The Importance Of Ownership

1996 Words4 Pages

Block holder ownership: As Ben Ali et al. (2009) verbalized, institutional investors, have the expedient to enforce and apply the principles of good corporate governance in order to forefend the shareholders’ rights and wealth. Thus, it will result with more transparent business communication and a wide range of voluntary disclosure. Anterior studies of Eng and Mak (2003) and Zourakis (2009) results obtained that there is a negative association between block holder ownership and the disclosure scores. Huafang and Jianguo (2007) however, argue that managers will disclose more information when there is a higher degree of block holder ownership. The possible reason for the differences on results could be that shareholders are not very well bulwarked in China making them less puissant than the block holders that can have relatively more influence on the provision of voluntary disclosure compared on average firms that already disclose information. Corporate governance: According to Blair (2004) corporate governance refers to ‘the licit rules, institutional arrangements, and practices that determine who controls business corporations and who gets the benefits that flow from them. Corporate governance issues additionally include how major policy decisions are made in business corporations, how sundry stakeholders can influence the process, which is held accountable for the execution, and what standards are applied.’ Ownership is a subcomponent of corporate governance and is additionally cognate to the firm is organized and how the stakeholders can influence the processes of a firm. One of the fundamental variables to lead and control the execution of a business to the greatest advantage of shareholders is a great nature of corporate infl... ... middle of paper ... ...undertakings with a generally diffused (or scattered) capital. Additionally, Khlifi and Bouri (2008), who are intrigued with the Tunisian firms, indicate that instrumentation in possession fixation is connected with a defragmentation in the gauge of voluntary revelation. Lakhal (2003) examined the relationship between voluntary divulgence by chiefs of French firms and the corporate administration attributes. Outcomes indicated that the possession structure is fairly scattered and in the event that where non-official executives have more experience board, the bore of divulgence expands voluntarily. In firms where the CEO holds the position of the executive too, voluntary revelation might be more outlandish. There is a useless and impuissant relationship between non-official board parts and choices about voluntary exposure and, also board size and divulgence choices.

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