At 9 a.m. on February 1st, 2003, disaster struck the space shuttle program: Columbia had disintegrated upon re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere just 16 minutes before it was supposed to land at Kennedy Space Center (National Geographic News par 2-3). The shuttle had been damaged by little more than foam from the external tank but it was enough to make it susceptible to the high temperatures it faced as it descended through the atmosphere. The idea that a space shuttle can endure damage that is unforeseen or unavoidable is well within reason. However, in retrospect it was found that foam strikes were present on most shuttle missions and NASA had a history of diminishing their recognized danger in favor of increasing the chances of meeting mission …show more content…
Video from the launch was examined by the Intercenter Photo Working Group, as is done for every shuttle mission. It showed a chunk of foam from the left bipod ramp on the external tank detaching and striking somewhere on the left wing of the orbiter at 81.9 seconds after liftoff, but not much more could be seen. The concern of possible damage that could not be detected from the video footage caused them to request an image of the space shuttle while still in orbit and spurred the creation of a Debris Assessment Team to review the extent of the damage further. There were multiple requests to image the damaged left wing from engineers to the program managers, all of which were rejected. Therefore, the Debris Assessment Team could only use computer simulations, though inadequate, to assess the damage to the shuttle. Still, they concluded that “localized heating damage would most likely occur during re-entry,” although this was not enough to convince the program managers that it was a pressing issue (CAIB …show more content…
In fact, damage from foam strikes had been documented on most shuttle missions, although the damage to Columbia during STS-107 was the most severe. The Colombia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) reported that there were an average of 146 divots in the heat shield after each mission, 31 having a diameter greater than one inch, and most of them being caused by foam impacts (rather than ice, birds, or other debris). Despite the shuttle having been designed with a tolerance of “impacts with a kinetic energy less than 0.006 foot-pounds,” the foam strikes came to be seen as a “maintenance issue,” rather than a serious problem because it did not seem to have any significant effect (CAIB
Some of my fellow students think this was good luck because ken had not gone with them since he turned out to be very helpful in the rescue mission. I fell it was bad luck, this was not expected it could have led to a tragic situation. It was just bad luck that this fault was not noticed prior to their launch and they were still experiencing bad luck even in the midst of bad luck. Fuel tanks leaking, increasing level of co2, freezing temperature etc. Even at the point of trying to make what reduced the co2 the bag they used got torn. One important factor is that in the midst of all this happening Jim calmed his crew; he was able to manage the change in situation and also deal with the conflicts that arose between jack and
[5] Roger M. Boisjoly, “Telecon Meeting (Ethical Decisions – Morton Thiokol and the Challenger Disaster)” [online], Washington, DC.: National Academy of Engineering, May 15, 2006 [cited March 16, 2010], available from World Wide Web:
The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.
Space exploration has changed and developed since the first man was sent into space. Advanced rockets, new computer technology, and remote controlled robots are only a few of the things that made space travel possible. Even though this technology was efficient, it was not cheap. When a rocket was sent into space, only the capsule holding the astronauts returned to space. This expensive way of space travel was forever changed with the creation of the space shuttle. The Columbia space shuttle was important to space exploration because it used new technology that changed space travel, completed missions that other spacecraft could not, and brought new people into space.
The Challenger space shuttle disaster is a tragedy that defined America in the 1980s. At the time, space exploration was growing at a rapid rate, and NASA had successfully completed a numerous amount of missions. The crew consisted of the typical seven members, however this exploration was especially exciting. NASA would be sending its first teacher, Christa McAuliffe, to space. She would be completing two lessons while aboard the Challenger. The popularity of this specific mission caused Americans of all ages to be glued to their televisions the morning of January 28th, 1986. Children were watching the launch from their classrooms at school, and adults were watching from at work or at home that fateful morning.
Rodney Rocha is a NASA engineer and co-chair of Debris Assessment Team (DTS). When possibility of wing damage appeared he requested an additional imagery to obtain more information in order to evaluate the damage. This demonstrates that he actually tried to resolve the issue. However, due to absence of clear organizational responsibilities in NASA those images were never received. Since foam issue was there for years and risk for the flights was estimated as low management decided not to proceed with this request. After learning of management decision Rocha wrote an e-mail there he stated that foam damage could carry grave hazard and have to be addressed. At the same time this e-mail was not send to the management team. Organizational culture at NASA could be described as highly bureaucratic with operations under standard procedures only. Low-end employees like Rocha are afraid to bring any safety-related issues to the management due to delay of the mission. They can be punished for bringing “bad news”. This type of relationship makes it impossible for two-way communication between engineers and managers, which are crucial for decision-making in complex env...
R. M. Boisjoly had over a quarter-century’s experience in the aerospace industry in 1985 when he became involved in an improvement effort on the O-ring which connect segments of Morton Thiokol’s Solid Rocket Booster. This was used to bring the Space Shuttle into orbit (OEC, 2006). Morton Thiokol is an aerospace company that manufactures the solid propellant rocket motors used to launch the Challenger (Skubik). Boisjoly authored a memo to R.L. Lund, Vice President of Engineering and four others, in regards to his concerns about the flawed O-ring erosion problem. His warnings were ignored leading to the deaths of six astronauts and one social studies teacher.
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster was one of the biggest space flight accidents and the result of a series of engineering failures. The Shuttle disintegrated after launch on its last mission, resulting in the death of its seven crew members. [1] The disaster happened on the Challenger program’s last launch on 28 January, 1986 at launch site Kennedy LC-39B. Later analysis showed that an O-ring, a seal on the right rocket boosted failed which was the cause of the accident. This incident is studied by engineers and organisations to see how effective communications can prevent engineering failures from causing catastrophic damages and how organisational ethics can be improved.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), was tasked with investigating the causes of the Columbia disasters. The physical cause of the disaster, the board concluded, was that foam insulation broke away from Columbia's external fuel tank and struck the shuttle's left wing at liftoff on Jan. 16, 2003. The resulting breach was enough to tear the craft apart in the searing heat of re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere as the astronauts headed home from a two-week science mission. [x]
This tragic accident was preventable by not only the flight crew, but maintenance and air traffic control personnel as well. On December 29, 1972, ninety-nine of the one hundred and seventy-six people onboard lost their lives needlessly. As is the case with most accidents, this one was certainly preventable. This accident is unique because of the different people that could have prevented it from happening. The NTSB determined that “the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew.” This is true; the flight crew did fail, however, others share the responsibility for this accident. Equally responsible where maintenance personnel, an Air Traffic Controllers, the system, and a twenty cent light bulb. What continues is a discussion on, what happened, why it happened, what to do about it and what was done about it.
...cause of a known and accepted problem (the foam that broke off had caused minor damage before), while the Challenger was the result of a failed part of the shuttle, much like the Apollo 13. The Apollo 13 was an internal failure that occurred during the flight so it was not as catastrophic as the external breaking of the Challenger, thankfully. I think we should still invest in space programs because of the danger we have already put on our Earth and the fact that eventually the space program might lead to successfully moving to another other celestial bodies like Mars should cease with humans until we have explored every facet of the Earth. Nothing in space (that we can travel to) is quite as interesting as the deep ocean crevices we have not explored, because there is actually life down there that might help in explaining how life can survive extreme conditions.
Five space shuttles were made till now. These space shuttles include the first space shuttle ever made, Enterprise. Space shuttle Enterprise was built for NASA as a part of the Space Shuttle Space Program to perform multiple test flights and but not capable spaceflights. For the reason that it was built without engines or a functional head shield. The shuttle had been intended to be refitted for orbital flight to become the second space-rated orbiter in service. However, during the construction of Columbia, details of the final design changed. Another space shuttle is Columbia, which accomplished being the first shuttle to reach space, in 1981. Columbia carried dozens of astronauts into space during the next two decades, they then reached several milestones. However, a tragedy, or something that no one would imagine happened, the shuttle and a seven-member crew were lost over Texas when Columbia burned up during re-entry on Feb. 1, 2003. Columbia 's loss made NASA make extra safety checks in orbit for all future
After the accident, a full-scale investigation was launched by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). It concluded that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by crevice corrosion, the corrosion is exacerbated by the salt water and the age of the aircraft was already 19 years old as the plane operated in a salt water environment.
The basic means of movement for the space shuttle can be explained in Isaac Newton's laws F=Ma and for every action, there is an equal and oposite reaction. The force, on the space shuttle, is equal to the mass of the shuttle multiplied by its acceleration. By burning fuel in a rocket engine on the back of the shuttle, a force on the shuttle equal to the mass of fuel being "thrown" out the stern of the craft multiplied by its acceleration. This basic physics formula is very important to the shuttle getting up into space and to the beginning of its deceleration on its return to earth. Thus it has a very real impact on weather the shuttle will survive the trip through the earth's atmosphere back to land. When the shuttle first enters the earth's atmosphere it is traveling at speeds topping 30,000 km/h. The shuttle has to decelerate to 0 km/h after it lands. The acceleration that it must endure to slow the shuttle is an incredibly large force on the structure of the craft.
In January of 1986 the NASA space shuttle Challenger exploded during takeoff resulting in the tragic deaths of seven crew members. Almost twenty years later, the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated on re-entry to Earth. In both disasters, an investigation reveals that for both accidents, Organizational culture was a culprit in the tragic accidents.