The Inherent Problem of an Outdated Certificate Revocation System

1873 Words4 Pages

When certificates become old, outdated, or compromised the web certificate may be revoked. Revoking certificates provides the Internet companies the ability to tell users that they have changed their security certificates. This research will introduce the inherent problem of an outdated certificate revocation system. This research will follow the mixed methods approach and consult many different types of research documents, tests, and discussions. This research will also document the level of knowledge that IT staff have when understanding certificate revocation. Some of the finding found during the initial research of certificate revocation found that there are better ways to use certificate revocation and that many browser companies haven’t moved forward with browser security. Some of the changes include enabling strict certificate revocation or fail soft, (meaning whether the certificate is valid or the connection for check the certificate times out, they will be both treated the same.) online certificate status protocol (OCSP) stapling, and OSCP must stapling. These finding help promoted the idea that the browser companies were not concerned with certificate revocation, until the heartbleed vulnerability brought on a tsunami of certificate revocations. Providing privacy and security to browser users is important, providing tools by default within browser only makes the Internet safer and user more protected.

Introduction

Certificate revocation in modern browsers has shown in the past couple weeks to be a huge problem. The system of revoking the certificate is not the problem; the problem is with the users browsers and the default settings installed on these modern browsers. A better system of revoking and checkin...

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Pettersen, Y. (2013). The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension. RFC 6961. Retrieved from http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6961.txt

Sullivan, N. (2014, April 17). The Heartbleed Aftermath: all CloudFlare certificates revoked and reissued.CloudFlare Blog RSS. Retrieved April 27, 2014, from http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-heartbleed-aftermath-all-cloudflare-certificates-revoked-and-reissued

Vacca, J. R. (2004). Public key infrastructure: building trusted applications and Web services. Boca Raton, Fla.: Auerbach Publications.

Websense Security Labs Blog. "Digging Into Certificate Revocation Lists." Digging Into Certificate Revocation Lists. N.p., 10 July 2013. Web. 25 Apr. 2014. .

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