The Evolution Of Presidential Power, By Louis Fisher's Presidential War Powers

“Presidential War Powers”, by Louis Fisher, presents a clear and thorough picture of the evolution of presidential power to commit the United States’ armed forces to international combat. Fisher argues that the original constitutional notion of shared powers has evolved into executive ‘usurpation’ and dominance. It becomes quite evident that Fisher despises this change and argues for a restoration for the original concepts. Although Fisher offers extensive ‘evidence’ to support his view, he offers a strictly legal interpretation of how presidents should act while overlooking the importance of political tides. In addition to lamenting on expansive executive powers, Fisher consistently offers one solution and that is playing by constitutional

Military interventions abroad to protect the interests, property, and livelihoods of Americans became a common practice among presidents. They justified increased interventions as part of their job. Fisher sees the “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine as playing an instrumental role in expanding executive power. Roosevelt argued that the United States could utilize the military to intervene in other countries not just to protect Americans, but also promote the country’s foreign policy goals. Fisher believes that this is problematic leading to unnecessary interventions. This argument is interesting in today’s context of international conflict and the amount of U.S. military interventions abroad. It seems that presidents nowadays are conflating the country’s best interests with their own greed and thirst for power. A lot of the conflicts the U.S. is engaged in today are unnecessary and demonstrate the expansion of executive powers that Fisher laments. He argues that increasingly secretive aspects of executive agreements “have brought us to danger and disaster. It threatens the liberties of our people” (pg.

Although he provides extensive historical details and case studies to inform his argument, he does not provide us with a theoretical framework through which to analyze and interpret this issue. His book thus is abundant in constitutional and legal history of executive expansion of power, however he does little to explain or provide solutions. He also dismisses other variables such political tides and context that play into executive decision-making. This is evident on pages 190-91, where he cites Justice Jackson’s remarks concerning presidential power. The justice argues that power dynamics are situational and Congress’ quiescence invokes presidential exercise of unilateral power. He states, “[…] any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theory or law.” In response to Justice Jackson’s statement, Fisher argues from a legal perspective that executive action cannot replace congressional approval. Again, despite the accuracy behind this legal interpretation, Fisher dismisses the importance of context and politics in shaping executive