The Person and the Mind

Arguments Against Dualism Introduction The debate as to the true nature of human beings, the existence of free will and the validity of science is centered on two philosophical theories; dualism and materialism. Under dualism, the proponents believe that there are two kinds of matter that make up human beings which is the physical presence and the non-physical mind or soul . Materialism on the one hand proposes that man and matter is one and the same thing and there cannot be in existence any other non-physical entity therefore . Materialism is one of the major theories that greatly oppose dualism. Arguments against Dualism Before we proceed to critique dualism, it is imperative we first understand the arguments that dualists put forward in regards to the exact nature of their theory.

Explaining Consciousness Provides Physicalism With Challenges That Place Limits On Scientific Knowledge, And What It Can Uncover About Consciousness Consciousness is one of those topics that are in the position of trying to understand one’s own organism with one’s own organism. The topic of consciousness is so elusive that it mirrors child hood games of trying to catch your own shadow. In the World of philosophy, discerning the truth about consciousness is no childish game. Materialist J.J.C Smart and philosopher Thomas Nagel agree that qualia exist, but are diametrically opposed when it comes to what consciousness is. In this paper I will argue for Nagel’s point of view that consciousness falls outside the nucleus of scientific explanation.

Because of this, existentialists think that reason cannot be absolute. Cause and effect relationship is concerned as determinism and it is approval when the scientist is in the state of being impersonal observation and experiment. As existentialists state, being impersonal cannot deal with personal experience. In addition to this responsibility is one of our basic experiences. “ Existentialism will teach us that we have to admit experience as evidence.”(Roubiczek, 1-17) If we don’t admit we cannot understand what we feel and we don’t feel responsibility for our actions.

According to van Fraassen, “science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a belief only that it is true”. The quote means that a theory must fit in an observable, empirical world and its descriptions about the world must be true. In addition, the theory must also save all phenomena related to theory and not just the observable ones. Van Fraassen also mentions that the acceptance of the theory involves more than belief. It requires certain commitments that reveal a pragmatic aspect to the acceptance of a theory.

On the basis of philosophy and the claims of science to know, only philosophy, in its yearning for certainty, has tried to suggest that there is such a thing as a law of cause and effect. Science rests content in making predictions based on experience without claiming any kind of certainty or privileged reasoning to back these predictions up. Hume might then also defend his own philosophy, saying that he proceeds according to a similar method. So, in the terms of causal relation, we are left with uncertainty unless we rely on these laws that describe cause and effect. And what of these laws then?

If the outcome of an experiment is not that in which was predicted, it is possible that the hypothesis is sound and the error lies in one or more of the auxiliaries. With this consideration, the logically decisive character of the crucial experiment is destroyed because of the uncertainty of exactly where the error lies. The outcome is supposed to support one Rafferty 2 2 hypothesis by completely falsifying its rival;... ... middle of paper ... ...ting that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation because of its background assumptions. The issue of recognizing whether error lies in one of the auxiliaries or within the entire theory is a problem that scientists will continue to face. I have argued that this problem casts doubt on the logic of falsification and the crucial experiment because the outcome of an experiment is not predicted on the basis of a single hypothesis since auxiliary assumptions are involved as well.

Second is because of falsifiability identification, with the demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science, a (supposed) true theory can’t be scientific, because it can’t be falsified. The plausibility of scientific theory in verificationism is “strong” supporting evidence. ... ... middle of paper ... ...ur deficient human understanding that inhibits us from perceiving it so. The methods of holism don’t seem to be wholly at odds with the traditional scientific method. That being said, holism doesn’t strictly adhere to the scientific method notwithstanding the usage of a scientific-sounding language and can produce neither specific predictions about the natural world nor consequential insights.

Since Laudan does not say how to prioritize incompatible aims, axiological consistency is an utopian desideratum. Thus, his constraints on cognitive aims contradict one another. Finally, (v), Laudan's axiological constraints are too weak and in order to strengthen them, he must invoke without justification some implicit pre-philosophical cognitive aims. This opens the logical possibility of axiological relativism, which Laudan attempted from the beginning to avoid. Laudan's Theory of Aims In Science and Values, Laudan has developed the view that our scientific aims can sometimes be rationally selected by imposing two constraints (1) on them: 1. they should be jointly consistent, 2. a pragmatic constraint of empirical realizability, or non-utopianism.

Popperian hypothetico deductivists would find several problems with the view of science Alan Chalmers stated in ‘What is this thing Called Science?’ From “Scientific knowledge is proven knowledge” to “Scientific knowledge is reliable knowledge because it is objectively proven” popper would disagree to everything. With Chalmers falsificationism or hypothetico-deductivism view, his statement indicates that scientific induction is completely justifiable. However as it is now known, induction is not a reasonable way to prove or justify science. One of a few problems that hypothetico-deductivists would find in Chalmers statement is contained in the phrase, “Scientific theories in some rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by the observation and experiment.’’ Theories are never produced strictly, Popper would say, but firstly crafted through the thought and feeling of a scientist in their given field. This then discards the idea that theories are the result of facts and it then forwards the idea that a theory will be manipulated by individual people as they are no more than a personal concept with reason.

In Searle’s first argument against the distinction between the mental and physical, he assumes this mistaken assumption is largely due to one’s common-sense supposition that there indeed is a distinction between the mental and physical at some deep metaphysical level. Searle confronts this assumption with the simple fact that he believes Consciousness it is a systematic biological phenomenon, much like digestion, and as such, concludes, that consciousness is a feature of the brain as such such is part of the physical world. However, I agree with Searle in the sense that the through simple reduction there incidentally will be a metaphysical distinction between mental and physical, however I disagree with the way in which he counters this. Searle claims the assumption is assuming the stance that if something is intrinsically mental, then it cannot be in any sense physical. His response to this is the claim that because “they are intrinsically mental, they are therefore a fortiori they are physical”(P115).He even goes further to say that terms are constrained in design, and as such are assumed to be a complete opposition.