more or less variations. But it must be noticed that both conceptions of Platonic thinking are contradictory and that is reflected in their explanations of Plato’s own philosophical project. To begin with, I will not compare each point of the Hermeneutic and Tubingen School positions.
What the revolutionary achievements of Descartes, Kant, and Fichte have generically in common is to account for the legitimacy of our knowledge claims or, in other words, for the possibility of autonomy. The business of that kind of philosophy is to rationally reconstruct the rightness of judging. For that design the architecture of those authors' theorizing is necessarily opposed to normal experience. (First of all, the common notion of "things affecting us" has to be abandoned.) Transcendental arguments are therefore all but common sense.
The overall effect this has on his project concerning metaphysics is unclear, and in the course of this paper, I will outline his general argument and commitments, in particular the emphasis he puts on both experience and the scope of human reason, reconstruct his argument from these commitments, and finally evaluate the arguments for Hume’s conclusions about metaphysics. Hume’s first step in part two of the Inquiry is to draw a line between impressions and ideas, with impressions being the experience of sensory perception, and ideas being recollections of prior impressions, albeit with less vivacity. Immediately this excludes innate ideas from Hume’s model of the mind, and, while th... ... middle of paper ... ...ed to human reason can be demonstrated adequately against, the only way revisions to Hume’s model of the mind can come about are through experiencing directly the mind’s capability to extend beyond the limitations he ascribes to it; mainly regarding what the mind brings to experience. Even if it is the case that the mind brings a kind of framework or some other content to experience from which it can anticipate the things it can experience a priori, we would have to experience that ability before we could reasonably conclude that the mind is capable of such feats in light of Hume’s arguments. The only real options available for reintroducing the possibility of metaphysics are to either experience a new capability of the mind beyond Hume’s description, or to push Hume’s commitments to a point where they produce an absurdity, and can be rejected by Hume’s own criteria.
Realism and conventionalism generally establish the parameters of debate over universals. Do abstract terms in language refer to abstract things in the world? The realist answers yes, leaving us with an inflated ontology; the conventionalist answers no, leaving us with subjective categories. I want to defend nominalism — in its original medieval sense, as one possibility that aims to preserve objectivity while positing nothing more than concrete individuals in the world. First, I will present paradigmatic statements of realism and conventionalism as developed by Russell and Strawson.
By Derrida we can discover this paradigm change in his critique of philosophical "logo-phono-ethnocentrism" and even more in his way of writing, wich through its disseminating force overpasses the bar between philosophy and literature. Alluding to the historical perspectives of these relationships Rorty remarked (Rorty 1984, 5) that as Derrida treats the philosophy of Heidegger, in the similar way treated Heidegger the philosophy of Nietzsche. Derrida is in the same position to Heidegger and Heidegger to Nietzsche as Wittgenstein is to Russell and Russell to Mill. It would be interesting to analyze paralelly the Mill-Russell-Wittgenstein line to the Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida line or to investigate the Mill-Nietzsche, Russell-Heidegger and Wittgenstein-Derrida couples. I would like to focus in my paper on three aspects of the Wittgenstein-Derrida relationship: the philosophical attitudes, the writing and reading activity and the language games and writing games.
They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (TLP 6.522). If these ineffable things do indeed exist outside the realm of language—that realm which Wittgenstein’s linguistic solipsism denotes as the limit of our thought—in what realm do they exist? In the same letter I previously mentioned that Wittgenstein wrote to von Ficker, the philosopher
I will first show that the strength of his criticism lies in its all-encompassing penetration of the foundations of modern philosophy, running through both the ontological and epistemological channels. Ontologically, Heidegger presents a critique of subjectivism; epistemologically, he discredits the correspondence conception of truth and its underlying visual metaphor. I will then look at his view of history and the meaning of his concept of "overcoming" in order to show that his aim is not to destroy the tradition, but to provide a wider basis for it by rescuing forgotten elements imbedded in the tradition itself. Finally, I will show that in this process of "overcoming," Heidegger did not really depart from the tradition, but absorbed some of its basic tenets, as his concept of death echoes major elements of Cartesian doubt. 1.