The Fragility of Freedom Gadamerian

The Fragility of Freedom Gadamerian

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the nature of freedom in Hang-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. It focuses on the last section of Wahrheit und Methode advancing the hypothesis that Gadamer’s model of understanding is derived from his particular appropriation of the Platonic notion of the beautiful which poses a passive interpretative posture toward the object of understanding and deprives the activity of interpretation the essential creative quality of freedom. I argue that to the extent that the object of understanding presents itself as immediate revelation of truth, the interpreting subject is reduced to a mere acknowledger of truth as opposed to a creative producer.

Opponents of teleological ontology and of philosophy of history have been attracted to hermeneutics as a more congenial perspective for the exploration of such issues as truth and right, knowledge and action, necessity and freedom. The appealing claim of hermeneutics is that universality need not be and should not be absolute as an ultimate end of a process of actualisation. In the view of hermeneutics, a determinate universal converts freedom to necessity however much consciousness may mediate activity. That is, even though activity engenders change, consciousness is more an expression of necessity in relation to the absolute than an expression of freedom. Indeed, in this view, teleological mediation between freedom and necessity is no reconciliation but rather a subsumption of freedom by necessity. To rehabilitate freedom, hermeneutics opts for a non-teleological history with an open, indeterminate future. The departure from teleology finds a new non-essentialist ground for truth and universality, namely, mutual understanding.

In this paper, I examine Gadamer’s notion of mutual understanding, fusion of horizons, to assess the place reserved for freedom. I focus on Gadamer’s appropriation of the Platonic notion of the beautiful as the model of understanding and I argue that such a notion of understanding poses a passive interpretive posture toward the object of understanding, i.e. tradition or contemporary alien culture. In this model of understanding, I shall argue, the latter presents itself as immediate revelation of truth and thereby deprives interpretation of the productive quality which Gadamer would like to attribute it. I begin by providing some theoretical background to Gadamer’s notion of understanding noting its debt to Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. I then proceed to examine Gadamer’s appeal to the Platonic dialectic of the beautiful as a model for understanding which highlights, to my mind and as I noted, the latent passivity of Gadamerian interpretation.